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Introduction
“That until the philosophy which holds one race superior and another inferior is finally
and permanently discredited and abandoned…And until the ignoble and unhappy regimes
that hold our brothers in Angola, in Mozambique and in South Africa in subhuman
bondage have been toppled and destroyed…Until that day, the African continent will not
know peace. We Africans will fight, if necessary, and we know that we shall win, as we
are confident in the victory of good over evil.”
-Haile Selassie1
“I think we’ve mishandled Mobutu and the whole area. I have not given too much
attention to it, so it’s partly my fault. Mobutu looks at the Congo in 1960 and that [then]
what we’re doing in Angola now where the Communist influence is greater than it was in
the Congo in 1960 and he must conclude that we have written off the area. If we’re
letting Angola go, then in essence we’re letting him go. At least I think if he’s rational,
that’s what he’s thinking.”
-Henry Kissinger2
“I know America. I know the heart of America is good.”
-Richard Nixon3
Angola, a Portuguese speaking country in southern Africa, was one of the principal
battlegrounds of the Cold War. Although Angola did possess incredible amounts of oil,
diamonds, and fertile land, it was not highly contested due to its vast mineral riches. Rather, in
their pursuit of African adherents to their competing ideologies, the superpowers sought to
champion Angolan independence as a powerful symbol of their support for African
independence, and racial justice. Furthermore, after the failed communist insurgency in

1

Haile Selassie, “Address to the United Nations, October 6, 1963,” in Selected Speeches of His
Imperial Majesty, 1918 to 1967 (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: The Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of
Information, Foreign Language Department, 1967), 374.
2
“Memorandum of Conversation - Document 111,” June 20, 1975, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969-1976, Southern Africa, Volume XXVI.
3
“Richard Nixon: Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1969, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941.
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neighboring Zaire (Congo) in the mid-1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union (and
its allies) viewed Angola as the critical battlefield of the Cold War in Africa.
However, it was Angolans themselves, not agent provocateurs from the East and West,
which brought the Cold War to central Africa. Angola’s nationalists, divided by ethnic, class,
and social differences, adopted competing ideologies in their pursuit of independence from
Portugal and one another. This internal rivalry within the Angolan revolution led Angolans to
seek external support from the superpowers. The 1975-1976 civil war, for which Angola is now
infamous, was the culmination of a twenty-year struggle between the United States and the
Soviet Union in southern Africa.4
Both the Soviet Union and the United States aligned with competing Angolan nationalists
for ideological reasons, rather than security concerns. For the superpowers, Angola was an arena
“to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies,” both of which claimed, “to expand the
domains of freedom” and “social justice.”5 Once committed to the conflict, neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union was willing to see their chosen rebels lose.
This is the story of America’s war in Angola. How the United States, through its
ascendancy to superpower status in World War II, came to facilitate the last colonial struggle in
Africa. Successive presidents, displeased with America’s role in Africa, worked with Holden
Roberto of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) to win Angola’s freedom.
America’s relationship with Roberto began in the 1950s, when the American consulate in the
4

Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The
University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third
World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Gleijeses
and Westad brought Angola to the forefront of the Cold War in Africa with their award-winning
books in the 2000s. Both focus on the American involvement in the Angolan Civil War as a
direct response to Portuguese decolonization, rather than as a continuation of American policy in
the region.
5
Westad, The Global Cold War, 4.
2

Belgian Congo hired Roberto with funds from the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) as an
informant. The Leopoldville consulate chose Roberto, an Angolan, not only for his knowledge of
events in the Belgian Congo, but because he was an African revolutionary that actively sought
out American support. The consulate wanted to “destroy the myth that the Soviet is the champion
of democracy and freedom.”6 Holden Roberto became America’s Angolan, and from 1955-1975,
he represented America’s plan for post-colonial Angola, and for the southern Africa region.
For the United States, Angola represented how race relations at home and America’s
alliance with Europe complicated U.S. Africa policies.7 Portugal, Angola’s colonial master, was
both a fascist country and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even
while America sought to be the symbol of emancipation in Angola, American support for NATO
empowered the ultra-right wing, white supremacist government of Portugal.8 Thus, despite
American support for Angolan nationalists and strong words against Portuguese colonialism,
Angola reinforced the image of the United States as a racist nation that supported white
supremacy in Africa and the American South. Indeed, “a group of U.S. ambassadors in Africa
warned their superiors in Washington in 1961 that ‘the most highly-charged issues in sub6

“Memorandum by the Consul General at Leopoldville (McGregor) - Document 9,” December
28, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v18/d9.; In Portuguese: Frente Nacional
de Libertação de Angola (FNLA). In French: Front di Libération Nationale de l’Angola (FNLA).
This paper uses the name in use at the period of mentioning for the present day Democratic
Republic of the Congo. All Congolese place names follow this rule, such as the Belgian Congo,
Republic of Congo, and Zaire; when mentioning cities, such as Leopoldville or Kinshasa, other
names may appear in parenthesis to avoid confusion.
7
Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the
Global Arena (Harvard University Press, 2003), 11. Thomas Borstelmann notes the enduring
nature of America’s racial foreign policy, which dates back to when “Slavery and westward
expansion wove together issues of race relations and foreign relations from the very beginning of
American history.”
8
“New State’ Portugal is often regarded as a fascist government. However, contemporary
admirers of the regime labeled it a ‘corporatist state.’ A good example of this viewpoint is
Michael Derrick, The Portugal of Salazar, First Edition (Campion Books, Ltd., 1939).
3

Saharan Africa today are the war in Angola and racial discrimination in the U.S.”9 Angola was
the international symbol of American race relations; from 1961-1976, the United States struggled
to save the soul of America in Angola.10
The durability of Washington’s interest in the region was a function of the centrality of
the Congo (Zaire) to America’s Cold War strategy and to Roberto’s revolution. After Belgium
departed suddenly during the summer of 1960, the United States poured resources into the
Congo to prevent communist infiltration into the region. The fulcrum of this policy was the close
personal relationship forged between members of the CIA and the Leopoldville (Kinshasa)
embassy staff and a powerful group of Congolese elites known as the Binza group, led by Joseph
Mobutu.11 Mobutu and the Binza group were close associates of Holden Roberto, whose ethnic
group, the Bakongo, straddled both sides of the Angola-Congo (Zaire) border. Roberto founded
the FNLA as an organization of Bakongo refugees and exiles in the Congo, and according to
Angola expert John Marcum, it was “patterned on Congolese (Belgian) models, was caught up in
the fortunes and intrigues of Congolese politics, and had less firsthand experiential knowledge of
conditions prevailing in Angola.”12 Roberto became a client of Mobutu as well as Washington;
this meant that Roberto’s fortunes were hitched to Mobutu’s. As long as America remained
committed to Mobutu, Roberto would not fade far from Washington’s view.
9

Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 145.
Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold
War, 1st edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 3. This is a play on George H. W. Bush’s
description of the Cold War as “a struggle for the very soul of mankind.”
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For more on American involvement in the Congo, see: Larry Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo:
Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone, First Edition (PublicAffairs, 2007); Madeleine Kalb,
Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--From Eisenhower to Kennedy, 1St Edition edition (New
York: Macmillan Pub Co, 1982); Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the
Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (Harper Perennial, 2002).
12
John A. Marcum, Angolan Revolution - Vol. 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 19621976 (The MIT Press, 1978), 52. John Marcum’s two volume Angolan Revolution remains the
best source for information regarding Angola’s political movements and their guerrilla wars.
10

4

The FNLA was not alone in its quest to liberate Angola from the yoke of Portuguese
imperialism. While Roberto politicked among his countrymen in the Congo, Agostinho Neto, the
future first President of Angola and leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA), had joined the communist party as a medical student in Portugal.13 Shortly thereafter,
other future MPLA leaders, such as Mario de Andrade and Lucio Lara, visited the Soviet Union
and affiliated with international communist organizations.14 Throughout the anti-colonial
struggle, the two rebel groups competed against each other for the support of the Angolan
people, a competition that frequently turned into armed conflict. According to Marcum, the
FNLA traditionally held a military edge over the MPLA, “in administrative-organizational terms,
the MPLA was the more impressive with its educated cadres and developing structure and
political programs.”15 The MPLA’s main support came from the ethnic Mbundu people of
Luanda and its surrounding provinces, as well as the creole population of the capital. In 1975,
The MPLA leveraged its support in Luanda, along with the help of Soviet arms and a Cuban
military mission to take over the country.
A third group, led by Jonas Savimbi, formed as an offshoot from Roberto’s National
Front, known as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).16 Savimbi
focused his movement on his own Ovimbundu people, who traditionally lived in Angola’s
central highlands. He competed with Daniel Chipenda, a fellow Ovimbundu, and member of the
MPLA, for ethnic dominance. Like Roberto, Savimbi’s forces regularly fought with MPLA

13

Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa, 1st Ed.(U.S.) (Paragon House, 1987), 38;
António Agostinho Neto, Sacred Hope (Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania: Tanzania Publishing House,
1974), xxv–xxvi.; In Portuguese: Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).
14
Vladimir Gennadyevich Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (Pluto
Press, 2008), 7–8.
15
Marcum, Angolan Revolution - Vol. 2, 61.
16
União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)
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rebels; in turn, the MPLA accused Savimbi of collaborating with the Portuguese.17 Savimbi grew
in importance as the war dragged on, and along with Chipenda, became a crucial factor in South
Africa’s decision to invade Angola in 1975.
Superimposed over these competing Angolan factions was a desperate Portuguese regime
with powerful allies. Portugal, a poor and under educated nation, had managed to cling to an
empire that in 1960 still spanned four continents. Controlled by an oligarchy of business and
military interests, the government of Prime Minister Antonio Salazar maintained control only
through liberal use of the Secret Police, the International Police for Defense of the State
(PIDE).18 Salazar called his reign the “Estado Novo,” or New State; he intended to indicate a
clean break from the debt and debacle of liberal democratic rule in the early twentieth century.
An odd partner for the United States, Salazar commanded Washington’s good graces primarily
because of the Azores islands, a strategically located strand of volcanoes in the mid-Atlantic, and
home to an American airbase. The Azores base alone led the United States to tolerate Salazar’s
Portugal, whose politics and colonial policies were outside acceptable practices for most
Americans.
A central tenet of New State thinking was the idea of Lusotropicalism, which held that
“because of the historically unique absence of racism among the Portuguese people, their
colonization of tropical, non-European territories was characterized by racially egalitarian
legislation and human interaction.”19 Lusotropicalism led Portugal to believe it could hold on to
Angola forever, since the Africans dominated there would eventually become Portuguese. The

17

William Minter, Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier (Africa World Press,
1988), 11–13.
18
John P. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974 (Praeger,
1997), 19–20. In Portuguese: Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado.
19
Gerald J. Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese (University of California Press, 1978), 3.
6

hope was that in Angola, Portugal would create an African Brazil. Americans and Portuguese
alike bought into the theory of Lusotropicalism, and it was this construct that the United States
used to back Portugal internationally.
By 1961, however, it was apparent that Portugal had no future in Angola, other than
perhaps as the leader of a sort of commonwealth. After France failed in Vietnam and Algeria,
and the British in Kenya, the expectations of independence in the third world accelerated. It
became clear to President Kennedy that the third world was where the superpowers would
confront one another, and that the United States needed a plan to meet the challenge. When
Angolan nationalists rose in open rebellion, (led by Roberto, Neto, and Savimbi) it became clear
that Angola was the next flashpoint. This is the story of how Americans came to realize this fact,
ignored it, and then managed that predictable crisis.
At the same time, the republican administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford tried
to unburden themselves from Angola’s independence struggle. These administrations chose to
align the United States with Portugal and its fellow reactionary states, apartheid South Africa and
Ian Smith’s Rhodesia.20 This shift corresponded with their views of domestic racial-relations,
and rapprochement with the white supremacist powers left the United States unprepared for the
crisis that unfolded in 1974-1976 after Portugal granted independence to its empire. After a coup
in Lisbon in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initially ignored Angola and instead
focused on Portugal.

20

Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 241. Borstelmann termed this an extension of
“Nixon’s Southern strategy…incorporating whites in southern Africa as well as the American
South.”
7

Only after Kissinger understood the complex regional nature of the conflict and saw it as
a direct challenge to American credibility, did Washington act.21 After intense lobbying from
African allies, Kissinger and Ford slowly formulated the idea of a covert operation to aid Holden
Roberto’s FNLA. The plan, codenamed IAFEATURE, was a product of Henry Kissinger’s anticommunism, not the desire to be on the champion of racial justice and self-determination in
Angola. As such, the secret mission to aid Roberto involved the worst aspects of white
interference in Africa: mercenaries, ethnic strife, and a military alliance with the apartheid
regime in Pretoria. IAFEATURE’s failure was a direct response to the implementation of these
questionable means. Nevertheless, despite years of neglect for Roberto and Africa under Nixon
and Ford, the strong preexisting bond between the United States and the principal black actors in
southern Africa nearly led to the success of the secret war. Only after losing in Angola did
Kissinger understand the centrality of the white-black struggle in southern Africa to the affairs of
the whole continent.
The story begins with Franklin Roosevelt’s quest to control the Azores islands, and ends
with the defeat of Roberto’s forces at the hands of a combined MPLA-Cuban-Soviet army.
Chapter 1 focuses on Africa’s role in America’s rise to superpower status during WWII and its
aftermath. During this period, Holden Roberto joined the CIA payroll, decolonization began in
earnest throughout Africa, and the white regimes of southern Africa began to show their
determination to remain in control. Chapter 1 also contains the detailed history of the FNLA’s
early development. Chapter 2 launches Roberto’s war against Portugal, and how Presidents John
21

Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy,
1st Edition (Oxford University Press, USA, 2004), 426, 400. Jussi Hanhimaki blamed Kissinger
for making Angola “unnecessarily into a test case” of American credibility. He uses Angola as
an “example of how Kissinger’s overall foreign policy outlook, when applied to complex
regional crises, not only contributed to the havoc in those regions but…contributed to the demise
of his entire foreign policy architecture.”
8

Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson sought ways to help Roberto against Portugal. However, Roberto
suffered a series of setbacks, the most important of which was Jonas Savimbi’s exit from the
FNLA and the creation of UNITA. Important to all of these developments was the increasingly
racial nature of the conflict, and the Congo Crisis. Chapter 3 concerns Nixon and Kissinger’s
change of policies in southern Africa, the MPLA’s growth in the early 1970s, and the events that
led to Angolan independence on November 11, 1975 and the end of America’s war in Angola.

9

Chapter 1: The Azores, America, and Angola

The American alliance with Portugal, born out of the Second World War, was the crux of
America’s involvement in Southern Africa during the 20th century. This odd pairing of an
autocratic European regime and the American republic forced both nations to compromise their
political beliefs. However, Portugal possessed islands of rare strategic value, which Washington
grew to covet. The Azores, a small island chain located in the mid-Atlantic, provided an ideal
position from which to defend the sea-lanes to and from the Americas, as well as serving as a
refueling hub for air traffic to and from North America and Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
American generals and admirals had coveted the islands as early as the Spanish-American War.22
These strategic islands would eventually become the center of Portuguese-American relations.
It was not until the second war with Germany that securing an American base in the
Azores became a reality. Desperate to defeat Adolf Hitler, the United States and the Allies turned
to African powers for crucial war aid: the Union of South Africa fought in nearly every theater of
the war, the Manhattan Project used uranium from the Belgian Congo, and the allies had hoped
that the Portuguese Azores would become a key transit hub.23 Portugal, a neutral power, sat out
the fighting in World War II and made a fortune selling war materiel to both the Axis and the
Allied powers. Portuguese neutrality encourage Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill to contemplate taking the islands by force, but instead entered an unlikely alliance with
Antonio Salazar’s fascist government to obtain access rights to the islands.

22

A.H. De Oliveira Marques, History of Portugal: From Empire to Corporate State (Vol. II), 1st
ed. (Columbia University Press, 1972), 74.
23
Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in
the Early Cold War (Oxford University Press, 1993).
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The price for what Dean Acheson called “perhaps the single most important (set of bases)
we have anywhere” was an American promise to secretly support and allow Portuguese
imperialism.24 After the war, Salazar leveraged the Azores to obtain American aid, including
NATO membership, economic development, and military modernization, all of which propped
up Portugal’s colonial adventures. Quite simply, the only reason for the inclusion of Portugal in
NATO and the close Portuguese-American relationship after World War II was the Lajes air base
in the Azores islands. Without this American support, neither Antonio Salazar’s ‘Estado Novo’
nor the Portuguese empire could have survived until the 1970s.
The empire, or ‘Ultramar’ in Portuguese, was the centerpiece of Salazar’s regime. The
Estado Novo tapped into the deep resentment within Portuguese society as it struggled to
reconcile a history of imperial greatness with abject poverty, high illiteracy, and general decline
throughout the twentieth century. Salazar’s regime, like the fascist governments of Italy and
Germany, promised Portugal renewed imperial greatness. This mission allegedly warranted great
abuses of his power, the least of which was the absolute authority of the PIDE. The esteemed
Portuguese historian A. H. de Oliveira Marques called the PIDE’s record “good enough to make
us think of the Inquisition in its golden age,” and only slightly less violent and organized “than
the German Gestapo or the Soviet Secret Police.”25 Angola was an essential theme of Salazar’s
regime; it justified the abuses of his power by connecting the dreary present to the hope of
returning to the glory days of the 1500’s. A deeper study of Portuguese colonialism is useful to
understand how the American Azores base propped up the Estado Novo regime in Lisbon and
dictated America’s relations with Angola.
24

Witney Wright Schneidman, Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s
Colonial Empire (University Press of America, 2004), 5.; William Minter, Portuguese Africa
and the West (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 88.
25
Marques, History of Portugal, 188.
11

THE ULTRAMAR
Portugal colonized Angola and the Azores islands during the Age of Discovery. Safe
from Spain due to Britain’s guarantee of protection provided by the 1386 Treaty of Windsor, the
fifteenth century was a period of rapid Portuguese expansion. The Portuguese originally
discovered the Azores and Angola during expeditions organized by Prince Henry Infante. ‘Henry
the Navigator’ brought naval experts from the Mediterranean and Northern Europe to Lisbon and
encouraged Portuguese expansion overseas. One of Henry’s chartered voyages discovered the
Azores in 1427 but “effective colonization” began “only after 1445.”26 Portugal began settling
Africa during the same period, first with a fort at Cape Verde, which became “the first European
settlement on the west coast of Africa,” and “quickly became an important trading post,
supplying gold and slaves to the homeland.”27 The Portuguese established relations with the
Kingdom of the Kongo in 1485, who according to John Marcum had an empire “that covered
what is (sic) present-day northern Angola and the Bakongo regions of the Congo republics of
Kinshasa (Leopoldville) and Brazzaville.”28 However, Portuguese exploration was not limited to
the African coast. In the New World, Spain and Portugal created a “line of demarcation from the
north to the south pole, a hundred leagues west of the Azores” in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas
that ultimately granted Portugal Brazil. 29 While Columbus was in the Caribbean to make good
on the Spanish’s treaty claims, Vasco de Gama “completed the long-hoped-for journey” around
the world heading east under Africa in 1497-1499, paving the way for settling the future

26

Joseph F. O’Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain (Cornell University Press, 1983), 557.
Ibid., 567.
28
John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962) (M.I.T.
Press, 1969), 1; Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa: Sixth Edition, Revised
(Penguin (Non-Classics), 1990), 125.
29
James H Guill, A History of the Azores Islands (Tulare, Calif.: Golden Shield Publications,
Golden Shield International, 1900), 63; O’Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain, 674.
27
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Portuguese possessions of Mozambique, Macao, Timor and Goa.30 By 1500, the Portuguese had
built an empire spanning Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa. These voyages and
settlements not only built the ‘Ultramar,’ but they also ushered in 500 years of European
involvement in Africa. This was the golden era of Portuguese history, a time that Portugal would
never again match in prestige, splendor, or power.
The Portuguese imperial project focused on building and maintaining commercial
connections throughout the globe. These outposts required only a minimal permanent presence to
allow for infrequent visits by traders from Lisbon. The majority of Portugal’s imperial holdings
fit this description, including Goa in India, Macau in China and Guinea-Bissau in Africa. The
Portuguese undertook larger colonial projects in the Azores and Brazil. The Azores islands were
uninhabited at discovery, and Portugal quickly dispatched settlers to colonize them.31 Other
Portuguese settlers went to Brazil and built large plantations to grow cash crops to sell in the Old
World. These plantations required slave labor, which Portugal hoped to procure in Luanda, the
capital of Angola. Settlement in Luanda centered on its natural harbor, which became a principal
base for the procurement of slaves for the plantations in Brazil. Angola was indispensable to the
Brazilian economy and more than 2.7 million slaves left the ports of Angola for the New World
in the 18th century alone. Angola provided more slaves to the Western Hemisphere than any
other region of Africa, making it, in the words of Marcus Rediker, “the most important region of
the slave trade.”32 Each part of the empire provided an integral part of the Portuguese economy.
However, the sum of the empire’s parts barely provided the funds necessary to maintain global
commitments.

30

O’Callaghan, A History of Medieval Spain, 674.
Ibid., 557.
32
Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human History, Reprint (Penguin Books, 2008), 97.
31
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Portuguese power and prestige receded almost immediately from the high water
mark of the 15th century. In 1581, Spain exploited a succession crisis in Lisbon to annex Portugal
and its empire. Other European powers also took advantage of the nation’s misfortune. The
French, Dutch, Danes, and English expanded their presence in Africa, Asia, and the New World
at Portugal’s expense. The 60 years of Spanish rule wiped out Portugal’s dominant position in
the world. Lisbon lost the commercial successes it had previously enjoyed, and the maintaining
the empire became a burden on the debt, rather than an economic engine. The Doms in Lisbon
began overseeing large trade imbalances and the accrual of debts abroad. In this period, Portugal
grew increasingly dependent of the British navy to defend the empire, and by the 19th century,
Britain insisted on concessions in return. In 1808, London forced Portugal to open Brazilian
trade to the world economy, and in 1810, the two nations signed a treaty that according to
Marques “ruined the foundations of the Portuguese economy.”33 The situation worsened when
Portugal lost Brazil in 1825.
After losing Brazil, Portugal turned seriously toward Africa for imperial conquest.
Although the Portuguese had maintained a trading presence on the West Africa coast since the
fifteenth century, Africa was a secondary imperial project whose sole importance was to provide
slaves to Brazil. Without Brazil, Angola lost its role in the slave trade. Nearly a hundred years
before the Estado Novo, Lisbon embarked on a mission to formally colonize Angola to create a
Brazil-style settler society in hope of restoring the greatness of the state. Losing the wealth of
Brazil had gutted the Portuguese economy, and the government in Lisbon hoped that Africa
could replace the lost profits.34 The campaigns to subjugate Angola in the 19th century and early

33
34

Marques, History of Portugal, 1.
Ibid.
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20th centuries, however, further bankrupted Portugal, setting the stage for Salazar’s eventual rise
to power.
By the 20th century, Portugal was not a ‘great power’ by any sense of the term. Lisbon
lacked the resources and work force traditionally required for conquest, and had to look to
outside sources for influence in world affairs. Indeed, the Treaty of Windsor remained the
foundation of Portuguese foreign policy until the Second World War, when the United States
formed an unlikely alliance with Portugal to obtain the rights to an airbase in the strategically
located Azores islands.

WORLD WAR II
World War II highlighted the strategic importance of the Azores to Washington, and the
island chain was the impetus for American involvement with the Portuguese Overseas Empire.
FDR redefined the goals of the military immediately after Germany invaded Poland. Although
Roosevelt maintained a policy of American neutrality in the European war, FDR began to prepare for
an eventual American involvement. For the first time “the United States committed itself to defend

the entire land area of the Western Hemisphere against military attack from the Old World.”35
This bold mission was “a new departure in the military policy of the United States, although it
was a natural outgrowth of American policy and practice under the Monroe Doctrine.”36 This
static defense of the western hemisphere included joint naval patrols of the Atlantic with the
British, and the Azores served as the dividing line between the American and British zones of
responsibility. The lend-lease act signed in 1940 between the United States and Great Britain
was essential in providing the bases the American Navy needed for such an ambitious strategy.
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America received “sovereign rights for 99 years over sites for naval, military and air bases in the
Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana, in exchange for” 50 World
War I era destroyers. Bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda came to the United States free of
charge.37 This strategy of ‘Hemisphere Defense’ slowly became a hot war in the Atlantic
between U.S. patrols and the German U-boats. The Joint Chiefs viewed ‘Hemisphere Defense’ as
the maximum extension of the American military.
As early as the summer of 1940, Hitler had begun planning an Azores campaign to
disrupt Anglo-American control of the Atlantic. Samuel Morison claims that the Germans had
hoped to use the Azores as “a jumping-off point for the Luftwaffe against the United States.”38 A
more likely use would have been as a forward base for German submarine warfare. With the
German occupation of France and Hitler’s access to French ports in the Atlantic, such an attack
became a real possibility. In early 1941, all the telltale signs of a German invasion of Spain and
Portugal began appearing in German propaganda radio programs, including frequent German
radio broadcasts that attacked the Portuguese government and accused Washington of coveting
the Azores themselves.39 Roosevelt believed that such an attack was imminent. On May 22, FDR
“directed the Army and Navy to be ready within thirty days to forestall a German attack on the
Azores by getting there first.”40
The military was wholly unprepared for the mission. The Joint Chiefs estimated the
operation would require 25,000 men, would use up all available ammunition and would tied up
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most of the Pacific and Atlantic transport fleets. Not only would the operation, titled Task Force
Gray, tax the army, navy, and air force to the max, it would probably launch the United States
into the war.41 But FDR was determined. Military planners struggled to mobilize the men and
materiel needed for the mission, and Roosevelt extended the deadline into June.
Events in Europe derailed the plan before it could be executed. On May 27, the British
sunk the Bismarck and effectively neutered the German navy.42 More importantly, on June 22,
Roosevelt’s deadline to take the Azores, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. With the German
Wehrmacht busy in the east, it became clear that the Azores were safe from German aggression.
The troops earmarked for the Azores rerouted to Iceland, and the US remained out of the war
until that December.
After Pearl Harbor, and America’s entry into the European conflict, the Joint Chiefs
slowly came to covet the Azores. American supplies went to Britain in ever-greater amounts, and
in turn, the Germans used submarines based in western France to challenge allied shipping. In
response to German submarine warfare, the Allies organized all trans-Atlantic commerce into
convoys. American ships protected convoys to the mid-Atlantic, where the British took over. In
addition, air bases in Newfoundland, Iceland and Great Britain provided limited air cover while a
system of mid-sea refueling allowed escort ships to protect convoys the whole way across the
ocean. The system had a large flaw. According to Winston Churchill, the Germans were able to
inflict heavy losses on shipping in the “large mid-ocean area north of the Azores” situated
beyond the range of Allied air power. This ‘Azores gap’ was the scene of some of the worst
allied losses in the Atlantic war. The Allies needed an airfield in range of the gap. Churchill,
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however, wanted not only to defend shipping lanes, but also to “attack U-boats not only going to
and from the Biscay bases, but also while they were resting, refueling, recharging their batteries
in mid-ocean.”43 Churchill came to see securing rights to an airbase in the Azores as a strategic
imperative.
Churchill was unwilling to allow the Americans to invade, as they had planned to in
1941. The British, Portugal’s historic ally, insisted on receiving Portugal’s approval for the
Azores base, which delayed its construction. The negotiations dragged on through 1942 well into
1943, at which point the Allies had already decided the Battle of the Atlantic.44 The delay was
costly. Churchill wrote in his memoirs that “it was estimated by the experts that a million tons of
shipping and many thousands of lives might be saved” if the allies had built bases in the midAtlantic islands at the onset of America’s entry into the war.45 It became clear to Churchill and
FDR that the mid-Atlantic location of the Azores made them strategically important, no matter
the circumstances. They pushed forward with negotiations for base rights.
The 1373 Treaty of Windsor served as the basis of London’s negotiations. Churchill, in
an address to parliament, described the treaty as committing Britain and Portugal to “be friends
to friends and enemies to enemies, and (that they) shall assist, maintain, and uphold each other
mutually, by sea and by land, against all men that may live or die.”46 Despite invoking the
ancient foundation of Anglo-Portuguese relations, Portugal only agreed to give the British
temporary rights to a base on Terceira Island in exchange for British military and economic aid
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to the Salazar government.47 London had negotiated the deal with Lisbon under the tacit
understanding that American troops would help construct and operate the base. It seemed that the
allies and Portugal had come to a settlement to allow British and American forces to occupy the
Azores.
The Portuguese recoiled at the thought of friendship with the Americans.48 Office of
Strategic Services agents in London noted that Salazar viewed the United States as the shining
example of political liberty that he had “tried so hard to rid” from “Portugal.”49 In 1943,
negotiations between the U.S. and Portugal began in an ad hoc manner following the death of the
American ambassador in Lisbon who was replaced by the George F. Kennan, the American
chargé d ’affairs in London.50 Kennan wrote back to Washington emphasizing the importance of
the Azores base and Portugal in general, and also noted “Salazar…fears association with us only
slightly less than with the Russians.”51 Republican Portugal had glorified American style
democracy, and Salazar’s dictatorship depended on strict control of the state. An American
presence in Portugal could only lead to calls to return to democracy. Worse, Roosevelt was a
vocal opponent of colonialism. Salazar believed that an alliance with America would lead to
international pressure for Portugal to relinquish its empire. That was something the old dictator
could not stand, more so because the colonies, especially Angola, were turning huge profits
providing raw materials to both sides in the war.

47

Ibid., 166.
Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, 789,802.
49
José Freire Antunes, “Kennedy, Portugal, and the Azores Base, 1961,” in John F. Kennedy
and Europe, ed. Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths (Louisiana State University Press,
1999), 149.
50
Minter, Portuguese Africa and the West, 39.
51
Antunes, “Kennedy, Portugal, and the Azores Base, 1961,” 149; Borstelmann, Apartheid’s
Reluctant Uncle, 47.
48

19

Fortunately for Salazar, American policy makers were far more pragmatic and much less
intent on spreading democracy than he feared. To assuage the dictator’s apprehensions FDR
assured Lisbon that the “United States had no designs on the territory of Portugal and its
possessions.”52 That included ‘designs’ to impose an end to empire in the post-war settlement.
With that, Roosevelt committed the United States to tacit support for Portuguese control over
Angola and public cooperation with Portuguese imperialism. The Azores, a chain of volcanic
rocks in the mid-Atlantic, forged an unholy alliance between the world’s largest democracy and
one of its oldest Fascist governments. A catholic priest blessed the first perforated steel runway
of what was to become Lajes Air Field, and United States and Portugal celebrated by holding a
joint banquet to commemorate the new relationship.53

PORTUGAL IN THE POST WAR ESTABLISHMENT
Following the end of the war, the United States quickly utilized the Azores in the
building of it’s defense system. The troops that flew home from the European theater and those
that transferred to the Pacific used Lajes airfield to refuel.54 In 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
“ranked the Azores as one of only seven military bases worldwide that were ‘required’ for the
national security of the United States,” while the National Security Council called Lajes field
“the most vital single spot in the world” in terms of any future war in Europe.55 Over 3,000
aircraft passed through Lajes during the Berlin Airlift, and in 1949 the airfield began hosting
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tankers for mid-air refueling of strategic bombers.56 Secretary of State Dean Acheson made it
clear to the Senate that the U.S. wanted Portugal as a founding member of NATO “because of
the Azores.”57 NATO military planners easily overlooked Portugal’s fascist government and
incorporated the airfield into plans for the defense of Europe, control of the North Atlantic, and
strategic command. It became an essential cog in the American war machine, a nexus for troops
and air power between the homeland and far off crises.
U.S. policy through the Eisenhower administration continued to mirror the conundrum of
the Cold War- U.S. support for an autocratic, non-communist regime in Lisbon in the name of
preserving liberty. Whereas Truman and Eisenhower pressured France and Holland to grant their
colonies independence after the war, they remained silent on Portugal’s possessions. The
Portuguese received Marshall Plan aid and the U.S. waived Portugal’s NATO dues. The United
States also paid the full price of Portugal’s NATO participation, which included the total
modernization of the Portuguese army, navy, and air force. Aside from the cost in materiel and
coin, Portugal was also a political liability at the United Nations. Although Portugal was a
founding member of NATO, it did not become a member of the UN until 1955. The world
organization denied Portugal’s application because of its overseas colonies, which were illegal
according to the UN Charter. Nevertheless, the United States under presidents Harry Truman and
Dwight Eisenhower backed Portugal in the international arena and rebuffed all demands that
Portugal release her colonies, including Angola. Portugal finally joined the UN in 1955 by
reclassifying the colonies as ‘overseas provinces,’ not unlike France’s classification of Algeria,
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and theoretically extending the privileges of citizenship to the peoples of the Ultramar.
Portugal’s entry into the UN was supposed to end the political cost of the Azores, and present a
kinder, gentler image of Portuguese colonialism to a skeptical world.
Most important to the Salazar government’s campaign was the myth of Lusotropicalism,
or the theory that “because of the historically unique absence of racism among the Portuguese
people, their colonization of tropical, non-European territories was characterized by racially
egalitarian legislation and human interaction.”58 Western audiences, more familiar with the
multiethnic culture of Brazil, largely bought the argument for Portugal’s African and Asian
possessions. Salazar’s government encouraged immigration to the colonies, and Angola
experienced a huge influx of Portuguese settlers in the 1940’s and 1950’s. Following the settlers
came investment from the state. The economic boom created by the war provided the capital for
investments in Angola, including new roads, railways, drainage and irrigation works, and
hydroelectric schemes.59 Portugal boasted of token improvements in education, health and
housing as signs of progress.60 These new investments, paired with the increased population of
white settlers, appeared to be evidence that Lusotropicalism was real and that an economic
miracle of sorts was taking place in Angola. Salazar presented to the world an Angola that was
peaceful, progressive, and profitable. Indeed, Angola was not a colony, but a harmonious
province of the Portuguese state.
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The truth was that Angola’s economic miracle was the result of the worst colonial
practices in Africa. Unlike other European colonial powers, Portugal was neither an economic
powerhouse, nor a democratic society. That combination meant that capital-poor Portugal relied
solely on coercion to develop its African colonies, and Angola was no exception. The exploitive
policies of the regime extended to all aspects of life in Angola: land, labor, and settlers.
According to Douglas Wheeler, the “modest profits” of the colony “would have been
endangered” if not for the immigration of poor uneducated Portuguese, free land, and “cheap,
poorly-paid labor.”61
Portuguese businesses expected labor costs in Angola to be nonexistent. Before the influx
of white settlers in the 1940’s, Portugal’s main income in Angola came from taxing households
and indigenous production. However, most Angolans lacked the currency required to pay their
tax bill. The need for currency meant that during “a given period of each year,” Africans worked
for wages, and “if they refused to volunteer to work they could be contracted by the State.”62
State contracted work was for “the public interest,” which included “providing colonos’ supply
of cheap labor…on private white farms.”63 In this way taxes served “two purposes: to raise
revenue for governmental expenses and to force the African into the money economy.”64 These
policies in Angola created “a legal obligation stated as a moral premise” for Angolans to work
for Portuguese businesses.65
The connection between taxation and forced labor put the Angolan colonial government
in the never-ending business of providing modern-day slaves to the powerful business interests
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of the colony. Employers only had to “notify the government of their needs” to receive more
workers.66 Government officials often gave the work of finding contract laborers to black
Angolans, who moved men across Angola “tied neck to neck with rope,” placed adds in local
papers with current prices for labor, and resorted to “nightly kidnapping forays” to meet their
quotas.67 Gerald Bender went so far as to say that white plantation owners “often treated
(contract laborers) worse than their forefathers had treated their animals or slaves.”68 If one died
or fell sick, they simply had to ask for a replacement from the government. This meant that
despite the end of de jure slavery, a new modern form of slavery persisted in Angola clothed in
the premise of ‘free’ or ‘contract’ labor. According to the regime in Lisbon “slaves were no
longer bought and sold; the laborer has come of his own free will to contract for his services
under the terms and according to the forms required by the law.”69 Slavery in Angola, disguised
as a corvée, or contract labor system, was “the flywheel of the… whole economy.”70
To exploit the corvée system, Salazar’s regime provided choice land to members of the
oligarchy and their business interests, and on that land, they built large plantations based on the
old Roman latifundia system. Portugal did not recognize native land rights, and the colonial
government simply seized land requested by the regime in Lisbon. The “corresponding eviction
of Africans from favorable land” allowed new settlers from Europe to move in, and in turn, use
labor from those evicted to build their farms.71 These massive estates required a small number of
European overseers, and because of the favorable cost of labor, a large number of native
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Angolans. The most profitable plantations grew cotton and Robusta coffee beans for the
international market, and given the low startup and labor costs, generated considerable profits for
their operators. The state in turn taxed those profits, which helped close the budget deficit and
reduce Portugal’s trade imbalance. This system was a classic model of fascist economic policy:
the state enabled the business interests aligned with the regime to use the coercive power of
government for personal profit. Men got rich from the colonies, and the dream of free land and
free labor encouraged Portuguese families to move to Angola.
For the masses of Portuguese settlers that moved to Angola between the 1940’s and 1974,
that dream was unattainable. Free land was only available to members of the ruling elite;
Portuguese law specifically forbade the kind of ‘homesteading’ that in the United States had
been crucial to economic growth and westward expansion. Such a system required a liberal state
that encouraged equality and economic opportunity. Not surprisingly, Salazar did “not believe in
universal suffrage,” nor in “equality.”72 Basil Davidson observed during his travels through
colonial Angola that the New State treated “the bulk of Portuguese…at least in essence, (to) that
of colonized Africans.”73 Due to the lack of jobs and opportunity in Portugal, Portuguese settlers
willingly worked for the low wages paid by the colonial government and its business allies. Most
of the immigrants from Portugal were poor, uneducated urbanites who came to Angola to escape
the abysmal job market of the metropolis. Expecting the chance to farm the land, they instead
found jobs as low-level clerks, and as menial laborers in Luanda, jobs that traditionally held by
creoles. These new Portuguese immigrants pushed Angolans out of the higher paying jobs in the
capital Luanda and into the contract labor market. The combined effect of the entrance of poor
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Europeans and the expulsion of Angolans from good jobs helped reinforce an economy based on
“cheap White labor as well as…very cheap African labor.”74
Angola’s economic gains during the Second World War veiled the massive divide
between rich and poor and the growing unrest amongst Angolans. Cotton was one of the biggest
moneymakers of the colony, and international investors saw the Angolan cotton crop as an
important sign of economic progress. However, the cotton industry was one of the main
offenders of the corvée system. Marcum described “cotton growing” in Angola, as “organized on
the basis of a manpower raiding system.” Africans “were hauled out of their villages” and forced
to grow cotton under the careful watch of conscript African soldiers. When the fields went
fallow, the laborers moved to new land.75 This profitable business model destroyed civil society
by removing men from their families, villages from their ancestral land, and enlisted village
chiefs as labor recruiters.
However, it was coffee, not cotton, which embodied Angola’s rising economy and
Portugal’s brutality. American troops drank Robusta coffee grown in Angola during the war and
the variety remained popular postbellum. Americans purchased roughly half of Angola’s coffee
crop, which comprised seven percent of American coffee consumption, and nearly a quarter of
all of Angola’s exports between 1945 and 1974. Indeed, after the war, America surpassed
Portugal as Angola’s largest export market.76 The “post-war coffee boom” in Angola created a
frenzied land rush amongst Portuguese and German investors in the northern part of the colony.
The coastal plain stretching north from Luanda to the border with the Belgian Congo filled with
coffee plantations, all of which turned to “forced labor and other abuses” in order to increase
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production.77 Corporal punishment was pervasive, and the housing and provisions for coffee
workers was abysmal. The situation was so bad that the Belgian Congo became an attractive
alternative to Angola. Despite the Congo’s reputation of depravity and abuse, Angolans moved
in droves during the supposed boom years in search of better jobs and living conditions. By
1954, the UN estimated 500,000 Angolans of six million had fled to live abroad.78
These Angolan refugees were predominantly members of the Bakongo ethnic group of
the coffee country. The Belgians Congolese had lightly defended the border, and its close
proximity to the coffee fields offered an escape for Angolan laborers. But more importantly,
members of the Bakongo ethno-linguistic group had already populated both sides of the
Belgian/Portuguese frontier. The European powers had arbitrarily divided the Kongo Empire in
1885, scattering the Bakongo people between the French Congo, The Belgian Congo, and
Portuguese Angola. John Marcum observed that the Bakongo people “have always flowed back
and forth across the superimposed colonial border with the Congo, continuing to constitute a
single ethnic community with fellow Bakongo ruled by either the French or Belgians.” Kinshasa,
or Leopoldville, was almost half Bakongo, as was Brazzaville across the Congo River. In
Marcum’s research he found that in the 1950’s, “thousands of Angolan Bakongo emigrated to
the Belgian Congo, drawn by the latter’s comparatively attractive educational and economic
opportunities.” Because of this migration of peoples, a “significant portion of Kikongo-speaking
people of the Lower Congo living” between Leopoldville and the Atlantic were “in fact, émigrés,
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or children and grandchildren of émigrés, coming from the Congo district of” Angola.79 One
such émigré was Holden Roberto, the eventual leader of the FNLA.80

HOLDEN ROBERTO
Roberto’s upbringing was typical of an Angolan émigré living in Leopoldville during the
final years of Belgian rule in the Congo. Roberto was born in Angola in São Salvador, the capital
of the ancient Kongo Kingdom, and a thriving center of Protestantism in traditionally Catholic
Angola.81 The English name ‘Holden’ came from a Baptist Missionary Society (BMS) pastor
named Robert Holden Carson Graham, who baptized him at birth.82 At age two, he moved to
Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo with an aunt and was educated in a BMS school there. Many
Bakongo on both sides of the border received education in English from BMS schools, which
provided better instruction than the Portuguese or Belgian parish schools. On the Angolan side of
the border, Portuguese authorities harassed protestant missionaries. Not only did such action
galvanize Protestant Angolans, but also Marcum noted that it also drew the attention of
“American Protestants known for their concern with race relations in Africa,” which visited
Leopoldville and made contacts with “the political leaders of the local émigré Angolan
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community.”83 These church leaders took their experiences from Africa back to the U.S. and
began a movement within American churches to denounce Portuguese imperialism and call for
Angolan independence. Roberto, like many of his compatriots, learned from the actions of
missionaries to view Americans as anti-colonial, anti-Portuguese stalwarts. A consequence of his
upbringing in the Belgian Congo and his early instruction in English was that his Portuguese was
not good. This was an unsurprising fact for an Angolan émigré, but for young Holden’s
politically connected family, his poor Portuguese skills limited his potential to serve the Kongo
king. In 1940, his family sent him back to Angola to study for two years at a BMS school in São
Salvador to improve his Portuguese and learn about his roots.84 After completing his studies in
1941, he returned to the Belgian Congo. Roberto, like most Protestant Angolans of the time,
found that their superior primary education made them excellent candidates for clerical positions
in the Belgian colonial administration. Holden found a job in the colonial government, and
worked in throughout the Congo in Leopoldville, Bukavu, and Stanleyville. While working for
the Belgians, Roberto met Patrice Lumumba, Congo’s first prime minister.85 His friendship with
Lumumba was only one of many politically useful connections he made while working for the
Belgian authorities.
Roberto’s clerical job also gave him opportunities to interact with the growing American
business and military presence in the Belgian Congo during World War II. Business interests, led
by the Union Miniére Du Haut Katanga (UMHK), kept the colony out of German hands and
redirected the trade lost with Europe to the United States. American trade with the colony
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became so large that it sparked rumors that America would colonize the Congo after the war.86 In
the post Hiroshima world, no single resource was more important that the uranium from the
Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga. Shinkolobwe uranium was more pure than the ores available at
the time in the United States and Canada, and provided the fissile material used in the first
atomic weapons.87 Shinkolobwe uranium made the stability of the Belgian Congo a priority for
the U.S., which in turn stationed intelligence officers in Leopoldville to monitor the political
situation.88
In 1949, Roberto quit his position in the Belgian bureaucracy at the behest of his uncle,
Barros Necaca, and moved to Leopoldville. There he took a job with the international trading
company where his uncle worked. Necaca also worked as an aid to the Kongo monarch Dom
Pedro in São Salvador, Angola.89 The Portuguese maintained the Kongo monarchy as a symbol
of their legitimacy in Angola; Portugal had used a treaty signed by an illiterate Kongo king as its
legal argument to keep Angola at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.90 According to John
Marcum, Roberto’s political career began in 1949, when Necaca and his nephew “systematically
canvassed and palavered among their compatriots in Leopoldville” to raise funds to support the
king.91 This was Roberto’s first real taste of politics, and he made important contacts within the
Bakongo community in Leopoldville. In 1951, Roberto visited Angola for three weeks while
campaigning with his uncle, where he witnessed Portuguese brutality firsthand. He wrote a letter
to the United Nations about what he saw, and in return received a sympathetic reply that denied
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direct assistance.92 In 1952, Roberto and other Bakongo leaders reached out to the American
consulate in Leopoldville, who granted them a hearing with the Chief of Station. The Bakongo
leaders asked the Americans for guidance on how to combat the cruel treatment of the Bakongo
tribes in Angola.93 These early political activities, and the connections he made in Leopoldville,
helped to identify Roberto as a notable leader of the Angolans living in the Belgian Congo.
Almost more important to his early political career was Roberto’s second job as a
professional soccer player. When Holden moved to Leopoldville in 1949, he started playing on a
local soccer team with his uncle. Roberto left his uncle’s team to join the Daring Club, the top
soccer team in the Congo. Roberto became a national icon in the Congo by playing for Daring,
but more importantly, it made him one of the greatest celebrities of the Bakongo tribe on either
side of the border. Another member of the Daring Club at the same time was Cyrille Adoula,
who would later be installed as prime minister of the Congo with CIA help in 1961.94 More of
his political contacts came from his professional soccer days than through work or politics. The
Belgian authorities made organized soccer a “compulsory requirement in the training of native
soldiers.”95 Joseph Mobutu played on several club teams after the Belgians conscripted him into
the Force Publique for being a “troublesome, stubborn boy” in 1949.96 Roberto’s soccer career,
although a secondary focus, brought him fame, recognition and powerful friends in the Belgian
Congo.
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Notwithstanding his popularity and networking in the Belgian Congo, Roberto made the
pivotal political and international connections of his career during a 1955 scandal in Bakongo
politics along the Belgian Congo-Angolan frontier. When the Kongo king died without an heir,
Angolan Bakongo leaders living in the Belgian Congo’s principal port, Matadi, led by Eduardo
Pinock, demanded a modern, protestant king. Portuguese authorities refused, and instead a
Catholic was crowned. Pinock organized a protest across the border in Angola. Roberto and his
uncle were against the plan from the start. Nevertheless, the ‘Matadi Group’ travelled to São
Salvador and demanded the king abdicate in favor of a Protestant. The Portuguese humored the
protesters and allowed them their demonstration. The king remained in the throne, and the
Matadi Group returned to the Belgian Congo defeated. Once the protesters had left the colony,
the Portuguese government officially sealed the border.97 The embarrassment over the closure of
the frontier led Necaca, Pinock, and Roberto to begin to talk about building international support
for Bakongo nationalism.98 Roberto wrote his second letter to the United Nations, and asked for
“the people of the Kongo Kingdom” to become ”a Trusteeship of the United States of
America.”99 Ignored by the UN, Roberto turned to the American consulate in Leopoldville to
further press the issue.
Roberto met with the staff of the American consulate in Leopoldville in late 1955 which
led to a twenty-year relationship between the U.S. and the Angolan nationalist. Holden made
such an impression on the consulate staff that the Consul General wrote a critical memorandum
to his superiors questioning U.S. policy in Africa. The Consul General pointed out that American
policy makers were more than willing to “tolerate or overlook conditions” in Angola, while
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chastising the Soviets for similar behavior in the Eastern Bloc. He noted, “the United States,
being tied to the Metropolitan powers, will in ten years be devoid of a policy that will appeal to
an emerging and awakened indigenous population in Africa.”100 While pointing out the
“medieval practices” of Portugal in Angola, he also called Roberto “naïve” to think that the U.S.
would do something to change those practices and risk relations with a NATO ally. Although
official policy in Washington was in full support of the colonial powers, this diplomat who had
“to deal with these people on the spot” and was “sympathetic and attentive” to nationalists,
hoped for a policy that would not drive “well-meaning and sincere Africans toward the
Communists.”101 Perhaps in a classic case of diplomats in the field driving foreign policy,
Roberto left the U.S. Consulate with cash provided by the CIA station and the promise of more
payments from the American Committee on Africa, a group founded in 1953 by Americans to
support liberation movements.102 This included, and was not limited to, direct monthly payments

100

“Memorandum by the Consul General at Leopoldville (McGregor) - Document 9,” 9.
Ibid.
102
“Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Johnson) - Document 350,” June 18, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196163v21/d350; “Letter From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) - Document 349,” May
23, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/d349; “Country Summary Prepared
in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research - Document 442,” March 6, 1967, 442, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d442; “Memorandum From the
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) - Document 352,” July 17, 1961, 352, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/d352. This is years earlier than is
frequently cited as the beginning of the CIA’s support for Roberto; it is unclear if Secretary of
State Kissinger was perjuring himself or as confused as everyone else when he testified before
Congress that “some financial, non-military assistance” began in 1961. Angola Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on African Affairs (Washington DC, 1976).
101

33

amounting to $6,000 a year in 1955 dollars.103 The money probably came from the consulate’s
budget for paying African informants to track potential sources of instability in the Belgian
Congo.104
Following this breakthrough in 1955, Roberto’s political activities accelerated. In 1956,
he secretly visited northern Angola for ten to network with local Bakongo leaders and establish
relations with non-Bakongo tribesmen in the area that would become the main combat zone of
the War of Independence. He also quit his job to take a low-profile position with an insurance
company.105 Under the leadership of Roberto, Necaca, and Pinock, the Matadi and Leopold
communities formed an official organization, the União das Populações de Norte Angola
(UPNA), whose stated purpose was the independence of the old Kongo Kingdom from
Portuguese rule. In the summer of 1956, the UPNA’s leaders wrote letters directly to State
Department officials to seek advice in identifying and contacting international supporters. The
troika also corresponded extensively with the executive director of the American Committee on
Africa, George Houser, who in turn connected them with officials from Ghana, Africa’s newest
independent state. George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah’s pan-African advisor, invited the UPNA
to participate in the Conference of All African Peoples in Ghana set for 1958. The UPNA elected
Roberto as its official representative, and the group fundraised from sympathetic donors for the
trip.106
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The convening of the All African People’s Conference was one of the pivotal moments in
the history of decolonization in Africa. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana,
understood the significance of his own nation’s independence: “The break-through came in
1957. Ghana achieved her independence and declared to the whole world that the independence
of Ghana was meaningless unless it was linked up with the total liberation of the African
continent.”107 In that vein, he planned two major conferences in 1958, the first for the eight
independent nations of Africa: “Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and
Ghana.”108 The second conference was for the independence movements; this was the meeting to
which Roberto was invited. The list of attendees read like a list of the first presidents of the
nations that emerged in Africa in the 1960’s. Roberto was able to form relationships with many
of those leaders, notably Patrice Lumumba, already an acquaintance from his days of working in
the Belgian Administration in Stanleyville; and Kenneth Kaunda, first president of Zambia. Also
present was Frantz Fanon, Tom Mboya, and, future presidents Taieb Slim of Tunisia, Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania, and Hastings Banda of Malawi. Most of the continent sent representatives.
The connections Roberto made in Accra established his standing in the world community. In a
few short years, many of his peers became the leaders of new nations, and it gave him an aura of
inevitability- that by right of attending the conference in Accra he was entitled to be president of
Angola.109
Roberto’s Accra odyssey was itself something out of a spy novel. The Belgian
administration of the Congo did not allow any Africans, even Angolans, to participate in politics
or hold a passport. The route was treacherous; the trip required a great deal of subterfuge. In
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August 1958, Roberto started complaining about an unknown sickness and left Leopoldville to
get a checkup from a doctor out of town. When he returned, Roberto produced a doctor’s note to
the Belgian authorities that he required surgery across the Congo River in Brazzaville, then
under French control. Roberto took a ferry anonymously across the river with only his doctor’s
note and his vaccination records as his only form of identification en route to a soccer friend in
Cameroon. Locals helped to guide him through a French counter-insurgency zone, then took
busses and hitchhiked his way to Lagos, Nigeria. After three weeks holed up in a hotel in
Nigeria, Ghana allowed him to enter.110
Roberto’s harrowing experience also produced a clever, fateful change for the future of
Angola and the United States. Under the fake name ‘Haldane Roberto’ he made contacts with
early arrivals to Accra and found that his peers found the tribal nature of the UPNA off-putting,
and that he would find little support for such a cause. Roberto decided to drop the ‘Norte’ from
his organization and quickly produced literature and pamphlets for the União das Populações de
Angola (UPA) which was focused on democracy and national unity within an independent
Angola.111 The UPNA represented the past. Roberto’s newly minted UPA was forward thinking,
and proved to be the proper vehicle for the Bakongo refugees scattered along the lower Congo
River to challenge the Portuguese on the world stage.
While in Ghana, Roberto applied for and received a Guinean passport, which allowed
him to use the little funds he had from his backers at home and in the U.S. to continue raising
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support abroad.112 He left Accra for New York to address the United Nations on behalf of the
UPA. Roberto referred to his speech as the “first time the Angolan issue was debated and
lobbyists for the nationalist cause were heard in New York.”113 He met face to face with the
American Committee on Africa, and he established many American acquaintances, including a
certain Senator John F. Kennedy.114 By the time Roberto returned to Africa in 1960 for the
Second All-African Peoples’ Conference in Tunis, his friend Patrice Lumumba had become
prime minister-elect of an independent Congo. Lumumba had left Accra in 1958 and returned to
the Belgian Congo a national hero. His homecoming speech inspired the riots that eventually
forced the Belgians to acquiesce and grant formal independence.115 Lumumba pledged to support
the UPA in any way.116 Lumumba’s rise and fall from power brought the Cold War to subSaharan Africa for the first time in spectacular fashion. Roberto’s trip to the United States and
the independence crisis in the Belgian Congo cleared the way for his efforts to remove the
Portuguese from Angola and take power for himself.

THE CONGO CRISIS
Shortly after the formation of the Republic of Congo, the new state descended into chaos.
The resulting ‘Congo Crisis’ led to a U.N. intervention and ultimately the deaths of U.N.
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the defeat of a
Soviet and eventually a Cuban attempt to overthrow the government in Leopoldville (Kinshasa),
and the installation of Joseph Desiree Mobutu as a pro-American premier. The specifics of the
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‘Congo Crisis’ as they unfolded in 1960-1961 are critical to understand Holden Roberto’s
eventual Angolan invasion, and America’s involvement in that war.
The unraveling of the Belgian Congo was the result of Belgian greed and heavy
international speculation.117 The huge territory that is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo
was once the personal possession of King Leopold II and not recognized as a part of the Belgian
nation until 1908.118 King Leopold’s original revenue maker was the rubber trade, but “the
principal reason for the Congo’s prosperity was it’s the mineral wealth.” The Katanga province
alone possessed reserves of copper, gold, uranium, tin, manganese, zinc, wolfram, tantalum, coal
and iron as well as cobalt. The southern province of Kasai was produced more industrial stones
than anywhere else in the world, and also the second most diamonds.119 To exploit the vast
mineral wealth of the Congo, Belgium turned to outside investors. Cecil Rhodes, the British
explorer and Rhodesia’s namesake, was a chief financier in 1899 of the newly established Union
Miniére Du Haut Katanga (UMHK). 120 South Africans eventually became the majority of the
UMHK’s investors, who invested profits from South Africa’s own gold and diamond mines in
Katangan mines. To further maximize profits, Rhodes and his English friends created the
Benguela Railway Company in Angola to provide an Atlantic outlet for Katanga’s mines.121 The
Benguela railway in Angola connected Katanga to the Atlantic ocean at Lobito in Angola by
1931, whose port became second only to Matadi on the Congo River as far as the Katangan trade
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was concerned.122 By the 1940’s, the economy of Portuguese Africa was benefitting from a
lucrative transportation trade that accommodated 40 percent of Katanga’s copper on the
Benguela railway and another 30 percent through Rhodesia to the Portuguese port of Lourenço
Marques (Maputo) in Mozambique.123
To protect international investments in the Congo and maintain order, Belgium relied on
a national army called the Force Publique, as well as local police known as Gendarmes. Unlike
European armies, the Force Publique lived off the land, pillaging local villages for food and pay.
It recruited by taking “orphaned children” and sending them “to Catholic missions to be trained
as soldiers.”124 According to one anecdote concerning the Force Publique was that “soldiers in
the Congo were told to account for every cartridge fired, so they hacked off and smoked the
hands, feet and private parts of their victims. Body parts were presented to commanders in
baskets as proof the soldiers had done their work well.”125 The Congolese National Army at the
time of independence was essentially a rebranded Force Publique.126 The Gendarmes
supplemented the national army. Like the Force Publique, they had Belgian officers and relied on
forced conscription. Whereas the national army pillaged to survive, the gendarmes relied on
patronage, and were committed to avoiding disruptions to civil society and commerce. The
Gendarmes were loyal to the local chiefs, or in the case of Katanga, to the Belgian mining
magnate the Union Miniére. At the time of independence, there were almost as many local
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militia as there were soldiers.127 This system of many local armies suited European investors
well, allowing them to run provinces like Katanga and Kasai as personal kingdoms much in the
way Leopold had owned the Congo.
Despite the heavy-handed tactics of the Belgians, independence came swiftly after a
series of events in the late 1950’s. A.A.J. Van Bilsen, a Belgian professor, wrote “A Thirty-Year
Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgian Africa” in December 1955 and it sent shock
waves through Belgian society.128 Van Bilsen argued that, “almost nothing had been done…to
prepare the Congolese for the responsibilities of independence.”129 After a series of riots that
crippled the colony, the Belgians announced a hasty retreat from Africa, and elections were held
for an independent, majority-ruled Congo. Free and fair elections produced a president, Joseph
Kasavubu, from the Bakongo region, and a Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, from a province
upriver from the capital; it was a truly national ticket. The Katangan candidate, Moises Tshombe,
led his delegation in a boycott of the government after failing to win either of the top positions.
Within five days of independence, three of the provinces seceded, including Katanga and Kasai,
and the army mutinied. Belgians left the country en masse.
It was not long before the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sprang into action. Lumumba requested
urgent aid from the United Nations and the Soviet Union, and both obliged. Throughout the
summer of 1960, hundreds of Soviet personnel entered the Congo, and the U.S. became
increasingly worried about the security of the uranium mines.130 In response, the United States
provided the logistical support for the U.N. army of peacekeepers, including an immediate airlift
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via the Azores base.131 The airlift itself was a marvel of American military power that brought
the first peacekeepers, mostly Tunisians, to Leopoldville within forty-eight hours of the passage
of the UN resolution, and only four days after Katanga seceded.132 Behind the scenes, the CIA
station in Leopoldville provided key backing for Joseph Mobutu, the army Chief of Staff.
Mobutu, with the approval of CIA Station Chief Larry Devlin, overthrew Lumumba in a coup
d’état and installed a pro-western government. In turn, the new government declared “the Soviet
and Czech embassies and the Chinese communist delegation persona non grata.”133 Lumumba
was arrested. Devline would later say, “At that moment, he (Mobutu) was the government and
the success of our African policy depended upon him.”134 Mobutu handed the reigns of power
over to an oligarchy known as the ‘Binza Group.’ He kept Kasavubu as President, but the Binza
group effectively ran the country.135 The immediate crisis had abated; in the words of Michaela
Wrong, “the huge African domino had not fallen: Congo was safely out of Soviet hands.”136
However, Lumumba remained a potent figure in prison, and Tshombe’s rebellion continued.
For Roberto, the anarchy and regime change in the Congo was a tumultuous period that
ultimately provided him a secure base to build his movement and plan for war in Angola. Before
Congolese independence, Roberto had secured promises of support from the Prime Minister, his
good friend Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba allowed Roberto to open offices in the capital and to
broadcast UPA programs on Radio Leopoldville. This was fortuitous, for Roberto was not the
only political leader organizing the Bakongo of the lower Congo River. Joseph Kasavubu, the
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Congolese President, was also Bakongo, and Roberto’s UPA had to compete for support and
affiliation. When Mobutu arrested Lumumba, Roberto hid in foreign embassies in the capital,
worried he would be targeted as a friend of the deposed Prime Minister. It would not have been
surprising had Mobutu and Kasavubu cracked down on Angolans during the coup, due to the
importance of Portugal to the economy, the large refugee population along the border, and the
ongoing secession movements. However, Roberto’s salvation was his close personal connections
to several members of the Binza Group, most importantly Cyrille Adoula, a young senator and
former teammate of Holden’s from his days playing for Club Daring. With Adoula, the UPA had
a stalwart supporter and a friendly voice in Mobutu’s camp. Congolese independence, despite the
difficulties surrounding it, gave Roberto’s a head start over rival Angolan nationalists, especially
the communist MPLA, who established a headquarters in Conakry, Guinea. The MPLA failed to
move into Leopoldville until October 1961.137

THE WHITE POWERS
The loss of Belgium whittled down the white powers of Southern Africa to three: the
United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, and Portugal. All three backed the secessionist
regime of Moises Tshombe in Katanga, but in their own spheres of influence, they had yet to
coordinate their efforts. Britain reluctantly stayed in Southern Africa; only the copper industry
and a desire to manage decolonization and ensure the emergence of majority-ruled states kept
them in the region. The whites of South Africa, led by the Afrikaner proto-fascist National Party,
worked toward creating ‘Bantustans,’ or ‘homelands’ to remove blacks from residential white
cities, while at the same time exploiting black labor in manufacturing and in the ubiquitous
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mines of Johannesburg. Portugal too sought to remain in Africa for perpetuity, not only in
Angola but also in the colonies of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, and
Cape Verde. Despite the integrated nature of the Southern African economy, the relatively
peaceful years of the 1950’s discouraged security cooperation between Portugal, the settlers of
Rhodesia, and South Africa; instead, each attempted to maintain racial dominance independently.
Although they had moved toward jettisoning colonies elsewhere, the British still held on
to the settler colony of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960. The Federation was a
time bomb for the British: tensions grew between English-speaking white settlers that dominated
Southern Rhodesia, the political and financial center of the colony, and the black political elites
of Northern Rhodesia, home to part of Katanga’s vast Copperbelt. African leaders, led by
Kenneth Kaunda, clamored for Britain to dissolve the Federation and grant Northern Rhodesia
independence. At the same time, whites in Salisbury grew impatient with British demands that
they acquiesce in majority-rule. The situation was headed toward crisis by mid-decade.
In South Africa, the relative calm of repressive National Party rule in the 1950’s gave
way to increased violence and international condemnation. British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan journeyed to South Africa in 1960 to proclaim that the “winds of change” were
sweeping through Africa, which implied that the world would no longer support Apartheid. Just
a month later, South African police massacred black civilians at Sharpeville, which proved to be
a prelude to the banning of all black political parties. Even President Eisenhower, an ardent
friend of the National Party and a supporter of increased trade between the U.S. and South
Africa, condemned the Sharpeville massacre. Pretoria officially threw off the last semblances of
British rule and declared the birth of a republic. Apartheid intensified.
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Portugal entered the 1960’s confident that its hold on Angola remained secure. The
colonial economy continued to expand, and through increased reliance on the Azores base, the
alliance with America seemed solid. In 1958, US Marines deployed to Lebanon via the Azores,
and in 1960, the UN peacekeeping mission to Congo-Leopoldville also stopped at Lajes.138 By
“1960, 70 percent of all American military air traffic to Europe and the Middle East was flowing
through the Lajes base.”139 As a sign of the close friendship between nations, Eisenhower visited
Portugal in 1960 and proclaimed, “There are no great problems between the United State and
Portugal.”140 However, Salazar remained cautious. After Congo achieved its independence,
Salazar sent reinforcements to Angola, increasing to 3,000 the number of Europeans in an
expanded colonial army of 8,000 soldiers.141 John Marcum summed up the situation in his
landmark history of the Angolan people: despite the intelligence efforts of the PIDE, Lisbon did
not understand how “the disintegration of traditional society and the injustice of colonial society
had led to widespread disorientation, despair, and repression, and to preparations for violent
protest.” Salazar was unaware that Angola had become a “black powder keg.”142

CONCLUSION
The United States, through economic and strategic necessities, became a major player in
Southern Africa during and after the Second World War. Primarily, it was strategic concerns,
such as securing an Azores airbase, procuring fissile material for the atomic bomb, and fighting
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common enemies, which brought America into alliances with the white powers of Southern
Africa. Once established, these military partnerships blossomed. Although the economic impact
for the U.S. was minimal, in Africa commercial ties to the west made colonies profitable,
destroyed African social structures, and encouraged African elites to organize against their
imperial masters. It was the importance of the Shinkolobwe uranium, not a desire to work with
black nationalists, which brought Holden Roberto on the CIA payroll in 1955. Nevertheless, the
U.S. funded the earliest activities of Roberto’s Union of the Peoples of Angola, with Roberto
even making personal connections with high-ranking members of Congress. Finally, the
implosion of the Belgian Congo forced a reevaluation of America’s partnerships with white
regimes; for the first time the strategic imperative of the United States required an alliance with a
free black state, and out of that need came the American alliance with Joseph Desire Mobutu, a
young Congolese General, the one-day dictator of Zaire. The U.S. no longer had the choice to
ignore revolutionary nationalism in the region, and events already in motion demanded a deeper
American involvement.
Nineteen-sixty was the turning point for Africa, the closing of the book on the post-war
period and the beginning of a new era. Seventeen new nations emerged from imperial
domination, including the chaotic Republic of the Congo. Amidst the crisis surrounding
independence in the Congo and the bitter escalation of racial oppression in South Africa, the
American people elected a new President. JFK had campaigned on the issues of economic
growth, an intensified Cold War, and racial equality at home and abroad. It was a sign of things
to come. The policies of ignoring the racial conflicts in Africa under Roosevelt, Truman, and
Eisenhower ended. President John F. Kennedy planned to confront white rule in Africa head on,
particularly by backing the fledgling independence of the Congo and Roberto’s forces in Angola.
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By 1960, the stakes had changed. America’s interests could no longer be served by acting as an
accomplice to the white powers and a nascent partner to black nationalists. The Soviet Union,
America’s Cold War rival, viewed the turmoil in Angola, the Congo, and South Africa and saw a
continent ripe for revolution. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Cuba and Che Guevara also had
“African dreams.”143 Southern Africa was no longer a problem ‘in the back yard’ of America’s
allies. Africa had become a battlefield of the Cold War.
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Chapter 2: Kennedy, Johnson, and Southern Africa

John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson committed the United States to the cause of racial
justice in southern Africa more than any other American presidents before them did. Even before
taking office, Kennedy had met Holden Roberto and incorporated Africa into his presidential
campaign, as both a Civil Rights and a Cold War issue. As president, JFK attempted to boldly
side the United States with black nationalists, including Holden Roberto, who by 1961 was at
war with Portugal. Roberto’s successes in that year led to the creation of the Angolan
Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE), the political wing of the FNLA, in Leopoldville
(Kinshasa).144 However, security concerns, chiefly the Portuguese controlled Azores in the
Atlantic, and South Africa’s control of the Cape sea routes, forced Kennedy to reconsider such
lofty aspirations for the GRAE. Johnson continued the strategies of his fallen predecessor and
took them further, including the decision to provide training and covert aid for Roberto, and a
massive paramilitary operation in the Congo to preserve its pro-U.S. government. Although
Roberto benefitted from his relationship with Joseph Mobutu, the rise of Moises Tshombe to
Prime Minister in the Congo and Jonas Savimbi’s flight from the GRAE prevented serious gains.
Meanwhile, South Africa and the Universal Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) of Rhodesia
escalated the racial struggle in the region. Johnson, encumbered by the Vietnam War, struggled
to maintain a proactive policy in southern Africa that balanced global security concerns with his
aspirations for freedom and liberty for all. However, LBJ’s gains in the region proved durable
enough to survive the neglectful Nixon years, and served as the foundation of the climactic
intervention in 1975.
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THE ELECTION OF 1960
Kennedy used Africa to advance his popularity throughout his political career. In 1957,
he had spoken on the floor of the Senate about the war in Algeria. He called for an end to
imperialism, in Eastern Europe and in Africa. The historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. claimed
the speech made him an international icon and “signaled his new prominence in foreign
affairs.”145 Kennedy pushed for the creation of the African subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and he became its first chair. He used the new position to call for
“sympathy with the independence movement,” and promoted “programs of economic and
educational assistance” as part of a policy focused on strengthening Africa.146 As a Senator, he
made a point to meet with African nationalists travelling in the U.S., including Roberto and his
Mozambican counterpart Eduardo Mondlane. Kennedy’s visibility on African issues bolstered
his credentials as both a Cold Warrior and a progressive on civil rights. In January 1960, despite
his youth, Kennedy announced his intention to run for President of the United States to counter
“Soviet gains” in the arms race, and “to maintain freedom and order in the newly emerging
nations.”147 That thinly veiled statement regarding Africa foreshadowed the role it would play in
the election.
Making Africa a component of the presidential campaign stemmed from a number of
factors. First, the throng of newly independent black nations in Africa synergized with
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Kennedy’s projection of youth and vitality. Second, the international crisis in the Congo brought
the Cold War in Africa to the public, which vindicated Kennedy’s progressive statements on
Algeria and served to underscore his qualifications on foreign policy. Finally, as Whitney
Schneidman cogently pointed out, Kennedy could make a “pitch for civil rights overseas” to
appeal to “the liberal wing” of his party.148
Kennedy played the Africa card early and often. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called it “the first
time in American history” that “Africa figured prominently in a presidential election.”149
Schneidman counted that throughout the campaign, “Kennedy mentioned Africa an
unprecedented 479 times.”150 He attacked Nixon on the campaign trail for his refusal to accept
the inevitability of independence in Africa.151 On the topic of the Congo, he expressed a
willingness to work with Lumumba, a clear repudiation of Eisenhower’s policies. JFK promised,
“to post more black diplomats in Africa” and personally paid the tab for a group of Kenyan
students to travel to American universities.152 Richard Mahoney called Kennedy’s Africa rhetoric
“a minor classic in political exploitation of foreign policy.”153 Kennedy knew that Africa was not
important to the general public; but civil rights were. He used Africa to paint Nixon as a racist
and to elevate his own profile as a champion in the struggle against racial inequality. Presidential
authority over foreign policy provided a means to secure civil rights abroad that Kennedy could
not promise at home.
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Politics aside, JFK used Africa within his overall focus on foreign policy and the need for
a more robust Cold War strategy. On the campaign trail in 1960, Kennedy spoke of Africa and
the “missile gap” between the Soviet Union and the U.S. as part of the same dire threat to
American security. The candidate tied nearly all aspects of the ‘missile gap’ argument to Africa,
including “the Polaris submarine, the minuteman missile,” and “airlift capacity.” Of
Eisenhower’s airlift on behalf of the U.N. Congo mission, Kennedy questioned, “How many of
them were jets?” America needed a new leader to modernize the armed forces in order to “stop
the conquest of the sixties” by the Soviet Union.154 These attacks on Eisenhower was the real
focus of Kennedy’s campaign, and Africa, along with Laos and Latin America, were employed
to further prove his point.
Although effective, Kennedy’s attacks on Nixon were unfair to the Eisenhower
administration. The desegregation of Little Rock’s Central High School, the Suez crisis, and the
Congo Crisis were gutsy uses of presidential power for racial justice. Eisenhower strongly sided
with progressive forces during these critical moments, first by using troops to force
desegregation in 1954 in Arkansas, and then by sharply condemning the intervention of Britain,
France, and Israel in 1956 during their attempt to stop Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez
Canal.155 Furthermore, it was pressure from the President, and not Congress, that led to the Civil
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, no matter how watered down and ineffective they were.
Moreover, although ‘Ike’ supported Portugal and it’s colonial interests, he understood that his
administration needed to show support for the newly freed African countries. Despite Kwame
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Nkrumah’s flirtations with the eastern bloc, the Eisenhower administration established relations
immediately with Ghana after its independence. Ike sent Richard Nixon, his Vice President, to
the ceremonies. After he visited Ghana in 1957, Nixon pushed for the creation of the Bureau of
African Affairs within the State Department.156 Vice President Nixon had joined a growing
chorus of American policy experts that foresaw “a very difficult and probably long period of
uncertainty” for the independent states of Africa that presented “plenty of troubled waters for
Communist fishing.”157 The sudden independence and descent into chaos in the former Belgian
Congo became the first great ‘fishing hole’ for communism in Africa, and the ‘Congo Crisis’
dominated Eisenhower’s foreign policy agenda during his final year in office. In September, less
than two months from the election, Eisenhower proposed an ambitious assistance package for
Africa before the U.N. General Assembly, and followed up with an unscheduled payment to the
Secretary General for the Congo operation.158 Nevertheless, Kennedy’s attacks worked with the
public, and he won the election by a razor thin margin. However, Kennedy soon found it
necessary to transform his rhetoric into reality.

KENNEDY
Events outside of the young president’s control accelerated his need to develop a plan for
Africa. Fearing that Kennedy was a less astute Cold Warrior than Eisenhower, Mobutu arrested
Lumumba and sent him to the rebels in Katanga, who murdered the Congo’s first Prime Minister
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three days before Kennedy’s inauguration.159 Two days after the inauguration, on January 22,
1961, Portuguese political dissidents hijacked the Santa Maria, the second largest ship in the
Portuguese merchant marine.160 Led by General Humberto Delgado and Henrique Galvão, the
rebels hoped to start a revolution in Portugal and force Kennedy to confront the cruelty of the
regime in Lisbon.161 Antonio Salazar requested that the American government find the ship and
take it by force. Kennedy refused, which infuriated Salazar. In response, Portugal for the first
time threatened to deny American access to the Lajes base.162 After his eventual capture in
Brazil, Delgado claimed that his goal was to reach Luanda and proclaim a rival government
against Lisbon. The reaction to this news in Angola was immediate. On February 4, Angolans
attacked the radio station, a prison, and police stations in Luanda with knives and clubs and
demanded the release of all political prisoners. Portuguese colonial authorities repulsed the
attackers and counterattacked, killing arbitrarily in the city’s slums.163 Dismayed at the events of
the previous weeks and eager to end Salazar’s 35 year-old New State regime, Portuguese
General Botelho Moniz approached the US ambassador, C. Burke Elbrick, and the CIA chief of
station in Lisbon, Fred Hubbard, to feel out the American position a possible on regime change
in Portugal. The CIA agents in Lisbon were receptive to the offer and immediately began
contingency plans in preparation for a coup d’état.164 The United Nations, which had already
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passed a resolution denouncing Portuguese colonialism in December 1960, scheduled a Security
Council meeting to discuss the matter in March.165 It appeared that the Portuguese Empire could
collapse at any moment.
Kennedy anticipated the fall of the ‘Ultramar,’ and viewed support for Holden Roberto as
part of his overall Cold War strategy. For all of the uncertainty regarding Angola, it was obvious
to Kennedy that eventually the country would become independent. The United States needed a
plan for that eventuality. From both his personal relationship with Roberto and from his most
trusted advisers, Kennedy knew of Angola’s contested rebellion first hand. During the
presidential campaign of 1960, JFK had sent W. Averell Harriman on a fact-finding mission to
Africa.166 While in Leopoldville, several members of the MPLA attempted to meet him to seek
American support. Aware of their communist sympathies, Harriman avoided contact.167 The
message was clear: America wanted a pro-western, capitalist Angola after independence.
Kennedy sought to win the ‘cold war’ brewing between Angola’s independence movements as a
part of his overall strategy for post-colonialist Africa.
Within a few months of taking office, the Kennedy administration began moving towards
a pro-independence policy on Angola. On March 7, ambassador Elbrick informed the Portuguese
to “not expect US support in Security Council or General Assembly debates on Angola.”168
Elbrick went on to chastise Salazar for the cruel treatment of Africans in Angola, warning him
that without progress toward self-determination, a “Congo type” disaster could happen. “Under
Rusk’s instruction,” Elbrick delivered the same message to Moniz.169 The first week of March,
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Roberto visited Washington again, and this time he met with Bobby Kennedy before addressing
the UN.170 Roberto spoke about the crimes committed by Portugal in Angola, and ominously
referred to the rising calls for violent overthrow of the Portuguese colonial government. The UN
Security Council scheduled a vote on March 15 to condemn Portuguese policy in Angola. In the
past, the U.S. had abstained from actions against its NATO ally in Lisbon, including in the
December 1960 vote. This time Kennedy instructed his UN Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, to
vote against Portugal. Roberto prolonged his stay in New York to comment on the Security
Council’s actions. America voted in support of the resolution, and Roberto proudly claimed that
Angola had “helped solidify the sharp change in American policy concerning Africa and
decolonization.”171
On March 15, 1961, Roberto’s UPA forces invaded Angola from the Congo. Angolans in
the countryside joined the UPA fighters, and over in the first days of the rebellion over 250
Portuguese civilians were murdered.172 The offensive turned into a general revolt in Northern
Angola, and rebel bands roamed the countryside attacking every Portuguese in sight.173 UPA
fighters also directed their wanton violence against the Ovimbundu laborers who had replaced
their brethren in the coffee fields, marking the first mass violence committed by Angolans
against fellow Angolans during the Civil War.174 Settlers fled as anarchy prevailed. With their
leader abroad and little organizational direction, the UPA found itself in “unexpected control of
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deserted towns, roads,” and “airfields.”175 The haphazard offensive came to a halt a mere 30
miles from Luanda.176 Roberto never imagined the invasion would be so successful.
The Portuguese responded to the uprising with maximum violence. Settler militias fought
back savagely, not only against the rebels but the African population in general. They burned
villages, fired indiscriminately at Angolans, and “spared prisoners only until they had talked.”177
Lisbon, fully aware the severity of the situation and the UPA’s proximity to Luanda, mobilized
for war. First came the Portuguese Air Force, which complemented the indiscriminate violence
of the vigilantes. With their American planes, the Portuguese hit targets, real and perceived,
within rebel held areas, and included the use of napalm.178 Despite the mayhem caused by both
the rebels and the government, widespread news coverage and condemnation of the fighting only
surfaced when the real war began in the summer, when the Portuguese army arrived from
Europe. Throughout March and April, the world’s focus remained on Kennedy’s maneuvers at
the UN and the coup attempt in Lisbon.
Kennedy’s Angola gamble failed along with Roberto’s invasion. The UN resolution
failed to pass, even with the U.S. voting in favor.179 Salazar caught wind of the plot against him
in April and fired the ringleaders before they gave the order to revolt. He went to the press and
portrayed “the United States as the agent provocateur” of the coup, which led to protests in front
of the American embassy.180 Moniz’s plot failed, and the national mood turned against America
and its interference in Lisbon and Angola.181 The American attempt to promote progressivism in

175

Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, 145.
Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, 27.
177
Wheeler and Pélissier, Angola, 179.
178
Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, 158.
179
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, 144; Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation, 71.
180
Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 19.
181
Antunes, “Kennedy, Portugal, and the Azores Base, 1961,” 157.
176

55

Lisbon and to liberate Angola backfired; instead, Portugal rallied and united behind the effort to
subdue the jewel of their African empire.
The war in Angola was Portugal’s first since World War I. Salazar sent twenty-five
thousand troops by sea from Lisbon to Luanda, which represented two-thirds of Portugal’s
NATO divisions.182 The army regained the initiative in the coffee fields in the north. The UPA’s
untrained, poorly equipped forces were no match for Portugal’s NATO trained and equipped
army. Throughout the long dry season of 1961, American supplied planes bombed rebel
strongholds, while the army pushed forward in trucks, half-tracks, and armored cars. For the first
time in Angola’s history, the Bakongo north became a militarized zone, and small towns and
plantations grew into sprawling military bases, including “a network of airstrips” to supply towns
once the rainy season washed out the dirt roads. By September, Salazar was able to declare
victory over the rebels. However, despite the capture of all towns, the re-establishment of control
over the border, and the destruction of “some rebel centers,” the CIA believed that Portugal
“failed to regain control of the areas outside of towns, and their control of many roads” was
“tenuous at best.” Portugal hunkered down for the rainy season, which overtook Angola in
October, a time when the rivers swell, dirt roads wash out, and long-distance travel becomes
almost impossible.183 Neither side had achieved a decisive victory. Both Roberto’s UPA and the
Portuguese settled in for a prolonged fight.
With two allies locked in battle, Kennedy’s foreign policy team wrestled with finding an
appropriate balance between the competing strategic imperatives: how to fight the Cold War in
Africa and to maintain the western alliance. The CIA increased payments to Roberto from
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$6,000 to $10,000 a year, with the understanding that this figure was not enough to make a
substantial military impact.184 To address the issue, Kennedy created the Presidential Task Force
on Portuguese Territories in Africa, chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G.
Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams, and included officials from the White House, the Departments of
State and the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, the CIA, the ICA, and the USIA.185 The State
Department, led by Williams, favored an aggressive Angola policy, even if it led to a Portuguese
“withdraw from NATO” and an American evacuation of the Azores base. The Department of
Defense disagreed rigorously, and claimed that any “courses of action which would gravely
jeopardize retention of the Azores bases in Spain would be unacceptable from a military point of
view for the foreseeable future.”186 After the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in April, and
with a new crisis brewing in Berlin, Defense’s position won out, and the debate continued
without consideration of military support for the Angolan rebels.
The taskforce agreed to work to create a broad front to pressure Portugal into granting
independence for its African possessions. Such a policy of forced moderation required that any
support for Holden Roberto, including his ongoing CIA stipend, needed deeper cover. Secretary
of State Dean Rusk decided to end direct payments to Roberto, which led Roger Hilsman to
initiate efforts to “locate an individual or institution willing to assume on a strictly private basis
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the current payments.” 187 With the funds under deep cover, the President and the Secretary of
State could deny their existence. In July, the taskforce produced National Security Action
Memorandum No. 60 on “U.S. Actions in Relation to Portuguese Territories in Africa.”188
NSAM 60 became the blueprint for both Kennedy and Johnson’s Angola policy. Above
all, the pressure tactics to be used against the Salazar regime needed to “minimize the possibility
of losing the Azores,” which would have “grave military consequences.” The plan was simple:
coordinate international pressure against Portugal, prevent American weapons from entering the
conflict, and “expand U.S. assistance to refugees” and make available “educational programs for
Africans from the Portuguese areas” to study in the United States.189 American support for selfdetermination nonetheless left Roberto without aid in his war against Portugal. Kennedy and his
administration believed that pressure tactics, rather than winning battles, presented the best
chance at Angolan independence.
Rather than weakening the Portuguese dictatorship, Kennedy’s moves strengthened
Salazar’s hand. Salazar purged the military of all opposition, and the people, aroused by his antiAmerican rhetoric, rallied behind him. He lambasted the United States for meddling in the
internal affairs of Portugal that considered Angola not a colony, but an overseas province. Events
elsewhere fueled Portuguese nationalism. In December, Salazar doubled his resolve when India
invaded the Portuguese Overseas Province of Goa. On December 19, after little resistance, the
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Portuguese garrison capitulated, ending the 400-year history of Portuguese India.190 The Indian
invasion raised the prospects of a similar Chinese offensive against Macao. Beset with threats
throughout the world, Salazar cast himself as the sole defender of the Ultramar, the source of
Portugal’s once and future greatness. By the end of Kennedy’s first year in office, Salazar was
stronger than ever.
The failure of Kennedy’s Angola ‘gambit’ produced repercussions that became clear in
1962. After the fall of Goa, Salazar instructed the PIDE to “obtain the names and addresses and
control the movements of all American nationals living off the limits of the Lajes Base in the
Azores.”191 Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, refused to see his American
counterpart, Ambassador Elbrick, during the spring and early summer. Adriano Moreira, the
Portuguese Overseas Minister, bashed American policy in early June in a statement to the press.
He said American policy engendered “neutrality toward enemies, hostility toward friends and
friendship toward neutrals.”192 Portugal’s anti-American posturing and diplomatic cold shoulders
were problematic because the American lease for the Azores base was set to expire in December
of 1962. The situation was so dire that in U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk went to Lisbon to
attempt a breakthrough with Salazar. Nothing came of the meeting, except an official list of
Portuguese demands and “a rumor in Lisbon that Portugal would ask the United States for eighty
million dollars to renew the Azores agreement.”193 Rusk decided to wait until October to address
the new Portuguese requirements for the base extension.
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October 1962 proved to be the worst moment for the United States to set the terms of a
new Luso-American agreement on the Azores. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to
the brink of World War III. American and NATO war planning relied on the Azores, as western
strategists had yet to create contingency plans for losing access to that important base. On
October 24, the State department notified most allies via diplomatic cable of the blockade of
Cuba. However, Kennedy wanted to give Nogueira the news in person.194 He had hoped to
“emphasize the value that the US attached to Portugal as an ally and a member of NATO” with
such special treatment.195 Rusk pressed Nogueira before his meeting with Kennedy to agree that
if war with the Soviets broke out the United States and NATO would have access to the Azores
after the agreement expired at year’s end. Nogueira’s response was crushing: “It is more than
two years that we, the Portuguese, are living in (a) permanent (state of) emergency, and it does
not seem to me that any of our allies are much disturbed by this fact.” After shooting down Rusk,
Nogueira went to Kennedy. With the fate of the world in the balance, Kennedy used the weight
of the situation to challenge the Foreign Minister on Angola: he asked Nogueira if Portugal
“could not see its way to proclaiming publicly its acceptance of the principle of selfdetermination.” Nogueira told the President that such liberalizations “would be impossible.” The
Azores agreement expired on December 31, 1962, which meant that American access to the
strategic airbase thereafter relied on the whim of the Salazar government.196
While Kennedy’s African policy floundered, Roberto made several significant political
and diplomatic advances. Recruitment for the UPA soared after the March 15 invasion. Angolans
living in the Congo flocked to the UPA headquarters in Leopoldville to join the movement.
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Roberto received promises of aid and invitations from nearly every African capital, as well as
from international aid organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service,
Lutheran World Relief, and the African Service Institute.197 More importantly, the UPA used the
fighting in Angola to persuade smaller Angolan nationalist organizations in the Congo to merge
and form the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE).198 The GRAE created a
military wing, known as the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). To train and
quarter this new army, the Congolese government gave Roberto land to base his operations at
Kinkuzu that Marcum would later describe from one of his visits as an “empty, isolated hills
place.”199 The base in Kinkuzu became the center of all FNLA operations.
The formation of the GRAE was a great propaganda success. It legitimized Roberto’s
leadership beyond his own ethnic group precisely while military activity in Angola decreased
and fighting against the MPLA rose. Furthermore, in 1963 the Organization of African Unity
recognized the GRAE/FNLA as the one true Angolan liberation movement. Not only did the
OAU recognize Roberto as the leader of the Angolan resistance, it made the colony the top
priority of its “liberation agenda.”200 Not only did this open the door for international funding,
but also it marginalized his main rival the MPLA.
The creation of the GRAE was possible because of a young, enigmatic leader from the
central highlands named Jonas Savimbi. Roberto had convinced Savimbi to drop out of school in
Switzerland and join him on his yearly trip to New York in 1961, where he “took the plunge” to
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join the UPA as Roberto’s head of Foreign Affairs.201 Savimbi proved to be critical in recruiting
Angolan students in Europe to join Roberto. Along with the addition of Rosário Neto, a LuandaMbundu, to the UPA leadership, Savimbi’s participation helped Roberto avoid the ‘Bakongo
image’ of the movement.202 Savimbi was described by his biographer Fred Bridgland as a master
political strategist, who sought to build “intensive political recruitment and indoctrination;
efficient health, welfare and educational provisions for civilians; and a highly organized and
sustained guerrilla warfare campaign, less dramatic than the original attacks but more enduring.”
He started student and youth movements, and helped negotiate mergers amongst Angolan groups
as well as treaties with foreign powers.203 However, as an Ovimbundu, the largest ethnic group in
Angola, Savimbi’s greatest worth was as spokesman to his people. After Savimbi’s appointment
as Foreign Minister, Ovimbundu joined the UPA in droves.204
Once wealthy slave traders, in the early 20th century the Ovimbundu themselves became
slaves in the Portuguese colonial state. Concentrated in Angola’s fertile central highlands, the
Ovimbundu represented the bulk of the forced labor workforce. The Portuguese utilized
hundreds of thousands of Ovimbundu contract laborers for infrastructure projects and field labor
during the post-war economic boom, which depopulated their homeland and opened land to the
settlers of the 1950s.205 As with the Bakongo along the Angola-Congo border, Protestant
missionaries had been active among the Ovimbundu areas of Angola’s central highlands since

201

Ibid., 221.
Guimarães, The Origins of the Angolan Civil War, 55.
203
Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, 55–56.
204
Ibid., 45–52.
205
Heywood, Contested Power in Angola, 1840s to the Present, 67.
202

62

the 1880s. The missionaries focused on education, health, and social services, and with aid from
the church, a small and influential protestant middle class dominated social life.206
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi came from this small class of Protestant elites and was a natural
fit to lead the Ovimbundu in resistance against Portugal. He was born into an influential
Ovimbundu family from Bié.207 His father, Loth Malheiro Savimbi, was a traditional chief who
had been stripped of his powers and lands by the Portuguese after an uprising in 1902 and
became the first black stationmaster on the Benguela railway.208 Loth had also built a church and
a school in the small village where he worked as stationmaster, an undertaking that he replicated
each time the Portuguese transferred him to another station. Due to frequent transfers, all along
the Benguela railway, there were churches and schools built by Loth Savimbi.209
Spared only a strong family emphasis on education, Jonas completed his basic studies at
a mix of Protestant and Catholic missions. He was one of the first Angolan students to receive
funding for college abroad from the Untied Church of Christ. After starting medical school in
Portugal, he left during a school recess in 1960, and received permission from his sponsors to
continue his studies in Switzerland. It was in Switzerland, after a change of major to political
science, that both the MPLA and Roberto courted Savimbi to join their movements. Roberto
received a major assist from Kenyan leader Tom Mboya, who eventually convinced Savimbi.210
With Savimbi on board, Roberto’s GRAE/FNLA appeared to be on the path to victory.
Roberto shed his image as a Bakongo tribalist, and gained recognition as the leader all of his
people. The GRAE had acted as a “government-in-exile for the Angolan people, and had, for a
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year, been locked in guerrilla warfare with the Portuguese colonial regime.” Not only was it the
chosen Angolan movement of the Congolese government, but also the GRAE enjoyed extensive
international contacts.211 This image of progress belied the fact that Roberto still lacked the
weapons, training, and funds to effectively fight the Portuguese. In fact, Roberto’s organizational
gains in 1962 and 1963 quickly gave way under pressure from the stagnated progress of the war
and the complications of living in the Congo.

THE CONGO CRISIS UNDER KENNEDY
Kennedy served a caretaker role in the ongoing Congo Crisis. The local actors had
already set the stage: Lumumba was dead, Mobutu’s Binza Group controlled Leopoldville
(Kinshasa), secessionists in Katanga and Stanleyville remained entrenched, and United Nations
forces enforced a shaky peace. Kennedy embraced Mobutu and privately searched for a way for
the United States to influence events in the Congo. However, the United States played no roll in
the major turning points during Kennedy’s tenure, namely, the death of UN Secretary General
Dag Hammarskjöld and the eventual UN victory over separatists in Katanga. Despite this lack of
substance, however, the style of Kennedy’s Congo policies made America’s relationship with
Mobutu durable enough to outlive the Cold War.
Kennedy nurtured America’s relationship with Mobutu and his Binza Group through
personal diplomacy. He brought Mobutu to the White House in 1963, where the president
exclaimed, “Nobody in the world had done more than the General to maintain freedom against
the Communists.”212 Mobutu’s visit represented a continuation of Kennedy’s Africa rhetoric
from the 1960 election, as both a symbol of American friendliness with the newly independent
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states and a determination to confront the Soviets anywhere.213 Most important, Kennedy kept
Devlin in Leopoldville, who more than anyone influenced American policy there.
Larry Devlin forged deep contacts within Mobutu’s inner circle that cemented the
American-Congolese alliance. He cultivated close friendships with “Mobutu, (Justin) Bomboko,
and Victor Nendaka,” who “formed an informal troika” that controlled the Binza group, and
therefore, the Congo. Between them, these three men controlled “the military (Mobutu), the
security police (Nendaka), and foreign affairs (Bomboko).”214 Devlin and his wife frequently
hosted the troika for dinner, and once even served Angolan lobster.215 According to Devlin,
along with others, including Holden Roberto’s friend and former teammate Cyrille Adoula, “the
Binza group advised Kasavubu, but unofficially it was the power behind the presidency.”216
Through the personage of Larry Devlin, the United States was the oligarchy’s closest friend.
The Cuban Missile Crisis proved the strength of that friendship. After Kennedy made his
decision to impose a blockade on Cuba and to take the crisis to the public, Devlin had the task of
reporting to the Congolese government. He delivered the news personally to Prime Minister
Cyril Adoula, whose “first words were, “this could mean war.”” Prepared for the full
ramifications of such an outcome, Adoula immediately pledged his country’s support to the
United States. Adoula stood by the United States throughout the crisis, all the way up to the
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removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons from Cuba. Devlin credited Kennedy’s “successful
handling” of the crisis “raised our stock with the Congolese.” Adoula, Mobutu, and the rest of
the Binza group felt personally engaged in the main theater of the Cold War, which further
strengthened their unwavering support of the United States.217
Shortly after the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons from Cuba, the Katanga secession
crisis reached a climax. In a surprise move, it was the Katangans, and not the government, the
Americans or the UN troops, that instigated the final conflict. On Christmas Eve 1962, Katangan
gendarmes attacked a UN barracks. Despite orders to remain at base, the besieged peacekeepers
went on a counter-offensive. UN troops quickly took Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), and by
January 2, 1963, they had secured the copper mines. The gendarmes steadily retreated; by the
time Kolwezi fell on the border with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Tshombe’s troops had
escaped to the bush or crossed the border into Angola. The gendarmes took with them aircraft
and cash, and the Portuguese accepted them with open arms.218 Moïse Tshombe fled to Madrid.
For the first time since independence, the Congo was whole.
The collapse of Tshombe’s regime hid the fact that the Congo remained in a state of
crisis. Soapy Williams wrote to Dean Rusk expressing his concern that “the events of DecemberJanuary seem to have led to a public and Congressional impression that the Congo problem is
now solved…This misunderstanding is very likely to cause difficulties” for continued American
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assistance.219 Despite the Congolese government’s firm grasp on the capital and the ability via
Holden Roberto to project power into Angola, the national army remained a major liability.
During a trip to Washington, Mobutu outlined the army’s shortcomings. A holdover of
the Force Publique, the new black officer corps remained poorly trained, and the enlisted troops
often went without pay. Discipline was nonexistent. Coordinating movement across the country
proved next to impossible, due to the vast distances and rough terrain, as well as the army’s
penchant for looting and pillaging. Mobutu asked Kennedy for American weapons, training, and
assistance, including personal “parachute training for four weeks at Fort Benning” followed by
“two weeks at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg” for himself. However, despite agreeing
that the Congolese army was a grave problem for American policy in the region, Kennedy “was
noncommittal” on expanding aid beyond Mobutu’s personal training in the United States.220
Washington continued to insist that retraining and equipping the army was a job for
Europeans.221 Without such external aid, the prospects for stability beyond the UN military’s
expected mid-1964 withdrawal were slim.
The crucial developments during the Kennedy years were the establishment of personal
relationships that brought American Congo and Angolan policies together. Roberto and the
Binza group, led by Mobutu, shared common friends and enemies. President Joseph Kasavubu, a
successful Bakongo politician in his own right, competed with both Roberto and his Congolese
masters for power and support. For the Binza group, Roberto served as a counterweight to
Kasavubu’s personal political power; for their part, the Binza group checked Kasavubu’s ability
219

“Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams) to
Secretary of State Rusk - Document 416.”
220
“Memorandum of Conversation - Document 423,” May 31, 1963, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis.
221
“Memorandum from the Ambassador to the Congo (Gullion) to President Kennedy Document 419,” 419.
67

to interfere with the UPA’s activities along the border. Furthermore, with Tshombe’s forces
safely ensconced in Angola, the Binza group thought of the GRAE as a counter to cross border
raids by the former Katangan gendarmes. Roberto was an asset to the regime in Leopoldville
(Kinshasa); as long as Mobutu’s men controlled the government, Roberto had a safe haven for
his movement and a staunch ally against the Portuguese.
In 1963, Mobutu and Adoula stepped up their support for Roberto’s government in exile.
Despite worries regarding Katangan retaliation, the Prime Minister granted Roberto “permission
to send a personal representative to Katanga to begin building a political apparatus there among
Angolan refugees and émigrés.”222 Roberto’s hope was to expand his insurgency into eastern
Angola, far from traditional centers of Portuguese power. In the main theater of operations, the
FNLA engaged in pitched battles with the MPLA within the Congo. These battles, essentially the
first of the Angolan Civil War, intensified the hatred between the two groups.223 The Congolese
government joined in, and frequently intercepted MPLA attempts to cross into Angola.224
Finally, after the OAU recognized the GRAE/FNLA as the one true Angolan liberation
movement, the Kinshasa government expelled the MPLA from the Congo. The MPLA members
who stayed behind in Kinshasa found it impossible to continue work amidst incessant
harassment from the authorities.225 Dejected, Angola’s communists moved across the Congo
River to Brazzaville, the capital of the Congo Republic. By year’s end, Roberto and his
GRAE/FNLA held the monopoly on the Angolan revolution in the Congo.
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Whereas Kennedy took a proactive stance on racial justice in Angola, he took a
conservative position against Apartheid. Rather than disrupt relations with such an important
business partner and ally, JFK moderated his moral opposition to Apartheid. In 1960 alone,
South Africa was home to about $286 million in US investments. Furthermore, American
strategic planners were well aware of South Africa’s ability to control the sea-lanes between the
Indian and Atlantic Oceans.226 A proposed UN 1963 general embargo to cripple the Afrikaner
government appeared to threaten the national interest and required an American response.
Kennedy favored some form of limited action against South Africa, but was unwilling to go to
the extreme length of supporting a general embargo.227 Unable to decide between the moral
choice and the military-economic one, Kennedy sought a compromise. The administration
decided to pre-empt the UN by calling for a voluntary arms-embargo to start in 1964, which
would exempt weapons used for ‘international security,’ the euphemism used by the Kennedy
administration to describe military hardware which could be used against the Soviet Union in the
event of a war.228 The administration designed the embargo to stop sales of equipment like
helicopters and armored cars used by internal security forces; the exemption for national security
left the door open for American Naval and Air Force sales. Furthermore, the delayed start date
allowed Kennedy to squeeze in more arms sales to South Africa before the embargo went into
affect.229 Nevertheless, “Kennedy and some of his advisers saw it as a dramatic new step”
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against Apartheid.230 In reality, the embargo compromise was a sign of the president’s shifting
attitude toward the white regimes of southern Africa.
At the same time as the effort to mitigate the South African embargo was underway,
Kennedy and his foreign policy team decided to change course and take a conciliatory tone with
Salazar and the Portuguese. Kennedy recalled ambassador Elbrick in the spring of 1963, and
Admiral George W. Anderson replaced him in the summer. Nogueira and Salazar never liked
Elbrick, and the bad blood from 1961 and the Azores negotiations in 1962 led to his undoing.
Adlai Stevenson abstained from UN votes on Angola, rather than vote against the Portuguese.231
Despite the tenuousness of America’s access to the Azores, Kennedy continued to utilize the
base and to support Portugal as a member of NATO. From 1960-1963, Alliance-wide military
maneuvers, including operations Spearhead, Long Thrust, and Big Lift, practiced deploying
troops to Europe in moments of crisis via the Azores.232 The goal was to show Portugal the
benefits of closer relations with the United States, and move Lisbon toward granting
independence to Angola.
Kennedy sent George Ball, Undersecretary of State, to meet with Salazar and do what
Elbrick and Rusk were unable to do: convince the Portuguese to allow self-determination in
Africa and unfettered American access to the Azores. Ball came away from his meeting
convinced that “Salazar was absorbed by a time dimension quite different from ours; it seemed
as though he and his whole country were living in more than one century, and the heroes of the
past were still shaping Portuguese policy.” Portugal seemed to be “ruled by a triumvirate
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consisting of Vasco da Gama, Prince Henry the Navigator, and Salazar.”233 Salazar, a throwback
to Portugal’s past, would not relinquish control of his ancient empire. Ball left the meeting
convinced that Lisbon would remain intransigent on Angola and their colonies. He decided that
American policy should not be about miracles; it should be about results. Ball and ambassador
Anderson were convinced of the need for major changes in U.S. Angola policy.
Kennedy did not live to work out a new course in Angola. The day JFK died in Dallas,
Holden Roberto was in New York, himself convalescing from an assassination attempt in Tunis.
He had expected to meet with the President to discuss an increase in funding and a new aid
package. Instead, Roberto watched Kennedy’s funeral on TV from a New York apartment.234
Angola’s American champion was dead; Roberto returned to Leopoldville (Kinshasa) without
meeting the new president, unclear as to whether the Texan would abandon or emancipate
Angola.

JOHNSON
President Lyndon Johnson inherited an ambiguous Angola and Portuguese policy from
his predecessor. Kennedy had failed to secure either the Azores base or Angola’s independence.
Johnson executed his own Africa strategy that kept the United States aligned with African
nationalism, and also preserved the Azores and the NATO alliance. Johnson received little credit
for his accomplishments.235 His foreign policy team would invest a great deal of time and
political capital in Africa, especially in 1964 and 1965 during the ongoing Congo Crisis, racial
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incidents in South Africa, Zambia’s independence, and Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of
independence. Most important, in 1964 LBJ authorized an expansive aid package to Roberto to
improve his leadership and political operations. Despite such a bold move, events in the Congo
prevented American aid to Roberto from coming to fruition. Nevertheless, Under LBJ the U.S.
created durable relationships that existed, albeit under distress, until the Angolan Civil War in
1975-76.
Roberto forced Angola onto LBJ’s agenda when The New York Times ran the column
“Angolan Rebels to Take Red Aid” on January 4, 1964. He bluntly summed up his needs: “We
are now at a point where a radical change of policy is imperative for us to make headway in our
struggle.” Roberto concluded, “that the Western countries are hypocritical…while paying lip
service to self-determination, the United States supplies its North Atlantic treaty ally, Portugal,
with arms that are used to kill us.”236 Members of the UPA, christened the FNLA in 1962, met
with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his African tour that winter.237 The Chinese promised
the FNLA that they could “have whatever (they) need in arms and money,” an offer Roberto was
eager to accept.238 The American embassy in Leopoldville contacted the Congolese government
immediately. Marcel Lengema, an assistant to Adoula, guaranteed the U.S. that “all material
assistance must be channeled through the Congolese Government. The Angolan government
cannot accept aid directly from abroad.”239 The Department of State sent out a flurry of
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telegrams to the embassies in Leopoldville and Lisbon to discern if Roberto was defecting or
merely trying to send a message to the new American administration.
What was immediately clear was that Roberto’s FNLA needed help. The war stagnated
and regular engagement between opposing forces was replaced with cross-border strikes to
destroy bridges and mine roads while the Portuguese responded by strafing villages and bombing
the countryside with napalm.240 Portugal’s counterinsurgency tactics cut off the people from the
rebels, which limited political organization and recruitment within Angola. The situation in the
Congo was no better. After a visit to Kinkuzu, Marcum claimed that Roberto’s forces ate
irregularly, mainly because they relied on “a combination of handouts from international relief
agencies and food purchases made with scarce funds that might better have been used for
military supplies.”241 FNLA troops rioted sporadically, often with the leadership requiring help
from Mobutu to suppress insurrection. Aid from the OAU had still not materialized; indeed,
nearly “a year after the OAU recognition of the GRAE, then, the dual promise of escalated
insurgency and massive pan-African support remained unfulfilled.”242 Without direct American
assistance, it appeared Roberto would in fact accept aid form China.
The National Security Council organized a series of meetings in the winter and spring of
1964 to determine how to respond. The consensus was that this was a cry for help, rather than a
genuine turn to communism and a rejection of American support. Johnson personally avoided the
NSC’s Roberto meetings in 1964, and instead entrusted the issue to his foreign policy team.
The NSC meeting on February 18, 1964 outlined the potential courses of action. The
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State Department, represented by Undersecretary W. Averell Harriman, pushed for continued
diplomacy with Portugal to seek peace with Roberto. To bolster their argument against direct
support for the Angolan nationalists, the State Department sent a circular airgram to every
African embassy asking for “any information…regarding current reports of internal dissension
within (FNLA) or host government’s views on Holden Roberto’s leadership.”243 The CIA,
USAID and the Africa Bureau of the State Department argued for a comprehensive package of
support to Roberto, “particularly refugee relief, secondary education, educational programs
specifically tailored to potential political leaders, administrative professional governmental
cadres and other such specialized requirements; and other forms of assistance by appropriate
means.”244 Such aid would supplement the relief work already provided by Catholic Relief
Services, Lutheran World Relief, Church World Service, and other religious organizations.245
The NSC appointed a ‘Special Group’ to determine the best course of action, and ordered a full
report on Angola, Portugal, and Roberto.
The first meeting of the NSC’s Angola Special Group convened on March 16. The CIA,
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy presented
the case for an expanded aid package; the State Department argued against.246 George Ball led
the State Department’s opposition, which focused on working with Portugal to seek a negotiated
settlement and a managed transition to majority rule.
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Ball hoped that Ambassador Anderson could convince the Portuguese to take a moderate
stance on Africa, and he had some reason for optimism. Anderson was less confrontational than
Elbrick, and his military background impressed Salazar and Nogueira. Anderson went so far as
to travel to Angola and Mozambique with Portuguese guides, and came back very impressed by
the reforms put in place after hostilities began. Ball commended Anderson for his good rapport
with the Portuguese.247 Anderson’s plan was simple; he attempted to convince Portugal to move
toward self-determination for Angola out of Portugal’s own self-interest. This was his way of
complying with the State Department’s orders to push African issues onto the agenda. One State
Department official likened the task to being “continually charged with the disagreeable task of
trying to get some forward political movement out of the Portuguese Government, while still
being responsible for maintaining good relations.”248 Notwithstanding Anderson’s hard-won
civility with Salazar, his diplomacy produced no breakthroughs for George Ball to use in the
policy debate back in Washington.249
Ball remained adamant that the United States should not back Angolan revels, and wrote
to Secretary of State Rusk “an emphatic dissent” to the military option. His greatest concern was
that “sympathy for the underdog” and “abstract libertarian principles” guided Angola policy, not
the national interest. He was upset that he had personally assured Salazar that the U.S. was not
involved with Roberto, when in fact the CIA had been since 1955. Ball argued that American
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credibility as an ally and honest broker was at stake. Furthermore, the plan the CIA and the
African Bureau promoted constituted “a joint venture with the Communists to undermine a
Western ally.” The core of his argument, however, questioned the underlying assumptions of the
foreign policy inherited by Johnson: “that we must give covert financial aid to the Angolan
Nationalists if they are to be friendly with us after independence.” Ball insisted that the United
States could wait until after independence to engage with Angola. In the Congo, Americans had
been able to thwart a communist advance despite being uninvolved with black politics before
independence and American aid to Belgian colonialism. Ball supported overt aid to refugees and
students, but would not throw his weight behind covert activities.250
G. Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams was the counterweight to Ball. He wrote Rusk stressing
that support provided to Roberto moderated the Angolan revolution. His stated end goal was for
an independent Angola to be a part of a Portuguese commonwealth including Brazil. His fear
was that Angola could develop into “another Congo-like situation” with chaos and rebellion.
Williams believed that aid to Roberto was the only way to prevent that outcome. Additionally,
Angola’s “wide African appeal” gave African leaders “no choice but to back the Angolan and
Mozambique nationalist movements if they are to survive politically themselves.” U.S.
engagement with the region demanded that American policy align with the free African states on
the issue. He prophetically argued that the colonial wars were creating social strains in Portugal,
and that the Portuguese military had become so despondent that it might rebel against Salazar.
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Williams worried that without American pressure to moderate its colonial rule, Portugal had no
future in post-independence Angola.251
Roberto made it difficult for Williams and the Angola hawks. With the war in Angola
stagnated, he worked to make exile living in Kinshasa as comfortable as possible. According to
Marcum, Roberto’s reputation as a rebel fighter took a hit when he “accepted the gift of a black
Mercedes from an anonymous benefactor…(and) took to driving about the Congolese capital in
his shiny new status symbol.”252 Marcum, a big UPA supporter, lamented that “Holden himself
became increasingly a Kinshasa businessman,” and he eventually purchased “four or five
buildings in Kinshasa bought partly with money that the Angolan liberation committee had
placed at his disposal, and partly thanks to American aid and Mobutu’s aid.”253 Roberto lived
less and less like a revolutionary and increasingly like the famous soccer player of his youth.
Angered by the lack of progress in the war and the Bakongo monopoly over leadership positions,
Jonas Savimbi quit the movement. Ovimbundu membership plummeted. A CIA report at the
time expressed doubt as to “Roberto’s long-term stayability (sic) as a leader,” even though the
agency continued to support an expanded Angola program.254 The evidence against Roberto
prevented the Special Group from agreeing to a military course of action.
Bundy, Robert Kennedy and McNamara stressed that Roberto’s problems were political,
and that covert aid was needed to shore up his leadership deficiencies. Bundy highlighted “the
folly of a stubborn adherence to an antique Portuguese policy.” Kennedy “felt strongly that we
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(the United States) could not abandon the movement.” McNamara even went so far as to say that
it was possible the Defense Department could live without the Azores base, and that the Azores
“should not dictate our foreign policy…keeping the USSR out of Africa was more important
than” the airfield.255 On May 21, 1964, the 303 Committee denied military funds, but
unanimously approved covert political funding for the FNLA.256 Soapy Williams met with
Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula in New York to discuss the terms of Roberto’s
increased aid. It seemed that the Untied States was prepared to help Roberto where he needed it
the most, with his leadership and political organization. Although American aid stopped short of
a military equipment, the proposed package had the power to help Roberto recover from his
recent setbacks, and to address the longstanding weaknesses of his movement.

JOHNSON SAVES THE CONGO, LOSES ANGOLA
Unfortunately, Roberto’s American aid never arrived. After the twin shocks of the pullout
of the United Nations peacekeepers and the Congo’s second parliamentary elections, events in
the Congo took an unexpected turn; by July, Adoula was out of power, and rebels led by Che
Guevara captured had Stanleyville, the historic home of Lumumba and a center of the
opposition. Moïse Tshombe, the one-time secessionist leader, came to power, and out of loyalty
to his European business partners, rejected the aid to Roberto. The Congo crisis had flared up
again, and once again, the country appeared on the verge of dissolution or communist takeover.
Mobutu’s oligarchy in Leopoldville quickly lost control of the provinces as the United
Nations troops left the country in stages. As early as the end of 1963, a small rebellion in the east
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expanded into wide swaths of the country.257 Kivu province fell first to rebels led by Laurent
Kabila called ‘The Simbas,’ and as the June 30, 1964 UN withdrawal approached, rebel control
spread. The Simbas were Congolese frustrated by the inefficient and corrupt government in
Leopoldville (Kinshasa). Their political beliefs included Marxist-Leninsm, but their main stay
was their belief in the slain Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Once the UN completed their
departure, rebels allied to the Simbas took control of Stanleyville and announced their secession
from the Congo ruled from Leopoldville.258
Amidst the chaos, Parliament sacked Adoula. The army was inept and the government
remained paralyzed as the country fragmented. In a panic, Congo’s parliament turned to Moïse
Tshombe, the former Katangan secessionist leader, to bring order to the situation. Tshombe
recalled his gendarmes back from Angola and brought his mercenary army with him from
exile.259 He was the only Congolese politician with a personal army, and his connections to
Katanga and its international businesses meant that the hemorrhaging would not extend into the
copperbelt. In a stunning reversal, Roberto’s good friend Adoula was out, Portugal’s ally
Tshombe was in.
With the Congo on the brink of dissolution, Tshombe first turned to his former white
allies. South Africa again provided funding for an army of French and Rhodesian mercenaries.
The new government in Leopoldville attempted to reengage with Portugal, whose ports of Lobito
in Angola and Beira in Mozambique exported the majority of Katanga’s copper. Tshombe
blocked the delivery of aid to the FNLA and disrupted its recruiting efforts, including the newly
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approved American support.260 Reversing the policies of Roberto’s good friend Adoula,
Tshombe cleared the way for President Kasavubu, Roberto’s Bakongo political rival, to openly
challenge the FNLA. It was the first time since immediately after Lumumba’s death that Roberto
found his position in the Congo threatened. Mobutu, whose army was unable to control the
chaos, could only watch on the sidelines.
In a bid to assert total control over the situation, Tshombe met with G. Mennen Williams
and asked him to recall the U.S. ambassador and to stop all support for Roberto. When informed
of the request, President Johnson acquiesced; he told Williams that he was worried that the
Congo was disintegrating. LBJ decided that “time was running out and the Congo must be
saved.”261 The 303 Committee, an oversight panel composed of members from the NSA and
CIA, tabled Roberto’s aid package in response.262 With Tshombe in power, saving the Congo
meant sacrificing Roberto.
In the summer of 1964, with his presidential election campaign underway, Johnson
ordered a covert military campaign in the Congo. The operation would include an “instant air
force” of ground attack planes, a vast mercenary army, foreign paratroopers, and paramilitary
operations.263 The CIA reassigned Larry Devlin to his old post at the CIA Station in Leopoldville
(Kinshasa), where he oversaw Johnson’s secret war and the expansion of the CIA’s mission in
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the Congo. 264 Devlin, a close confidant of the Congolese leadership, wrote in his memoirs that
the he had allowed “the Binza group and Tshombe” to determine “the form, extent and auspices
of the U.S. intervention.”265 The massive program grew into a full-fledged war.
Devlin’s secret army was a conglomeration of distinct, compartmentalized factions.
Tshombe brought his former secessionist gendarmes into the Congolese army, which
undermined Mobutu’s control of the institution. Fighting ahead of the army was a force of
hundreds of foreign mercenaries, including the infamous “Mad Mike” Mike Hoare and Bob
Denard.266 The CIA recruited Cuban exiles from Florida, “veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion,”
to pilot Zaire’s new air force.267 They flew an assortment of obsolete aircraft, many modified for
a ground attack role: thirteen T-28 fighter-bombers, five long-range B-26 attack bombers, three
C-46 transport aircraft, and two small twin-engine liaison planes.268 To maintain and support the
small air armada, the CIA created a front organization, run by Europeans, known as the “Western
International Ground Maintenance Organization,” or WIGMO.269 It was a perfect mixture of
secrecy, deniability, and effectiveness. On paper, these were nothing more than the Congolese
armed forces. In actuality, they were separate groups that operated independently. The CIA
dictated strategy and managed the logistics.
The war reached its climax shortly after LBJ’s victory over Goldwater. Just a week after
the U.S. election, the mercenary army reached the outskirts of Stanleyville. Inside the city, the
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Simbas held “30 Americans and 800 other foreigners, mostly Belgians” hostage.270 Fearing for
the safety of the hostages, the Belgians and the Johnson administration concocted a joint plan to
rescue them. Known as ‘Operation Dragon Rouge,’ the scheme called for a Belgian paratrooper
attack supported by the U.S. Air Force. On November 24, 1964, with the CIA providing air
support, Belgian troops made a combat jump from American C-130s into the besieged city.271
Later that morning the mercenaries began their assault. The combined mercenary and Belgian
force massacred the rebels; the beatings, robbery, rape, torture, and murder committed in the
name of securing the city damaged the standing of the Congo and the United States within the
capitals of Africa.272 Nevertheless, Johnson’s secret war broke the rebellion, and the Congo
remained loyal to the U.S.
In the wake of the upheaval in the Congo, President Johnson ordered a reevaluation of
U.S. Angola policy in December 1964. By that point, Tshombe’s anti-FNLA efforts had taken
full effect. The Congolese government, once an ally, no longer allowed the FNLA to import
weapons. The CIA found the FNLA to be “increasingly ineffective, and has been racked by
mutinies…it is chronically short of food and ammunition, and largely cut off from its own forces
inside Angola where nationalist activity has virtually ceased.” The overall opinion of Roberto
amongst the embassy staff in Leopoldville plummeted. Even his best supporters began to doubt
his leadership after his failings in 1964. John Marcum, author of The Angolan Revolution, added
a special comment to the departmental review; for the first time, he questioned “Roberto’s
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leadership ability and potential.” Marcum’s opinion was particularly damning, given that the
CIA viewed him as “the closest American to Roberto.”273
With Roberto no longer a credible option in the eyes of his closest supporters in
Washington, Johnson decided to switch tracks and try the policy of cautious engagement with
Portugal proposed by George Ball and Admiral Anderson. The first step was to normalize
relations with Portugal. In 1965, the CIA secretly sold Portugal seven B-26 bombers in an
attempt to convince the Portuguese to negotiate a long-term lease for the Azores base.274 By the
summer of 1965, Anderson had created a comprehensive proposal for normalizing PortugueseAmerican relations. The so-called Anderson Plan required Portugal to allow “free political
activity in the territories with full amnesty for refugees” in exchange for “a suspension by
African nationalists of anti-Portuguese activities in the UN.” Anderson promised to resume all
military sales to Portugal if the African nationalists failed to hold up their end of the bargain.275
The Anderson plan offered Portugal an opportunity to escape its status as an international a
pariah and to procure sorely needed American weapons.
By then, however, Portugal had partially insulated itself from American pressure by
securing income and military hardware from other NATO allies. Since the start of the war in
Angola, Portugal had concluded military agreements with France and West Germany, which
lessened their need for American aid. Portugal traded France the rights to a missile tracking
station in the Azores and Germany land for an airfield in Beja in exchange for jet aircraft,
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helicopters, frigates, and submarines.276 After Charles De Gaulle reduced France’s commitment
to NATO in 1966, Portugal assumed greater importance within the alliance system. NATO had
reorganized the alliance’s naval forces losing access to French ports, which led to the creation of
the Iberian Atlantic Command, or IBERLANT, based near Lisbon. IBERLANT forced the
relocation of American Navy resources from Norfolk Virginia, further bolstering the American
military presence in Portugal.277 In addition the lucrative base deals and arms purchases, Portugal
benefitted from full participation within NATO training, standardization, and equipment
purchasing programs. The result was that Salazar and Nogueira rebuffed Anderson’s new
approach. America simply did not have enough leverage to moderate Portuguese colonial
policies. Johnson’s efforts to reach out to Portugal produced even less benefit than his attempt
the previous year to finance and train Roberto.
LBJ had had enough of ineffective Angola/Portugal policies. Rather than pick one side or
the other, Johnson proposed a curse on both houses- Roberto and Salazar. He ordered the Joint
Chiefs in 1965 to minimize the Azores base and all other Portuguese NATO installations in
American military planning. Salazar sensed that his bargaining position had weakened, and in
turn, Portuguese-American relations marginally improved. In December 1965, Johnson placed
George Ball, who was adamantly against arming Roberto, in charge of African policy.278 It was a
clear sign to Salazar that the United States would no longer pursue an activist foreign policy in
regards to Angola.
Roberto’s fortunes improved when Mobutu took power in a coup at the end of 1965. A
new constitution written the previous year switched the roles of the prime minister and the
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president, and both Tshombe and Kasavubu wanted the newly empowered presidency.279 The
National Security Council wanted the “two Congolese prima donnas” to retain their own offices,
which Mobutu cynically characterized as, “a Johnson-Goldwater ticket” for the Congo, even
though neither was a member of the Binza group.280 In a repeat of the 1960 coup that led to
Lumumba’s death, Kasavubu extra-constitutionally fired Tshombe. Amidst the madness, and a
potential return to chaos, Mobutu, with approval from Devlin, launched his second coup in five
years.281 With the support of the army high command, he declared the end of the Congolese
Republic and sacked the government. Mobutu declared Tshombe the “chief enemy of the
regime,” and on December 23, the one-time president of Katanga and Prime Minister of the
Congo left for exile in Europe.282 Mobutu had emerged from his powerful position behind the
scenes to take the reins. For the United States and Roberto, it meant that their main now ally
directly controlled the Congo’s destiny.
President Johnson remained staunchly committed to Mobutu following the coup. When
mercenaries loyal to Tshombe mutinied against Mobutu in 1967, LBJ sent him three C-130 cargo
planes, despite the disapproval of Congress.283 For Mobutu, the gesture reinforced his
understanding of the Congo-U.S. relationship; that the United States understood the Cold War
was ‘hot’ in Africa, and in times of need, Mobutu could count on America to provide swift
support.
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Mobutu secured Roberto’s place in the Congo. Although his fortunes had waned, the war
against Portugal stagnated, and his movement splintered, Roberto no longer worried whether his
host government might evict him. As a fixture in the courtier life of the capital, Roberto
continued to meet discreetly with personnel in Kinshasa (Leopoldville) under a policy of
“maintaining unobtrusive but useful contacts with Portuguese African nationalist leaders” as
outlined in a National Policy Paper on Portugal.284 Throughout the final years of the Johnson
presidency, Roberto continued to update the embassy on the GRAE, his relations the Congolese
government, and his disagreements with other Angolan nationalists.285 However, Roberto’s
moment had passed. By 1969, the momentum from his 1961 invasion was gone. The MPLA, and
a new rival, UNITA, slowly replaced Roberto on the international stage as symbols of Angolan
nationalism. More than ever, Roberto focused on survival rather than the fight against the
Portuguese. Even under Mobutu’s care, Roberto would struggle to control the GRAE/FNLA in
its struggles against its rivals.

THE PROBLEM OF ZAMBIA, RHODESIA, & SOUTH AFRICA
The Johnson years saw the rise of a new crisis in Africa that hardened the animosities
between the whites and blacks of southern Africa. Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of
independence (U.D.I.) in 1965 created a new white pariah state, whose existence imperiled
Zambia, which had only been independent from Britain since 1964. Rhodesia quickly became a
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close ally to Portugal and South Africa, and the United States increasingly viewed the racial
conflicts in southern Africa as one issue.
Shortly after the 1964 election, Johnson and his foreign policy team engaged with the
British to mitigate the push by Rhodesia for independence and to support the fledgling nation of
Zambia. The fear was that Rhodesia would retaliate against Zambia’s support for black rebels by
strangling the Zambian economy. Landlocked Zambia, whose mineral riches rivaled the Katanga
province across the border in the Congo, relied on completely the white regimes of colonial
Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Africa to export its raw materials. Furthermore, mining
operations in Zambia required electrical power from the Kariba Dam, and the industry’s smelting
and transport needs required coal from Rhodesia’s mines at Wankie. Of immense strategic
importance for the United States and Great Britain was the region’s copper, which the American
ambassador to Zambia described as “25 percent of free-world copper production.”286 Rhodesia
also contained precious ores, most important of which was chrome. Rhodesia was the West’s
most reliable source of chrome, and many in the United States, including Senator Harry Byrd of
Virginia, favored good relations with Rhodesia to maintain access to that strategic resource.
Copper and chrome helped to make Rhodesia the center of white-black confrontation in Africa; it
remained so until the South African invasion of Angola in 1975.
Rhodesia declared independence from Britain on Veterans Day, 1965, which began a
prolonged and bloody war to maintain white supremacy. Both the United States and Great
Britain sought to overthrow the Rhodesian regime and set the British colony on the course to
majority-rule. Johnson deferred leadership on the issue to the British, which still claimed control
of the erstwhile colony. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson explored several options to end
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the crisis, of which all required massive American support. Britain initially proposed that the
United States airlift Zambia’s copper to world markets in order to choke the lucrative
transportation business operated by Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The American
ambassador to Zambia, Robert Good, estimated that the airlift would have required 94,500 flying
hours and cost $85 million.287 The United States preferred a British invasion, which Wilson
rejected for fear that it would become a repeat of the Boer Wars. The military option was deemed
unfeasible due to British difficulties moving troops abroad and American military commitments
in NATO, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Dominican Republic.288 Without a credible military
option, Britain struggled to find a solution.
Reflecting their weak economy and diminished power in the world, the British took a
non-confrontational approach. In 1966, The UN passed a comprehensive embargo against
Rhodesia, and the United States and Britain fully complied. Rather than bringing Rhodesia to
heel, the embargo helped bring the white regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal
together for mutual defense and increased trade.289 Portugal and South Africa ignored the
embargo and allowed landlocked Rhodesia, already dependent on the two countries for access to
the world economy, to avoid the crippling sanctions. The only country to feel real suffering was
Zambia, whose President Kenneth Kaunda straddled a fine line between confrontation with white
dominated minority regimes on one hand, and active participation in the economy of the region
on the other.290 Robert Komer of the National Security Council wrote to the President that “the
longer the Rhodesian boil goes unbalanced, the sharper the confrontation over the Southern third
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of Africa will become.”291 Britain’s decision to take a strong rhetorical stand without real action
was the opposite of what Washington had hoped for.
South Africa’s support for Rhodesia was the crux of the problem. However, with its
vibrant economy a sound investment choice for American and British businesses, South Africa
remained an unlikely foe. Both Washington and London acknowledged that meaningful change
in southern Africa required a direct confrontation with the Apartheid state, yet neither was
willing to assume the cost. British companies had over three billion dollars invested in South
Africa, and together America and Britain enjoyed a one billion dollar favorable balance of
payments with Pretoria. South Africa produced 70 percent of the West’s annual output of gold,
which also helped insulate it from sanctions. In 1967, the U.S. Defense Department estimated
“that a blockade against South Africa alone would require four carrier task forces (4 carriers, 24
destroyers and 3 submarines),” and that a deployment over six months would require additional
forces due to “rotational and repair requirements.” A blockade of Portuguese Angola and
Mozambique would require an even larger force, and could result “in a possible military
confrontation” between NATO allies.292 The only American naval operation of comparable size
occurred in the Pacific Theater of WWII. With the cost of direct confrontation so high, Johnson’s
options for dealing with South Africa were limited.
Despite few good options, LBJ did his best to apply pressure against the Apartheid state.
In 1964, he reinterpreted his predecessor’s military embargo against South Africa to deny all
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weapons sales to the Apartheid government, even those that Kennedy had previously
exempted.293 This decision upset defense contractors and their supporters in Congress, a cost
LBJ was willing to absorb. After a controversy caused by the South African denial of shore leave
for black sailors from the USS Independence in 1965, the United States Navy boycotted South
African ports. The boycott became untenable as the war in Vietnam escalated and the Navy’s
Atlantic Fleet traveled to and from Southeast Asia via the Cape. Meanwhile, South African
authorities insisted that all American sailors on shore leave participate in segregated activities.
This led to a minor international incident when the USS FDR stopped at Cape Town to refuel.
Johnson cancelled shore leave for the FDR, and he ruled out all future use of South African ports
until “no racial conditions were imposed” on American sailors.294 These small symbols of
defiance angered Pretoria and made South African officials pine for a friendly government in
Washington that left race out of international relations.
In 1966, Johnson spoke to the issue of the racist regimes in southern Africa in an address
to the Organization of African Unity, which the White House billed as “the first address by an
American President devoted wholly to Africa.”295 Bill Moyers encouraged Johnson to give the
speech “for foreign policy reasons” and as “a cheap way to keep the civil rights people quiet.”296
He also wanted the president to pre-empt Bobby Kennedy’s 1966 trip to South Africa in his
preparation for a presidential run in 1968. Moyers wanted a strong speech, so that Johnson would
not “simply offer economic assistance and material aid while Kennedy trots off making hay on
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the intangible issue of the rights of man.”297 With these political objectives in mind, Johnson
delivered his speech to the OAU.
LBJ spoke in broad terms on natural rights and freedoms, including the “inalienable right
of all people to control their destiny” and the basic rights “to secure the right of self-government,
to build strong democratic institutions, and to improve the level of every citizen’s being.”298 He
deplored “the more repugnant (and) narrow-minded, outmoded policy which in some parts of
Africa permits the few to rule at the expense of the many,” Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa,
for example. 299 The OAU speech helped heal the wounds of Stanleyville and the Anderson plan,
which had hurt America’s standing in independent Africa. It showed that the United States
viewed the region holistically, which increased the sense of isolation and despair amongst the
white powers of southern Africa. The United States, once a segregationist nation that openly
allied with colonial and white supremacist powers, now seemed firmly on the side of black
Africa. At least, such was the case under Johnson.

UNITA & THE EASTERN FRONT
In 1964, when Jonas Savimbi left the GRAE/FNLA, he took with him a cadre of nonBakongo members. Even before Savimbi’s falling out with the organization, these Ovimbundu,
Chokwe, Nganguela, and Sele Angolans had formed an ‘Opposition Group’ that challenged
Roberto’s leadership within the GRAE.300 It was this group that had rioted at Kinkuzu and
incurred the wrath of Mobutu’s soldiers. Savimbi had also built his own “independent political
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base in Katanga,” amongst the non-Bakongo refugee community there.301 It was because of this
local support that Savimbi had expected to lead guerrilla activities based in Katanga. Due to
Savimbi’s growing personal power, including budding relationships with various African
leaders, Roberto had already taken moves to oust him even before Savimbi quit. The final straw
came in 1964 in Cairo.
Savimbi was supposed to be in Switzerland attending classes when the OAU convened
the Cairo Conference of Heads of State and Government in July 1964. Savimbi surprised the
attendees when he arrived and discovered his seat taken by one of Roberto’s close friends. Angry
that Roberto replaced him, Savimbi sought out Roberto to no avail. Dejected, Savimbi called a
press conference and announced his resignation in an accusation-filled tirade.302 Savimbi stayed
in Cairo a few days to make further contacts with conference attendees, including Malcolm X.303
Despite his fallout with Roberto, Savimbi remained committed to the Angolan revolution, by any
means necessary.
Devoid of a powerbase, Savimbi turned to his contacts in the socialist camp. Throughout
the end of 1964 and early 1965, he visited the MPLA leadership in Brazzaville, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, as well as making three significant stops
in Algeria, North Vietnam, and China.304 In Algeria, Savimbi met with Che Guevara, who he had
previously met in January 1964. The highlight of his North Vietnamese tour was a chance to talk
strategy with General Vo Nguyen Giap. None of the trips, however, was more important to
301
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Savimbi than China. After an initial rebuff from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the elder Chinese
revolutionaries agreed “to train some of his men and to give them support.” After completing his
degree in Switzerland in July 1965, Savimbi spent the rest of the year in China attending
guerrilla warfare classes at the Nanking Military Academy. Throughout that fall and winter,
other Savimbi followers joined him for training.305 With his vanguard ready, Savimbi went back
to Africa to start his own movement.
In 1966, Savimbi trekked into Angola from Zambia and declared himself the leader of the
Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). UNITA’s manifesto was neither procommunist nor pro-western. Marcum described Savimbi’s political program as “purposively
inclusive,” with a focus on fighting a war of “Angolans within Angola.”306 Savimbi’s forces split
up into small groups in Angola’s southeast, where they focused on grass roots organizing.307
Savimbi combined Protestant methods of evangelism and social justice with political theory
learned in Switzerland and China.308 In addition to training in political and guerrilla warfare,
Savimbi planned a series of spectacular attacks to punctuate the expansion of the war into
Angola’s vast eastern provinces.
UNITA began offensive operations in December. First was a full frontal assault on a
logging camp at Cassamba protected by two hundred Portuguese soldiers, which resulted in no
Portuguese killed and several UNITA casualties.309 However, it was a Christmas day attack on
Teixeira de Sousa, a railroad town near the border with the Congo, which captured international
attention and elicited a major Portuguese response. At the cost of over 300 UNITA dead,
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Savimbi and his men damaged aircraft, freed prisoners, killed Portuguese, and most important,
cut the Benguela railroad, which disrupted Zambian and Katangan copper shipments for a
week.310 Portugal responded with the same kind of indiscriminate attacks and troop buildup that
they employed in the North in 1961. In early 1967, UNITA cut the rail line and derailed trains,
attacks that both the MPLA and FNLA quickly distanced themselves from, allegedly out of
respect for Zambia and Zaire. In response, Kenneth Kaunda closed the border of Zambia to
Savimbi, sealing the movement in Angola.311
After his initial assaults on Portuguese targets in Angola’s sparsely populated eastern
provinces, Savimbi’s movement settled into community organizing, small-scale guerrilla
operations, and sporadic firefights with the MPLA. By 1967, the MPLA had also started
operations in eastern Angola, but with free access to the Zambian border, its leadership remained
safely out of Angola. The MPLA questioned UNITA’s military effectiveness; allegations that
UNITA avoided Portuguese patrols and frequently fought against other Angolans dogged
Savimbi.312 It was important to Savimbi for his own personal movement to have strong support
from the countryside, in direct contrast to Roberto’s exile politics. Savimbi operated outside the
internationally recognized center of Angolan exile politics and remained an obscure figure until
independence in 1975. Without the courtesan politics of a foreign capital, UNITA focused on
building grass roots in the bush. In 1971, an Austrian reporter visited Savimbi’s camps in Angola
and “reported that the area was “well-organized and well-run,” the “administrative process
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worked,” and that discipline was the best of the many guerrilla and underground movements he
had seen.”313

CONCLUSION
President Lyndon Johnson and his foreign policy team spent a surprising amount of time
on African issues. As the crises in Africa piled up, they increasingly required president Johnson’s
direct involvement. He tried to create a breakthrough from the stagnant policy he inherited from
Kennedy on Angola and Portugal to little avail. However, Johnson’s secret war in the Congo
helped Mobutu crush the rebels who would pose the greatest challenge to his rule until a
rebellion swept him from power in 1997. Despite the uneven nature of American support during
this period, Roberto remained loyal to the United States.
By the end of the Kennedy and Johnson years, the war in Angola developed into the
stalemate it would maintain until the civil war. America maintained an arms-length relationship
with Roberto, while at the same time the United States embracing patron, Mobutu. The
GRAE/FNLA remained weak, yet relevant, after the departure of Savimbi, whose own forces
heralded the start of the “tripartite phase” of the war, and its expansion into the east. Rebellions
in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique in 1963 and 1964 further taxed the Portuguese regime.
Nevertheless, even the 1968 death of Salazar did not change the status quo, and to the dismay of
the White House, the Estado Novo continued for another seven years under Marcelo Caetano. 314
Worse still, American control of the Azores remained tenuous, the whites of southern Africa
clung to Apartheid, and the United States appeared powerless to change either situation.
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Chapter 3: Operation IAFEATURE and the Failure of American Policy
Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford evidenced little interest in Africa, with
devastating consequences for U.S. foreign policy in the region. Nixon and his foreign policy
guru, Henry Kissinger, concluded that “the whites are here to stay” in southern Africa, and with
that mindset, dropped the Angola program specifically and American support for black regimes
in the region in general.315 Meanwhile, the war in Angola simmered, Mobutu’s army decayed,
and South Africa sought to protect itself through regional diplomacy. Portugal seemingly
benefitted from the new administration in Washington, but with wars continuing across Africa
and tensions building at home, the fate of Angola remained uncertain. The new American policy
relied on Portugal’s ability to maintain control of its colonies, as well as the stability of the
Lisbon government. These underpinnings proved to be the undoing of America’s war in Angola.
Kissinger, at the helm of American foreign policy after Nixon’s resignation, failed to
recognize the severity of the situation in Angola. By the time Kissinger realized the importance
of the revolution and latent civil war there, it was almost too late to implement a strategy to help
Holden Roberto wrest control of Angola. Once he did pick a course of action, Kissinger chose a
flawed strategy, codenamed IAFEATURE. Before Congress ended the covert operation, it had
already failed militarily, diplomatically, and politically. Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the MPLA
had in effect defeated the United States in a direct confrontation, little more than six months after
the Fall of Saigon. In the process, Washington embraced an alliance with South Africa. Angola
became the center of the Cold War in Africa, and the United States became mired in a strategic
partnership the ultra-nationalist, racist regime in Pretoria.
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The disastrous chain of events that played out during Angola’s independence in 1975 was
not preordained. In fact, the unraveling of twenty years of American relations with Holden
Roberto and the plight of Angola was the result of conscious decisions by the Nixon and Ford
administrations. Although Kennedy and Johnson were unable to liberate Angola or build a strong
Congolese (Zairian) military, they had adopted a policy that committed the U.S. to black Africa
in its struggle against white oppression. It was only after the loss of Angola and the diplomatic
fallout from the entente with South Africa that Kissinger realized the importance of aligning
America against the white regimes in Africa. It was a complete turnaround for the man who as
National Security Advisor had disregarded the importance of the conflict five years before. The
price of Kissinger’s miscalculation and ignorance regarding Africa was the national
embarrassment of the United States, and an escalation of the Cold War.

CHANGING OF THE GUARD
Richard Nixon’s bold vision for reinventing the international system and preserving
America’s dominance required a reevaluation of American foreign policy. Nixon “intended to be
a foreign policy president,” committed to demonstrating a greater understanding of the forces at
work in the world than his predecessor.316 He spoke of taking “the long view,” in international
affairs, in order “to realize our destiny of preserving peace and freedom in the world.”317 On the
campaign trail he promised to “end the war and win the peace” in Vietnam.318 It was a message
designed to save a flagging superpower from decline. Part of Nixon’s proposed grand strategy
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for the United States was a reevaluation of American policy in Africa, and ultimately, a tragic
new course.
Nixon and Kissinger understood all too well the power of decolonization to create
superpower confrontation. The Vietnam quagmire illustrated this point clearly. Kissinger
understood the emerging nation’s role in global affairs, especially how “new nations” that
“weigh little in the physical balance of power” have the power to change “the moral balance of
the world.”319 Nixon directly addressed the developing world in his first inaugural address when
he described an ideal peace as one that includes “compassion for those who have suffered; with
understanding for those who have opposed us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of this
earth to choose their own destiny.”320 Nixon foresaw that with “the decentralization of
communist control has come an appropriately tailored shift in communist tactics… in some ways
more dangerous” than those pursued during the first two decades of the Cold War.321
Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger both underestimated the latent superpower conflict in
southern Africa.
At the core of Nixon’s misunderstanding was his willingness to accept the Apartheid
government, Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, and Portugal as legitimate African powers. In 1967, Nixon
told a crowd of California conservatives, “the Communist appeal was against colonialism…Now
that the colonialists are gone, they must base their case on being for Communism.”322 In his first
year in office, he naively told the OAU that his vision was for “the Continent to be free of great
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power rivalry or conflict in any form,” and he defined the “problems in the southern region of the
Continent” as racial, rather than post-imperial. Nixon told Africa’s leaders that the United States
rejected violence, and that he held both sides equally responsible for the insurgencies in
Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese Africa.323 In private, Nixon told a gathering of American
ambassadors “Africa will not govern itself for 200 years.”324 The new president sought an end to
Johnson’s Africa policies, and Kissinger agreed. On April 3 1969, with approval from his boss,
Kissinger ordered a complete re-evaluation of America’s Africa strategy.325
Before the Africa review began, a chance encounter between Nixon and Marcelo Caetano
of Portugal made it clear that the new American president sought fundamental change. In March
1969, shortly after Nixon took office, former President Dwight Eisenhower passed away from a
heart condition. Despite the frosty relations between the United States and Portugal under
Johnson, or perhaps because of them, Caetano came to Washington “to show Portugal’s esteem
for the late President,” and to improve relations with the United States. Nixon agreed to meet
with the Portuguese dictator, and together they agreed to end the bitterness between their
countries.326 Foreign Minister Nogueira followed up on Caetano’s trip weeks later and an

323

“U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the Congress by
Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 18, 1970 - Document 7,”
February 18, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1,
Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d7.
324
“Memorandum of Conversation - Document 31,” July 29, 1969, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d31.
325
“Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon - Document 5,” April 3, 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus196976v28.
326
“Memorandum of Conversation - Document 253,” April 1, 1969, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d253.
99

agreement between the heads of state was formalized. Nixon and Kissinger came to an
understanding with Portugal that the U.S. would cut off all contact with the FNLA and downplay
the racial conflict in Southern Africa. Nixon assured Nogueira that “his was a new administration
with a completely open mind.”327 At an official state dinner during the visit, Nixon went further
and told the Portuguese diplomat “I’ll never do to you what Kennedy did.”328
The Nixon-Caetano agreement portended the new American approach to African affairs.
Portugal, the last of the colonial powers, was viewed negatively by every independent African
state. The wars in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau ranked with the Rhodesian war and
Apartheid as the greatest foreign policy concerns of the continent. Both the Organization of
Africa Unity and the United Nations had condemned Portugal for its colonial abuses, and both
had standing committees whose sole purposes were to coordinate and finance the rebel
movements against Portugal. That is precisely why Johnson and Kennedy refused to meet
directly first with Salazar and later Caetano. The meeting between the heads-of-state and their
quickly hashed out agreement showed Nixon’s priorities.
The rapprochement between Nixon and Caetano presaged the outcome of the Africa
review. Kissinger’s April 10, 1969, National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 “directed
a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa (south of Congo (K) and
Tanzania).” NSSM 39 asked the National Security Council to “review…the area as a whole –
including Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Portuguese territories, and adjacent African
states.”329 It was implicitly a review of the white dominated states, with the unspoken aim of
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improving relations with them. Mobutu’s Congo was outside of its scope. This decision to
decouple the alliance with Mobutu from the racial conflicts to the south had grave consequences,
as would the shift to dealing with the white powers, instead of building better relations with the
black states.
The final report, completed in December 1969, surveyed the region and American
interests there and put forward five policy options, each a total package intended to guide
American Africa policy for the rest of Nixon’s term in office. They ranged from “cutting ties
with the white regimes” to normalizing “relations with all governments of the area,” including
the white ones. Kennedy and Johnson’s policy was one of the five options, considered the
second-most favorable toward black Africans. The review lambasted the status quo as ineffective
and costly, and declared that United States had no “vital security interests” in Africa. It also
rejected “black violence” as a means to end post-colonial racial conflicts. Given this sharp
rebuke to the status quo and its perceived lack of advantages, Nixon chose to pursue closer
relations with Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portugal and to end all support for black nationalists.
The premise of this option was that “the whites are here to stay,” which became the basis of
Nixon’s Africa policies.330
Critics of Nixon labeled his decision “The Tar-Baby Option” for its focus on improving
relations with the white powers.331 The choice was not surprising, given the close relationship
between members of the incoming Republican administration and white African business
interests, and Nixon’s view that Africa was “a peripheral issue.” Dean Acheson had lobbied
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Nixon to make a change, and Secretary of State William Rogers proved a willing instrument.332
These men devised the new policy, which asserted American support of African selfdetermination, but in practice increased aid and commerce with the white regimes. NSSM 39
called for more intelligence sharing with the white regimes, as well as a softening of the various
embargoes levied against Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa during the 1960s. Even though
the memorandum stated it was “doubtful” that this change could improve relations with the white
regimes and disengage with black rebel groups, it represented the closest strategy to Nixon and
Kissinger’s preferences.333
Nixon and Kissinger faithfully executed ‘tar-baby’ up to 1976. The United States allowed
the sale of “non-lethal” or “dual use” materiel to all three white-dominated African governments.
On Rhodesia, Nixon supported passage of the Byrd Amendment, which excluded chrome from
the Rhodesian embargo. Tim Borstelmann has noted that the amendment made the United States
“the only nation in explicit legislative defiance of its UN obligations regarding sanctions.”334 A
corollary of the dismissive attitude towards Africa was the official view that the continent had
become a dormant theater of the Cold War. Reports throughout Nixon’s tenure downplayed the
‘soft power’ gains of the Soviet Union and China in Africa, and rejected the seriousness of their
ability to make inroads in the region.335 Despite this optimistic outlook on Africa and the
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prospects for communist gains there, Nixon’s team did concede two facts: that limiting South
Africa’s influence in Angola was in the national interest, and that the relationship with Mobutu
was America’s greatest regional asset.336 Whereas Nixon and Kissinger ignored the concern
about Angola, they invited Mobutu to the United States in 1970 with the hope of maintaining the
strategic partnership.

MOBUTUISM
After the Congo’s penultimate coup of 1965, Joseph Mobutu embarked on a grand
project to build the state in his image.337 His ‘New Regime’ sought to build “a unified,
centralized nation state, the restoration of the economic order and fulfillment of the manifest
destiny of rapid development which its rich natural resource base seemed to promise.”338 During
his early years in power, the economy experienced substantial gains. Mobutu initially claimed
legitimacy as a transitional figure, the one leader able to rid the state of corruption and the
influence of Tshombe and his Europeans allies. However, by 1967, he had installed single-party
rule with himself as patrimonial leader.339 Crawford Young identified Mobutu’s “array of praisenames daily reiterated in the regime media: Guide of the Zairian revolution, the Helmsman,
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Father of the Nation, Founding President.” As part of the official policy of “Mobutuism,” his
image appeared everywhere, including on the front page of all newspapers almost every day.340
Mobutuism existed despite the fact that the army, the national institution most identified
with the regime, was the greatest weakness of the Congolese state. A continuation of the old
Force Publique, the military had received training from a variety of nations during the 1960s
with mixed results. By far the most effective units were the five airborne battalions, trained by
Israel. The CIA relinquished control of the air force, which had been a critical factor in defeating
the rebels in 1964-1965, and the air branch languished without American oversight. After the
1967 rebellion the army discharged the last of Tshombe’s mercenaries. Mobutu continued to
hope that new training regimens could make the military an effective fighting force.341 The
American embassy in Kinshasa agreed upon the importance of supporting the military, and
recommended a continuation of the “MAP, Defense Attaché and USIS language programs,” and
to help modernize the Congolese army into a leaner, more effective fighting force.342 Despite its
deficiencies, the army remained an important constituency and source of power for the ‘New
Regime.’
To further consolidate his power, Mobutu dismantled the Binza group and stripped its
members of power.343 As dictator, Mobutu could directly influence all matters of state without
sharing power and access with the oligarchy. He was no longer America’s man in the shadows,
but rather, a strong man in the mold of South Korea’s Yun Bo-seon and Reza Pahlavi, the Shah
of Iran.
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Holden Roberto survived Mobutu’s purge of political elites. Holden went to great lengths
to secure his position in Kinshasa, including the controversial decision to divorce his first wife
Suzanne; he then married a woman from the same village as Mobutu’s first wife, which
established a form of familial bond between the two men.344 Mobutu’s dismantling of the
Congo’s political parties removed Roberto’s Bakongo rival, former-President Kasavubu and his
ABAKO party from the scene. As a member of Mobutu’s inner circle and a businessman in
Kinshasa, Roberto benefitted from the concentration of wealth and power of the regime. Free to
politic in the Bakongo heartland, Roberto provided a modicum of stability in the critical BasCongo district. Support for the Angolan revolution bolstered Mobutu’s revolutionary credentials,
and temporarily masked his dictatorial intentions. His leadership in the last great anti-colonial
struggle also raised his stature as an African statesman.
When President Nixon and Mobutu met in 1970, the Congolese leader stressed the need
for modernization of the Congolese army and continued American support for Holden Roberto.
His top priorities were C-130 transport aircraft and M-16 rifles, and he pressed for both
throughout the Nixon presidency. These were pressing concerns, given the vast size of the
Congo, the undependable nature of its roads, and the outdated Belgian weapons of the army.
Nixon was amenable to the demands, but warned that finding the funds in Congress was “a
problem.”345 Mobutu closed their discussion with an impassioned plea for American support for
Roberto, and emphasized how critical Angola was to Zaire’s security.346 Nixon offered to raise
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the issue with the Portuguese, but did not reconsider the moratorium on contact with
independence movements.
None of Mobutu’s entreaties affected American policy. The goal was to make Mobutu
feel like an important head of state, and by wining and dining him, placate him enough to allow
the U.S. to ignore the Congo entirely. To Nixon and Kissinger, Mobutu was an exotic holdover
from an earlier time, a personality who only needed their ego petted to maintain the relationship.
Kissinger regarded the rearmament as a ridiculous demand meant to raise Mobutu’s prestige at
home in the Congo.
On Angola, Kissinger believed that due to the importance of the Benguela railway to
copper production, Mobutu would seek a U.S.-brokered rapprochement with Portugal and come
to view the FNLA as a nuisance. The President, the NSC, and the State Department all agreed
that without such an alliance, the question of Mobutu’s relationship with Roberto prevented the
sale of weapons to the Congo. The State Department especially worried that Portugal would
interpret arming Mobutu as a veiled attempt by the United States to support the FNLA, and
would therefore jeopardize negotiations to reach a new Azores agreement.347 As Mobutu moved
his nation forward towards his vision for modernity, a profound divide developed between
Washington and its African strongman because of their differing views of the Cold War in Africa
and the anti-colonial struggle in Angola.
In 1971, Mobutu announced a new initiative to boost the Congo’s self-image; the nation
would forsake all European names in favor of ‘authentic’ African ones. Congo became Zaire.
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Joseph Desiré Mobutu became Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga.348 The name
changes were accompanied by a dramatic period of state expansion, economic growth, and the
development of a highly sophisticated, dictatorial kleptocracy. In conjunction with making
‘Authenticity’ was “the centerpiece of state ideology,” Mobutu embarked on a vast public work’s
program that included:
“The doubling of copper production; completion of the second stage of the Inga dam
development; construction of a 1,200 mile, direct current high-tension power line to
transport the dam’s energy to the Shaba mines completion od the national rail line from
Shaba to Kinshasa, and its extension to a new deep-water port at Banana (with a huge
bridge at Matadi), development of coastal and offshore oilwells, (sic) a steel mill near
Kinshasa, an aluminum mill and a uranium enrichment plant near the Inga dam;
promotion of a third “development pole” at Kisangani, liked by rail to the national
network.”349
In total, the ‘authenticity’ program led a vast diversification of the Zairian economy, and a bold
attempt to achieve economic independence. The Inga-Shaba complex gave Mobutu a ‘kill
switch’ over the economy of Shaba (Katanga), and infrastructure improvements had the potential
to end Zaire’s dependence on white dominated regimes in the copper trade by replacing the
Benguela railway. Mobutu turned to a wide group of international investors, not just his
traditional Belgian supporters, to secure the credit required for the buildings program.
Mobutu grew wildly rich during this period. His wealth came from direct ownership of
industries, and from a vast system of corruption. According to Crawford Young and Thomas
Turner, corruption was not “a lubricant for the state”; “in Zaire corruption became the system.”
In Mobutu’s own words, the government was “one vast marketplace,” with all services and
transactions subject to an “invisible tax.”350 As his wealth grew, Mobutu became more eccentric,
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and in the early 1970s he developed his iconic costume, which Michaela Wrong described as: the
“leopardskin toque, Buddy Holly glasses and the carved cane so imbued with presidential force
mere mortals, it was said, could never hope to lift it.”351 He was rapidly becoming the kind of
character no administration in Washington could get behind.
Yet, Sheldon Vance, American Ambassador to Kinshasa, cultivated the relationship with
Mobutu with the skill and personality of Larry Devline. Vance quickly grew close to Mobutu, so
close that the Zairian strongman told Nixon and Kissing that the two men shared “morning
coffee just about every day.”352 The American ambassador worked to portray Mobutu’s radical
reforms as moderate and pro-American. Vance pointed out to Washington that Zaire hired
American firms for large-scale construction projects, including the Inga-Shaba dam and
transmission line. He also tempered Kissinger’s expectation that Mobutu planned to drop
Roberto because support for the Angolan cause reinforced his “anti-colonial” credentials.353
Vance did not advocate for Roberto like he did for Mobutu, but he did not lobby against the
GRAE president either.
Meanwhile, the FNLA struggled to regain the initiative against Portugal, UNITA, and the
MPLA. The war in Angola’s northern coffee region and the wooded Dembos region continued at
its slow, monotonous pace. Roberto finally organized an eastern office of the FNLA in Katanga,
but cross-border activity remained low. Roberto consolidated the leadership of the GRAE/FNLA
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and finally focused on party organization and political programming. However, his troops
remained restless. Revolts continued at the FNLA’s main base at Kinkuzu.354 American National
Intelligence Estimates interpreted this as a major defeat for Roberto and a sign that Mobutu’s
patience with the Angolan revolution had ended. Kissinger agreed and hoped that Zaire would
reject the FNLA and instead embrace Portugal as a regional trading partner.355 The Nixon
administration was reading its own regional assumptions onto Zairian foreign policy.
Washington had given up on Roberto and chosen Portugal, which led to assuming the same from
America’s regional allies. A rapprochement between Mobutu and the Portuguese, however,
proved to be elusive.

THE MPLA AND THE EASTERN FRONT
While Kissinger and Nixon continued to ignore Angola, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) kicked off a general offensive at the start of the dry season in
1970. Although the MPLA had engaged in the east since 1966, the new operation represented the
fruits of four years of organizing. Led by Daniel Chipenda, an Ovimbundu, the ‘Eastern Front’
component of the MPLA broke the stalemate in the war against Portugal. MPLA fighters had
used Zambia as a rear-base since 1966, and slowly infiltrated fighters and political operatives
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into Angola. By 1970, this insurgent force in lightly populated Eastern Angola was ready to
engage Portuguese bases and population centers.
Unlike Holden Roberto’s 1961 offensive, or Jonas Savimbi’s first UNITA attacks, the
MPLA designed the war in the east as an integrated military and political effort. The strategy
called for creating ‘liberated zones’ in rough terrain, where MPLA cadres could educate, recruit,
and train the local population. Made up of mostly ethnic Mbundu from around the capital or
creoles, the MPLA political cadre suffered from a lack of language skills and ethnic credentials.
The peoples of Angola’s far east represented smaller ethnic groups, and few had been in contact
with the Portuguese long enough for the colonial language to serve as lingua franca. Led by the
poet-physician Agostinho Neto, the MPLA leadership struggled to foment revolution in the
countryside.
Agostinho Neto was an inspirational leader hailing from the Mbundu-Creole component
of the MPLA. Born in 1922 in Luanda’s hinterland, Neto’s father was a Methodist preacher. He
was famous amongst the Mbundu for being one of few native Angolans to attend one of
Angola’s two high schools; he later studied medicine on a Methodist scholarship at the
University of Lisbon and the University of Coimbra.356 Before Neto left for medical school in
Portugal, he wrote poetry taking his place among the vibrant literary community of Luanda’s
educated elites studying in Europe. In 1948, this small group of poets and scholars founded a
literary journal, the Mensagem (Message) that became the handbook of the MPLA leadership in
exile.357 In Portugal as a college student, Neto soon met Portuguese dissidents and communists
and joined the anti-Salazar resistance. Neto and Jonas Savimbi worked together for a short
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period before Neto’s arrest in 1960.358 This small group of future MPLA revolutionaries reached
out to the Soviet Union in 1958, and by 1960, senior leaders were making regular trips to
Moscow. In response to these entreaties, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced, “the
patriots of Angola can be sure that the sympathies of the peoples of the great Soviet Union are
fully on their side.” Initial Soviet funding reached the MPLA in 1961.359 By the time Neto
finished his studies in Lisbon, he was a doctor of tropical medicine and had been in and out of
Portuguese prisons since 1952.
Neto’s fame grew during his time spent in prison. During the 1950s, leading intellectuals
such as Jean-Paul Sartre, André Mauriac, Aragon and Simone de Beauvoir, Nicolás Guillén, and
Diego Rivera protested his imprisonment.360 While abroad in Portugal, Neto married a
Portuguese woman, Maria Eugénia, and took her and their new son to Angola in 1959. He
opened his own general medicine practice in Luanda, but the PIDE arrested him in 1960 during a
crackdown in preparation for Congolese independence.361 On February 4, 1961, Neto was in
custody when hundreds of Africans armed with nothing but knives and clubs attacked the main
prison in Luanda.362 In July 1962, he escaped from house arrest in Lisbon and smuggled his
family to Morocco, where he assumed the title of MPLA President. By that point in his career,
Neto could lay claim to excellent contacts with intellectuals in Europe, leftist guerillas
throughout Africa, and according to Marcum, a reputation as “a political legend.”363
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Despite Neto’s leadership, in the early 1960s, the MPLA struggled to gain ground against
Roberto’s GRAE. The MPLA finally opened an office in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in October
1961, too late in the rainy season to begin guerrilla operations.364 At first, its strategy focused on
a merger of all Angolan movements, with the hope that once conglomerated, the MPLA would
take the lead.365 The MPLA struggled to overcome ethnic Mbundu stereotypes of being elitists, a
reputation made worse by the fact that many of the MPLA’s top leaders were European educated
academics. In 1962, the movement appeared on the ropes when the OAU officially recognized
the GRAE/FNLA as the one true Angolan movement, and the government in Kinshasa expelled
the MPLA from the Congo. The Congolese authorities constantly harassed MPLA members who
tried to continue their work in Kinshasa.366 Dejected, Angola’s communists moved across the
Congo River to Brazzaville, the capital of the Congo Republic.
Brazzaville presented the MPLA with unexpected avenues of operation and support. Just
before the MPLA’s move in 1963, a revolution in Brazzaville had pushed the Congolese
government towards socialism. This change of fortunes for the MPLA improved further with the
arrival of Che Guevara and a Cuban delegation to Brazzaville in 1965. Che was passing through
on his way to the Eastern Congo to wage war against Mobutu, and after an “awkward” start to
talks with the MPLA, Che agreed to sending Cuban military advisors to Brazzaville to train
Angolans.367 With Cuban training, the MPLA started operations in Cabinda, a small Angola
enclave that contained all of Angola’s oil reserves.368
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In 1966, following in UNITA’s lead, the MPLA launched an offensive in Eastern Angola,
with Zambia as a rear-base. Rather than relocating their headquarters to Lusaka, MPLA leaders
remained in Brazzaville, where they maintained their global contacts and shrewdly leveraged the
war in the east to bring significant international attention to their cause. By 1970, the MPLA had
forces in Cabinda, northern Angola, and the vast eastern provinces. Combined with the wars in
Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, the MPLA expected that their offensive would bring an end to
the Portuguese Empire.

PORTUGAL STRIKES BACK
Years of fighting three far-flung wars prepared Portugal for the latest Angolan onslaught.
By 1970, the Portuguese war machine that counterattacked the MPLA in the east was a different
beast than had fought off Roberto’s invasion in 1961. Whereas the troops in 1961 arrived by
boat, 1970 Portuguese soldiers arrived in Luanda by Boeing jumbo jet. Portugal had replaced the
WWII-era American trucks and half-tracks used to fight Bakongo militants up Angola’s ‘Coffee
Road’ with Panhard armored cars and helicopters. With West German financing, Portugal had
built an indigenous arms industry that produced modern, NATO assault rifles. Airfields had
sprung up throughout the African countryside, including the Henrique Carvalho base in eastern
Angola, whose runways rivaled the capacity in Luanda. Portugal supplemented its outdated
aircraft with jet fighters purchased from West Germany.369 Parachutists landed deep in enemy
territory along the Zambian border, and helicopter assaults became the signature maneuver of the
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Portuguese army.370 By Portugal’s collapse in 1974, the war in Angola resembled a European
version of Vietnam, a war of advanced weaponry played out in a verdant landscape.
Under the Nixon Doctrine, Vietnam had ‘Vietnamization;’ for Angola, there was
‘Africanization.’ As the Portuguese population grew weary of the colonial wars, the army
suffered an acute manpower shortage due to desertions, emigration, and draft dodging. Each year
of the war, Portugal called up nearly 90% of all able-bodied twenty-year olds for the draft.371
Portugal augmented its European forces with black auxiliaries, both in the second line of forces
as guides, civil militia, and self-defense groups for villages, and as frontline combat-troops.372 To
fill vacancies in the army, the Portuguese conscripted vast numbers of Ovimbundu laborers into
the colonial army to fight against Angolan nationalists. Ovimbundu recruits eventually became
the majority of the 34,500 African conscripts in the Angolan army by the early 1970s, as well as
most of the 60,000 strong militia force.373 Supplementing these conscripts was the ‘Grupos
Especiais,’ or ‘Flechas;’ these were bushmen that hunted insurgents for the secret police,
renamed the ‘General Security Directorate’ (DGS) under Prime Minister Caetano.374 A fixture in
the hectic early days of the eastern front, Tshombe’s former Katangan gendarmes served the
Portuguese as an elite fighting force under their own leadership and officer corps.375
The Portuguese implemented an ambitious counterinsurgency operation throughout the
country that focused on economic development and the separation of the rebels from the
populace. Marcum observed that the army “pulled back into small, armed, island like outposts
linked by rutted dirt roads and began resettling the sparse local populations in fixed, armed
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villages.”376 In important regions, often where white settlers lived, villagers became cheap labor
for the regime, and many of the old abuses of the forced labor system reappeared.
The central highlands, home to both the Ovimbundu population and to a large contingent
of Portuguese settlers, became in essence a giant strategic hamlet. The army successfully denied
entry to the region by the rebels, which allowed businesses to abuse and exploit the hapless
Angolans. Linda Heywood, in her study of the Ovimbundu people, described the situation thusly:
“in many strategic villages the Ovimbundu were in effect slaves to the state,” forced to build the
defenses, their own huts, and provide labor for local settlers.377 With their families scattered in
the labor market, many women turned to prostitution, generally under the domination of newly
arrived European madams. Ovimbundu prostitutes eventually spanned the whole colony, serving
both settlers in the cities and the soldiers in the military resettlement camps. The war
systematically destroyed every facet of Ovimbundu society.378
The Portuguese counterinsurgency campaign demoralized and weakened Angolan
resistance in the east. The war became a battle of competing camps: on one side, the MPLA built
revolutionary villages in ‘liberated zones,’ on the other the Portuguese forced nearly a million
Angolans into strategic hamlets along an expanding system of paved roads and airfields.379 The
MPLA’s leaders increasingly stayed outside of the war zone, leaving local commanders to bare
the burden of running the stagnating war. Under the stress of the relentless Portuguese war
machine and a growing resentment against the MPLA leadership held by fighters in the field, the
MPLA had fractured into three factions by 1974. Daniel Chipenda, the main MPLA commander
in theater, led his troops in rebellion against Neto’s leadership in a movement known as the
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‘Eastern Revolt,’ and soon after an ‘Active Revolt’ started in Congo-Brazzaville.380 The MPLA,
FNLA, and UNITA increasingly fought each other rather than the Portuguese; the insurgents
simply had no answer for Portugal’s helicopters and strike aircraft.381 Whereas the MPLA looked
ascendant at the start of the 1970s, by 1973 it looked as if NSSM 39’s assessment of the
resilience of the Portuguese military was correct. Only outside forces could end the war in
Angola.

NIXON’S TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY
The final stage of Angola’s war for independence occurred during and was affected by
the rise and fall of Richard Nixon. Nixon’s promise to be a foreign policy president finally bore
fruit. In time for his re-election in 1972, Nixon validated his détente strategy by signing
agreements with both the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong’s China, which was perhaps “one of the
most significant moments in postwar American foreign policy.”382 Finally, after an escalation,
the invasion of Cambodia, and a harrowing Christmas bombing of Hanoi, Nixon extracted the
United States from the war in Vietnam, albeit on terms similar to those available to him on his
first day in office. Then came Watergate.
As Nixon’s administration floundered in the wake of the break-in, and subsequent
scandal, responsibility for foreign policy increasingly fell on Henry Kissinger’s shoulders. Not
only was he given credit for the opening to China and the Soviet Union, but the media hailed his
‘Shuttle Diplomacy’ after the 1973 Yom Kippur War as reshaping the landscape of the Middle
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East, and paving the way for an Egypt-American alliance. These developments and Kissinger’s
ascendency profoundly influenced the actors engaged in the end of Angola’s colonial period.
The 1973 October War had an immediate impact on Angola. Anwar Sadat’s surprise
attack on Israel proved that despite an improvement of relations between the Soviets and the
Americans, third world actors still could draw the superpowers into direct confrontation.
Furthermore, the arms race and diplomatic offensive that followed the war proved the true nature
of détente; both superpowers expected to secure gains in the third world at the other’s expense
even as bilateral relations improved. Both of these truths fueled the Angolan Civil War.
However, it was Portugal’s role in the Middle East drama that most affected Angola, Zaire, and
Washington’s response to the crisis.
At long last, the Azores airbase proved it’s worth during the American airlift in support
of Israel during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. All of Europe except Portugal refused
America landing rights to refuel planes for the operation. Lajes Airfield laid on a direct line
exactly in the middle of Washington and Tel Aviv. All 22,395 tons of cargo that the United
States airlifted to Israeli flew on planes that refueled at Lajes airfield or by mid-air refueling
stationed there. According to an Air Force history of the airfield, the crucial role the Azores
played in helping Israel “confirmed the importance of the Air Force maintaining basing facilities
at Lajes.”383
Portuguese approval of the airlift did not come easily, and it did not immediately improve
U.S.-Portuguese relations. When Kissinger requested use of the base, Lisbon responded by
demanding advanced American weapons. Lisbon’s gall provoked Kissinger’s anger, “I must tell
you in all frankness Mr. Prime Minister that your failure to help at this critical time will force us
383
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to adopt measures which cannot but hurt our relationship.”384 Washington was willing to pay for
the use of Lajes but did not want the two overtly linked. Caetano agreed to the airlift without
further questions. Both Washington and Lisbon understood that compensation was already under
discussion as part of the ongoing Azores negotiations that targeted spring 1974 for completion.
Just before the airlift during the early fighting between Israel and Egypt, Mobutu came to
Washington for his second meeting with Nixon. Although they discussed the Middle East, the
meeting focused on economic issues and troubles in U.S.-Zaire relations. Mobutu complained
about a general lack of access to Nixon and Kissinger, and how American policies regarding
copper and grain hurt Zaire. Mobutu did not mention Roberto, but expressed his pleasure with
Ambassador Vance. Mobutu asked if Vance could stay in his post “for a long time yet.” Nixon
assured him there were no plans to move him.385
Sheldon Vance reassured both Mobutu and Washington that their respective partner was
well intentioned. After Nixon’s the opening to China, Mobutu Sese Seko, and Holden Roberto
made their own forays to Beijing and the east. Vance spun Mobutu’s outreach to China as a plan
“to enhance his image as a leader of Africa and a major voice among the non-aligned states.”
Just as the United States had not veered towards socialism after Nixon’s visit to China, Vance
expected no “basic change in Mobutu’s policy towards the United States.”386 At the same time,
the ambassador lobbied hard in Washington for the M-16 rifles Mobutu had long sought.387
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Mobutu forged ahead after the October crisis and raised his profile as a revolutionary and
a statesman. In November 1973, Mobutu expanded the ‘Authenticity’ campaign and announced a
new economic policy known as ‘Zairianization.’ Zairianization was a program to seize the “vast
swath of the economy from foreign hands” that the government had not already nationalized.388
Almost immediately, it became clear that friends of the dictator would own the confiscated
industries. New Zairian managers, eager to maximize profits, refused to pay taxes and laid off
workers, which led to riots; Kinshasa was bedlam, and Mobutu its architect.389
With revolution threatening at home, Mobutu toured the Middle East. He secured oil
supplies from Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran, and discussed Israel with the Muammar Gaddafi and
Saudi King Faisal. The Zairian leader met with Sadat, who “welcomed him as a younger
brother.” Ironically, it was the ‘older brother’ that sought wisdom from his junior. Curious to
learn the ramifications of his recent commitment to the west, Sadat peppered Mobutu with
questions about his American patron. America’s African ally told its new Arab one that although
“the United States and Zaire disagreed on some things,” the “Americans were completely sincere
friends and have never interfered in Zaire’s Affairs.”390 Mobutu sincerely viewed himself as a
messenger of America’s policy in the world.
Despite his efforts to serve the United States’ global leadership, Mobutu’s superpower
ally failed to return the favor. After years of deliberation, the State Department denied the sale of
M-16s to Zaire out of concern for ongoing negotiations with Portugal over use of the Azores
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airbase.391 Five weeks later, the government in Portugal fell. The fate of the Azores and Angola
remained undecided.

CARNATIONS
The fall of the Portuguese government in 1974 came as a total surprise to Washington.
On April 25, 1974, a group of young Portuguese officers known as the Armed Forces Movement
(MFA) removed Marcello Caetano from power in a bloodless coup. As a sign of the peaceful
nature of their actions, MFA members placed carnations in their rifle barrels.392
The coup shocked the American embassy in Lisbon. Whereas under Kennedy and
Johnson ambassadors like Elbrick and Anderson had taken active steps to ingratiate themselves
with dissidents and military alike, under Nixon, Lisbon became a retirement post. The United
States did not even have an Ambassador in Portugal for all of 1973. Kissinger’s appointee, Stuart
Scott Nash, only arrived in country three months before the coup. The entire American
intelligence community failed to notice the faintest sign of instability. The week of the coup,
Nash visited the Azores en route to the annual meeting of the Harvard Law School Association.
When he learned that flights to Lisbon were delayed indefinitely, Nash decided to leave Lajes for
Harvard rather than a NATO capital in increasing disarray.393 Kissinger, deeply involved with
the Middle East, had a new crisis on his hands.
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The new government in Lisbon quickly announced that Portugal would jettison the
Ultramar. Ending the African wars was on top of the agenda for the young officers who took
over; after years of stalemate, the Portuguese people had had enough.394 In Guinea Bissau,
PAIGC had already governed and had gained limited international recognition before the
revolution. In Mozambique, FRELIMO had failed to achieve similar success, but their status as
the only rebel group in that colony had earned them international recognition as the governmentin-waiting. In Angola, however, the colony remained fractured, a tripartite state whose actors
operated in different regions, amongst different ethnic groups, under competing notions of
Angolan nationality. Imperial retreat presented no clear path to Angolan independence.

THE SCRAMBLE FOR ANGOLA
The fall of the New State in Portugal ushered in foreign powers to south-central Africa on
a scale reminiscent of the ‘scramble’ of the late 19th century. Neither Roberto, Savimbi, nor Neto
believed that the Portuguese exit meant the end of their liberation struggle. The long, fruitless
war of independence transformed all three men and their movements into dogmatic, ethnocentric organizations that hated one another as much as they hated the Portuguese. The FNLA,
UNITA, and the MPLA each fought for their own imagined independent Angola: Roberto for a
mirror of Mobutu’s corrupt kleptocracy with himself at the top of a vast patronage system;
Savimbi for an Ovimbundu dictatorship neutral to the superpowers; and Neto, for a revolutionary
state along communist lines that maintained its commercial ties to the west. Angola’s leaders
spent the independence struggle constantly at odds, rebuffed all efforts by the world community
to unite, sabotaged each other’s political and military efforts, and at times fought each other
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more fiercely than they did Portugal. The war entered a new stage, where their interpersonal
competition left the bush and evolved into politicking and conventional warfare.
International support quickly lined up in accordance with the alliance system of the past
fourteen years; however, Savimbi’s UNITA and Chipenda’s MPLA offshoot added a new twist
to an otherwise predictable situation. The Organization of African Unity continued to support
both the FNLA and the MPLA, and in May 1974 began funding UNITA as well.395 Zaire
remained resolutely behind Roberto. Zambia, which had served as a rear-base for the MPLA’s
Eastern Front, initially sided with Chipenda and reached out to Savimbi.396 MPLA members in
Cuba, present for July 26 celebrations, asked for money, weapons, and training and the Cubans
proved forthcoming.397 Odd Arne Westad, whose access to Soviet sources remains unmatched,
claimed that the Carnation Revolution “sent Moscow’s Africa policy into high gear,” and the
Russian embassies in Zambia and Tanzania played host to several attempts to repair the rift in
the MPLA leadership between Neto and Chipenda.398 In contrast to Moscow’s hyper-activity,
Henry Kissinger ignored Angola well into the summer of 1974 as the collapse of the Nixon
administration and the fall of Saigon kept him busy. When Kissinger did contemplate the
implications of the Carnation Revolution, he did so primarily with Portugal and NATO in
mind.399
Henry Kissinger’s first priority after the April 26 coup was the situation in Lisbon, and
understandably so. Never before had a NATO government been overthrown by coup d’état.
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Furthermore, the CIA and the embassy staff in Lisbon had no idea of the imminent collapse of
the Caetano regime. Information continued to be a problem as the revolution ran its course.
Kissinger appointed Frank Carlucci, an old hand from the Congo program of the 1960s, to be
Ambassador to Portugal. Carlucci was a brilliant chose for the post, given his experience not
only in the Congo but also as a Foreign Service officer in Chile during the coup in 1972. The
embassy in Lisbon slowly improved U.S. intelligence and had come up to speed by the end of
1974. Carlucci understood that in the face of limited options with which to influence the
revolution, information gathering was his top priority. But Portugal seemed more an excuse not
to turn to focus on Africa, rather than a true burden on Kissinger’s time and faculties.400
Joseph Mobutu certainly felt neglected after the Carnation Revolution. On March 26,
1974, right on the heels of the final denial of the M-16 purchase, Sheldon Vance left Zaire to
assume the position of “Executive Director of the President’s Cabinet Committee on
International Narcotics Control.”401 There would not be another U.S. Ambassador in Kinshasa
until late August. With the United States focused on the outcome in Lisbon, Mobutu worked
with regional partners on a diplomatic solution to Angola’s peculiar, tripartite nationalist
situation. In May, Mobutu flew to various leadership summits with Roberto in tow.402 Mobutu’s
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ideal solution involved a merger of all three groups, with Roberto installed as President. The
talks produced little results, however, a result in no small part due to the divisions within the
MPLA.
Meanwhile, Mobutu remained busy outside of the Angolan crisis. At the beginning of the
month, a group of Americans came to Kinshasa to go over the logistics of the upcoming ‘Rumble
in the Jungle’ fight between Muhammed Ali and George Foreman. At the head of the entourage
was Don King, who was in charge of working with Zairian officials on the details of the fight. It
was to be a showcase for Mobutu’s Zaire, a symbol of the progress made since the tumultuous
1960s.403 However, by May, Zairianization had already created a crisis, as tax payments
plummeted and protests overtook the country.404 With the revolution threatening the nation’s
grand spectacle, the unthinkable happened: the price of copper fell drastically. Copper had
enjoyed historically elevated prices from 1967-1974, and it hit an all-time high in April, which
raised the prospects of success for Mobutu’s development schemes. The crash that began in 1974
sent prices to an all-time low, which not only robbed the state of revenue, but it also endangered
development; Mobutu had mortgaged future copper shipments to pay for his grand projects.405
The copper crash left Zaire in a credit crisis, just as Mobutu began working on an Angola
strategy. Now, more than ever, the dictator needed American guidance and finances.
In June, Mobutu began to work on capturing Washington’s attention. On June 3, 1974,
Mobutu facilitated an agreement between China, Zaire, and Roberto to train and equip an FNLA
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conventional army.406 The same day, Zairian officials pressured the American embassy to
support the FNLA in response to China’s “obvious” effort to “gain a foothold in Angola.” The
embassy reported to Washington: “This is probably not the last feeler from (the Government of
Zaire) on subject of US aid to FNLA.”407 It was an almost exact repeat of Roberto’s strategy in
1964; secure support from China to put pressure on the United States. Except this time, Zaire
allowed the advisers and weapons in country. Mobutu, mimicking his ally, worked with China to
train and arm the FNLA as an anti-Soviet force. Chinese and North Korean advisers and
weapons poured in to Kinshasa throughout June.408 In July, Mobutu again met with American
contractors in an attempt to purchase a fleet of transport helicopters and other advanced U.S.
equipment.409 He was successful in securing an order for C-130’s, but due to credit issues and a
lack of pressure from Washington, Lockheed promised delivery of the planes no sooner than
1977.410 Despite the growing budget crunch from the copper crash, Mobutu was obsessed with
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Angola and the need to upgrade his military. Without American aid, such an upgrade seemed
unlikely.
In August, Mobutu requested an urgent meeting between his Foreign Minister and
Kissinger.411 Washington was at that point in the midst of the death throes of the Nixon
administration, and Kissinger took the meeting amidst the turmoil. Zairian Foreign Minister
Umba-di-Lutete originally scheduled the meeting for August 9, 1974, but Nixon’s resignation
that morning forced a delay. Luckily for all parties involved, President Ford retained Kissinger,
and the meeting went off as planned three days later. Umba gave Kissinger a full report on the
situation in Angola, including a direct request for American support to Roberto. Umba stressed
the need for diplomatic, political, and military aid for the FNLA; “the situation in Angola could
very well move quite fast.” He said, “It is important that events not pass us by.” Kissinger
thanked Umba for bringing the situation to his attention, and promised to “do something about
it.”412 Rather than consider a deeper American involvement, Kissinger simply asked the CIA to
increase Roberto’s pay “high enough to assure President Mobutu” that Angola was important.
The payments were low enough that they did not require approval from an oversight
committee.413 At that point, Kissinger still believed that “the United States was neutral” to the
conflict.414
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On August 17, Vernon Mwaanga, the Zambian Foreign Minister, also travelled to
Washington to meet with Kissinger to discuss the worsening crisis in the region. It was a similar
exercise in futility. Mwaanga brought up the whole gauntlet of regional issues: South Africa,
Namibia, Rhodesia, the Byrd Amendment, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Angola. Kissinger
feigned an interest in each topic, and even expressed the American “willingness to play a
constructive role in the area,” if only Zambia would write a memorandum “as to how to be
helpful.” On Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, Kissinger expressed America’s acceptance of the
socialist groups in waiting to take control from the Portuguese. On Angola, Mwaanga stressed
the need for “a united front” between “all three groups.” Kissinger mentioned that “another
African minister had told him that” only Holden Roberto should be included in the postindependence government. If pressed to choose one side at that moment, which Zambia did not
believe was the correct course of action, Mwaanga signaled that it would be the MPLA.415 The
meeting belied Kissinger’s total disinterest in the region, and concealed that fact from Mwaanga.
Nevertheless, Mwaanga later wrote an opinion piece in the Times of Zambia that
reflected his true feelings about America’s interest in African affairs. He said that based on his
private discussions with Kissinger, it was clear that the United States had “not necessarily
formulated what would be really described as a definitive policy for Africa.” Zambia had
produced a 25-page memorandum for Kissinger after the August meeting, yet the United States
chose to remain on the sidelines. From reading the tealeaves, Mwaanga feared that there was
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“imminent danger” that Washington would “make a closer commitment to South Africa.” He
prophesized that if the United States “failed to confine South Africa to its own territory,” with its
“tremendous influence,” then American policy would be denounced by Africans.416
The Africa Bureau of State Department agreed with Mwaanga. Kissinger’s
Undersecretary for African Affairs, Donald Easum, advocated against U.S. involvement with
“any of the Angolan liberation movements.” Easum understood the importance of being on the
right side of southern Africa’s race conflicts, and his public stances did not reflect the NSSM 39
ethos that Kissinger preferred- that the United States needed strong relationships with ‘white’
Africa. He represented the post-‘Congo Crisis’ African Bureau, focused on economic aid and
non-alignment on the continent. Angola, however, was a secondary interest to Easum; his
obsession was for the United States to support the newly independent Guinea-Bissau and
Mozambique. For these positions, Kissinger took to calling Easum “Mr. Guinea-Bissau” in
meetings. In July, Easum vetoed a CIA proposal to ask the 40 Committee to begin a training and
armaments program for Roberto, and in October, he took an unauthorized trip to Mozambique.
Even though Kissinger had told Mwaanga that the United States would reach out to the new
government in Maputo, the Secretary of State fired his undersecretary after less than a year. The
State Department reassigned Easum to Ambassador to Nigeria after only nine months in
office.417
Another diplomat to draw Kissinger’s ire during the crisis was Deane Hinton, the new
U.S. ambassador to Zaire. Hard to work with and pretentious, Hinton had little patience for
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Mobutu’s style and excess.418 Hinton had no interest in Angola; rather, he viewed his role as a
fiscal conservative meant to reign in Mobutu’s spending with the Zairian economy in tatters.
When he arrived in country, Hinton was more interested in the upcoming boxing match than
establishing a close relationship with Mobutu.
Right from the beginning, the Mobutu-Hinton relationship soured. At their first meeting,
Mobutu spoke at length about “the independence of Angola” as “Zaire’s most important
problem.” Hinton intimated to Mobutu that Angola was a top priority in Washington, even
though he had received no instructions on the issue.419 As 1974 dragged on, Mobutu increasingly
grew frustrated with the American ambassador and Washington’s inaction regarding Angola.
Hinton reported to Washington his disbelief over Mobutu’s lack of gratitude once the State
Department finally approved the sale of M-16’s. What the dictator really wanted, Hinton
reported, was C-130’s, tanks, armored personnel carriers, A-4 fighter-bombers, and air defense
systems.420 Mobutu told Hinton that Zaire needed military aid because “to have peace one had to
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prepare for war.”421 Still completely unaware of the situation in Angola and Zaire’s role in that
conflict, Hinton turned the discussion over the arms package into major row in U.S.-Zairian
relations.
Upset with Washington’s emissary and still unconvinced of the American commitment to
Angola, Mobutu requested American military advisors to come to Zaire and begin a full-scale
modernization effort. Hinton and Kissinger obliged, but deliberately limited the scope of the
advisor team to “avoid implication that U.S. is assuming responsibility for assessing Zaire’s
military,” or that the United States would provide any military hardware.422 Mobutu had
expressed the hope that the mission would lead the Americans “to recognize” threats to Zaire’s
security and “respond as in the past.”423 Instead, it only prolonged the frustration caused by
American inaction.

POLITICAL PARTIES WITH ARMIES
Meanwhile, the military situation in Angola in the summer of 1974 remained fluid.
Whereas UNITA and the MPLA worked out cease-fires with the Portuguese by the end of July,
the FNLA went on the offensive.424 Using their newly acquired training and weapons, Roberto’s
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men engaged with Portuguese troops who were growing increasingly disinterested in the
fighting. The FNLA only agreed to a cease-fire with Portugal on October 12, after they had
established a zone of control in Angola’s extreme north along the border with Zaire.425 The
MPLA formalized peace with Portugal by signing their own cease-fire with the Portuguese on
October 21.426 The war for independence was over; what was to come next was not exactly clear.
Amidst the uneasy truce with Portugal, and with animosity and distrust amongst themselves
growing, the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA entered Luanda in late 1974 intending to seek recruits,
establish a foothold in the capital, and impress foreign powers with their legitimacy.
By the time of their respective entrances into Luanda, both Roberto and Neto had begun
lining up aid from their international patrons. Roberto had already secured Chinese and North
Korean support, and Mobutu kept hammering away at Kissinger in the hopes of securing major
American support. On February 4, the anniversary of the 1961 riots in Luanda, Neto was met by
a crowd of 300,000 to 400,000 supporters as he entered the capital.427 He arrived by airplane
after stops in Paris and Lisbon, and the pilots diverted the plane from Luanda’s main airfield
because they could not land due to the crowd waiting for him on the tarmac.428 Moscow took this
and other stories of Neto’s personal popularity to mean that the MPLA was the most powerful
movement in Luanda, and that the people recognized Neto as its leader.429 Westad claims that as
early as December 1974, Moscow “drew up an elaborate plan for supplying the MPLA with
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heavy weapons and large amounts of ammunition.”430 Only Savimbi and Chipenda remained
without external support.
Shut out from direct lines of communications to the super powers, Savimbi turned to
South Africa. In secret meetings in Angola throughout the end of 1974, Savimbi told the South
Africans “the MPLA was supported by the communist bloc and that Holden Roberto, leader of
the FNLA…would become a military dictator.”431 He needed small arms, uniforms, and boots.
Savimbi told the South Africans that “Zambia would support South African military action in
Angola – if it was kept secret.”432 In response to his request, on October 9, 1974 South Africa
gave Savimbi a token amount of light weapons including carbines, pistols, and ammunition at
Rundu, a town on the Angola-South West Africa (SWA) border. In December of 1974, South
African intelligence officers visited Luanda and returned to Pretoria with the recommendation
that UNITA receive more clandestine assistance, particularly food and clothes.433
South Africa’s support for Savimbi, like all the outside aid at this point in the conflict,
represented small but important escalations on behalf of all parties involved. During the summer
and fall of 1974, regional diplomacy failed to merge the MPLA factions, let alone the three
major nationalist movements. While each party met to determine peaceful terms for their
integration into Angolan political life, they all built conventional armies on the sidelines. This
early aid set the escalation cycle in motion and from January 1975 forward, the United States,
Soviet Union, Cuba, South Africa, and Zaire all increased their footprint.
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Angola’s three independence movements, the FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA, signed the
Alvor Accord in January to establish a transitional government. This new government featured a
novel and unwieldy configuration of three Prime Ministers, one from each of the movements. All
decisions required a two-thirds majority. The agreement likewise split the army and all other
ministries in three. The grand vision of the agreement was parliamentary elections scheduled for
October 1975 before the planned November 11 independence day.434 From the start, none of the
three parties committed to the government. Roberto, Savimbi, and Neto all sent trusted
confidants to serve in the ministerial council, freeing themselves from governing in order to
focus on war strategy.
After the Alvor Agreement, the CIA succeeded in securing funds for Roberto. CIA
Director William Colby presented the funding request. Colby briefly explained the situation in
Angola, and asked for $300,000 for Roberto and another $100,000 for Savimbi. He presented
both requests as support “for non-military aid” to prepare for the election. The committee denied
funds for Savimbi, but approved the full amount for Roberto’s FNLA.435
Roberto immediately put the American money to work. Even though the U.S. committed
$300,000 to the FNLA, there was still no coordination between Roberto and Washington.
Kissinger did not consider the money a means to an end, but rather, an end itself. Nevertheless,
the MPLA and the Soviets interpreted Roberto’s actions and the rumors of American money as a
major move by the United States. Meanwhile, relations between the parties remained tense;
indeed, the peace barely held for two weeks before the situation boiled over into street violence.

434

Tony Hodges, “How the MPLA Won in Angola,” in After Angola: The War over Southern
Africa, ed. Colin Legum (New York: Holmes & Meier Pub, 1976), 47.
435
“Memorandum for the Record - Document 102,” January 23, 1975, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969-1976, Southern Africa, Volume XXVI; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions,
282–283.
133

The first bloodshed in Luanda occurred in mid-February and took place between the
MPLA and Daniel Chipenda’s MPLA splinter group. Chipenda, whose forces the Alvor Accord
did not recognize, opened offices in Luanda in early 1975. On February 13, MPLA forced
aligned with Neto murdered fifteen to twenty of Chipenda’s supporters and ran the rest out of
town.436 Despite their political differences, a desperate Chipenda turned to Roberto, and on
February 22, he proclaimed the merger of his forces with the FNLA. Chipenda’s 2,000 men
became the FNLA – South, or the FNLA/Chipenda. They were the best-trained and experienced
forces available to Roberto and gave the FNLA inroads into ethnic groups and regions outside of
the Bakongo north.
The alliance between Chipenda and Roberto was possible for several reasons. First, the
FNLA had fought against MPLA troops in the Bakongo north, mainly against Mbundu forces
from Luanda and the surrounding hinterland. Chipenda’s mostly Ovimbundu and Chokwe troops
came from the South and East of the country, and their campaigns against the Portuguese in the
east rarely put them in contact with the FNLA. There in the eastern front, Chipenda and his men
had also fought against the Ovimbundu troops of Savimbi’s UNITA. The rivalry between
Chipenda and Savimbi to lead the Ovimbundu people and the history of violence between their
armies made such an alliance out of the question.
The MPLA also recruited unlikely allies. In April, Neto successfully brought the former
Katanga Gendarmes into his army.437 The former soldiers of Moïse Tshombe’s secessionist
movement in the Congo, they had served the Portuguese in the eastern theater of the Angolan
war since 1967. The Katangans fought UNITA and Chipenda’s MPLA forces, but had had
relatively few interactions with Neto and his associates. Both Savimbi and Chipenda were mortal
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enemies of these forces, which aided Neto in bringing in the elite fighters. The Katangans would
remain the MPLA’s best fighters in country up until independence.
The steady drumbeat of war overshadowed the work of the provisional government. The
mood in Luanda remained tense, and members of the new government carried revolvers to
work.438 During the last week of March, Roberto’s forces attacked MPLA offices in Luanda with
grenades and targeted training camps along the coffee route into the city. All told, the FNLA
killed over fifty MPLA members.439 On March 30, a five hundred FNLA soldiers crossed the
border from Zaire on trucks and invaded the slums on the outskirts of Luanda. Fighting in the
musseques raged for days as the FNLA carved out safe havens along the approaches to the city.
The MPLA responded by indiscriminately distributing weapons to its supporters, including
teenagers.440 Soviet arms steadily reached the MPLA through Congo-Brazzaville, Cabinda, and
eventually entered directly into Angola by sea and air, which further fueled the fighting.441 By
late April, the fighting had turned into a full-scale frontal assault by the FNLA in all of the
musseques; over seven hundred died and over a thousand were wounded. Fighting spread into
the North and East as the MPLA counterattacked in district capitals.442 In early May, Mobutu
sent in 1,200 Zairian troops to fight alongside the FNLA.443 While the provisional government
continued to meet, the Civil War steadily intensified.
UNITA conspicuously stayed out of the warfare in Luanda; Savimbi instead built his
political machine in the countryside and lobbied the South Africans for military backing. In fact,
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Savimbi, like Roberto, had yet to enter the capital since the coup.444 Savimbi understood
UNITA’s natural weaknesses. He possessed the smallest army and he was a relative unknown in
Luanda. However, UNITA support in the capital was irrelevant given that the Ovimbundu,
Savimbi’s ethnic group and political base, represented Angola’s largest population bloc. If the
provisional government survived long enough for elections, his large Ovimbundu base would put
him in the Presidency through the ballot. The problem was surviving until then.
After Kissinger and the 40 Committee skipped over funding for UNITA in January,
Savimbi deepened his South African connection. On February 12, 1975, he met at length with
several South African Defense Force (SADF) officers and discussed his personal politics, vision
for Angola, and attitude toward whites. Savimbi’s answers were agreeable to the Apartheid
state’s emissaries. UNITA, according to Savimbi, would allow “whites to remain in Angola, as
either Portuguese or Angolan citizens.” On the important subject of South Africa’s enemy in
Namibia, SWAPO, Savimbi “admitted UNITA had worked with them for years” but that he was
willing to set them aside as an ally to “concentrate all his efforts” on winning power in Angola.
A week later South Africa approved more support for UNITA, including 402 pistols, 95,000
rounds of ammunition and $200,000 in cash.445 In April, Savimbi met with South African secret
police (BOSS) agents four times in three different countries, including Britain and France. He
pushed them for financial and political assistance, as well as light weapons for 8,000 men and
equipment to broadcast election propaganda.446 The South Africans denied this request, but did
not rule out future aid. UNITA armed the troops it could, and Savimbi canvassed the capital and
the Ovimbundu highlands for recruits.
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On April 25, the anniversary of the MFA coup in Lisbon, Savimbi entered Luanda.
Despite the MPLA’s strength in the city, large crowds met him at the airport, reminiscent of
Neto’s grand entrance in February.447 The Portuguese had brought large numbers of Ovimbundu
into the capital to replace Mbundu and Creoles in the colonial administration to limit the
MPLA’s presence in the bureaucracy. Together with the large number of Ovimbundu laborers,
soldiers, and prostitutes, Savimbi had a larger political base in Luanda than Roberto.
Nevertheless, with the MPLA and FNLA engaged in firefights in and around the capital, Savimbi
returned to Nova Lisboa (Huambo) to organize his forces. In early June, the MPLA surrounded
and slaughtered 260 UNITA members in the suburbs of Luanda.448 More than ever, Savimbi
needed external support. He kept the alliance with South Africa, his stance on Angola’s whites,
and his tacit agreement to end his alliance with SWAPO out of his political rhetoric. Savimbi
possessed the smallest army in Angola, but his politics and covert diplomacy steadily attracted
supporters, of whom none was more important than Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.

ALLIES
Kaunda, like Mobutu, grew tired of American inaction in Angola. Zambia’s position in
the conflict had evolved since the previous August. Above all, Kaunda needed to preserve the
Benguela railway and with it the flow of Zambian copper to western markets. The copper crash
further heightened the importance of keeping the link to the Atlantic open. With Daniel
Chipenda’s forces out of the MPLA and subsumed into Holden Roberto’s forces, Kaunda looked
to Jonas Savimbi for an alliance.
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Savimbi had become an attractive ally for several reasons. UNITA emerged as a uniting
force for the Ovimbundu, whose population remained concentrated along the Benguela railway,
despite fourteen years of war. Savimbi campaigned along the tracks, and politicked in the same
villages and towns in which his father had built churches earlier in the century. By appealing to
their shared experience of exploitation and the promise of development in the fertile highlands,
UNITA created “a Pan-Ovimbundu ethnic identity.”449 Because of this development, Kaunda
began talks with Savimbi in late 1974 to strengthen UNITA’s international position. It was
Savimbi, with Kaunda’s support, which had organized the Alvor Accord, the agreement between
Portugal and the nationalists that created the transitional government.450 After news of Roberto’s
American support became widespread in early 1975, Kaunda wanted his chosen client included
in America’s plan. In April, he travelled to Washington to convince Ford and Kissinger to do just
that.
The Zambian president, his Foreign Minister, the U.S. Ambassador, and his trusted
confidante Mark Chona travelled to Washington D.C. to meet with President Ford and Secretary
Kissinger to convince the Americans to get more involved with Angola, and Savimbi
specifically. Kissinger later credited Kaunda with bringing Angola to the attention of the Ford
Administration.451 Kaunda knew that with the fall of Saigon imminent, his American counterpart
would be distracted from the brewing disaster in southern Africa. With no bilateral problems
between Zambia and the United States, Kaunda’s sole purpose was the Angolan Civil War. He
made it clear that Zambia’s preferred outcome to the power vacuum in Luanda was for Savimbi
to become Angola’s first president. Kaunda said Savimbi was “someone who could save the
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situation.” Kaunda gave Savimbi credit for the Alvor Accord, and mentioned that his associates
were “impressed with Savimbi’s sincerity and his honesty of purpose.”452
Kaunda did not mince words regarding the consequences of American failure to act in
Angola. The Zambian president himself met with the South Africans regarding the ongoing war
against Ian Smith in Rhodesia, and during those talks, the South Africans confided in him that an
MPLA takeover in Luanda was “too ghastly to contemplate.” Kaunda worried that delay and
inaction would leave Ford and Kissinger without enough time to formulate an effective policy. In
a moment of desperation, the United States would have no choice but to turn to South Africa. He
combined this threat with the prospect that the situation in Angola and in nearby Rhodesia was
on the verge of “an explosion” that “would not be confined to South Africa alone.”
Due to “South Africa’s ability to strike all of Africa,” an escalation in the racial conflict would
envelop the region. Kissinger agreed that the United States sought to contain South African
aggression. Kaunda warned Kissinger: act in Angola, or “events may overtake you and the U.S.
could find itself fighting on the side of the racists.” Kissinger and Ford, busy with the North
Vietnamese assault on Saigon, promised the Zambians that they would decide on a course of
action in June.453
The State Department compiled reports in May in preparation for a full policy review.
Kissinger ordered NSSM 224 on May 26 to set the parameters of the debate.454 He gave the State
Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA until June 30 to prepare the complete

452

“Memorandum of Conversation - Document 103,” April 19, 1975, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969-1976, Southern Africa, Volume XXVI.
453
Ibid.
454
“National Security Study Memorandum 224 - Document 105,” May 26, 1975, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Southern Africa, Volume XXVI.
139

study. In the meantime, Kissinger and the 40 Committee began preparations without the
participation of the State Department for a major American intervention.
The 40 Committee took on a siege mentality. Kissinger worried that “We have been
diddling around…we have given Roberto a bit, but he needs weapons and discipline…Kaunda
doesn’t have the horsepower…Mobutu is a bloody bastard but he is the only hope.” Above all
Kissinger and his advisers wanted to prevent an MPLA takeover. Angola was too big, too
resource rich, and too strategically located on the frontline of the black-white conflict to allow it
to fall to the communists. Losing Angola would represent a total disaster for Kissinger’s Africa
policy up to 1975. Nixon and Kissinger had chosen the whites in 1970, and since that fateful day,
antagonized America’s black partners in the region. With Angola’s impending independence fast
approaching, Kissinger’s anger with the American foreign policy establishment grew. Kissinger
complained that “no agency supported doing anything—State, JCS.” Brent Snowcroft,
Kissinger’s deputy, remarked that even the CIA “haven’t a position really.”455
But the implications of an MPLA victory in Angola would have far reaching
consequences for the remaining white dominated states of southern Africa. With the Portuguese
exiting the scene, only Ian Smith’s Rhodesian government and Apartheid South Africa remained.
With a majority-ruled government coming into power in June in Mozambique, landlocked
Rhodesia would find itself surrounded by black states. For South Africa, Angola falling into the
hands of a communist government seemed to ensure that the former Portuguese colony would
become a staging ground for cross-border raids into South African occupied Namibia.
Mozambique presented the same potential for raids into South Africa itself. From the view from
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Pretoria, the African dominos were falling. Angola was an existential crisis for the whites, which
were the foundation of Kissinger’s regional policy. Kissinger understood by May that inaction
was not an option.
State Department officials from claimed that “everything” was already “going our way so
we don’t need to do anything,” and that “Angola was not of great importance.” They preferred a
“hands off” approach to Angola, and to “let nature take its course.” William Colby of the CIA
and the Kissinger’s deputies agreed that the United States needed to take action, and the real
question was how much and whether or not to include Savimbi.456 The CIA prepared an opinion
paper suggesting “covert political action” and “covert military aid” for both Roberto and
Savimbi.457 The State Department countered those sentiments with the argument that Mobutu
would not let Roberto lose, and that Kaunda would insert Savimbi into the presidency, even
though those outcomes were mutually exclusive.458 Opening the debate on Angola had brought
Washington no closer to consensus.
In June Mobutu broke the logjam in the policy debate as the U.S.-Zaire relationship hit its
nadir. He announced he had discovered a plot against his life, and he blamed the United States
for orchestrating a bloody coup because he had publicly lambasted Nathaniel Davis, the newly
appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in January, and for his position on
Angola.459 Zaire formally asked Ambassador Hinton to leave; Mobutu threatened to send him
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home as persona non grata.460 This alarming chain of events finally convinced Kissinger that
Angola was the reason for Mobutu’s military requests, and the strain in U.S.-Zaire relations.
Kissinger recalled Hinton, but more importantly, Mobutu’s tantrum convinced him of the need to
intervene in Angola.461 In a meeting with his close confidants, Kissinger confessed that he
“didn’t focus on (Angola) early enough.” Furthermore, he admitted, “We’ve mishandled Mobutu
and the whole area. I have not given too much attention to it, so it’s partly my fault.”462 Kissinger
finally saw the crisis through Mobutu’s eyes: “He must think we are out of our damn minds…to
have the whole country go communist without doing anything…It will end up in Angola as it did
in the Congo… Someone will get on top by force.”463 To reach out to the African dictator,
Kissinger recalled Sheldon Vance from his duties with the narcotics task force and brought him
to Washington to join the Angola discussion.
Kissinger assigned Vance the delicate mission of repairing relations with Mobutu and
bringing him on board with an American aid program to Roberto and Savimbi. Kissinger told
Vance he worried that Mobutu believed that “if we’re letting Angola go, then in essence we’re
letting him go.” Vance, who had not seen Mobutu in a year and a half, agreed. By now,
Kissinger already decided that he wanted covert action, but was unsure what such a program
would entail. What he needed was Vance to sort through the Hinton-Coup row and have Mobutu
sign off on a CIA program.464 Upon his arrival in Zaire, Vance met with Mobutu for a two-hour
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breakfast meeting. After he stated the purpose of his visit and Mobutu aired his complaints,
Mobutu laid out the situation from his point of view. Roberto had 15,000 men in Zaire, “but they
were not adequately equipped, certainly not comparably with those of Neto,” despite Chinese
arms and training in 1974. Mobutu still needed “M-16 rifles, mobile artillery, ammunition, and
money” for his own forces. The situation was dire but not impossible.465
Mobutu’s plan was simple. The United States would funnel weapons and cash to Roberto
and Savimbi through Zaire. By his estimation, the United States and Zaire had until
independence, November 11, to prevent Neto from declaring a Soviet-allied Angola. The overall
aim of the plan was to achieve a military stalemate between Roberto and Neto in northern
Angola, and to offer Savimbi as a compromise candidate for president.466 Vance fully agreed
with the program envisioned by Mobutu. On his own initiative, He met with Holden Roberto and
discussed the military situation in the north.467 The former ambassador returned to Washington
touting good news.
Vance’s debrief on June 27 determined the shape, speed, and ultimately the deficiencies
of America’s program designed to thwart an MPLA victory in Angola. Sheldon was enthusiastic
about Roberto’s chances for victory if the United States gave “substantially more money to
Holden and Savimbi.” When the Secretary asked the definition of “substantial,” Vance replied
“several millions I think and arms also given through” Mobutu. On top of the aid to Roberto and
Savimbi, Vance advocated giving Mobutu the rifles, C-130s, and light armor he had sought for
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the past five years. Although Vance did not suggest sending U.S. military officers, he did make it
clear that the mission “would take a lot of direct advice.”468 Capturing Luanda was the critical
aim of the operation, because “the history of Africa has shown that…whoever has the capital has
a claim on international support.”469 Kissinger wanted to send Larry Devlin, or “somebody like
Devlin” to run the operation. He did not want to hold back: “If we’re going to do it we should do
it. I don’t understand the difference in virginity between giving money and giving arms.” Despite
Kissinger’s eagerness to begin the operation, he did not want to bring the matter to President
Ford yet. The two men were soon to leave for a meeting with the Soviets to finalize the Helsinki
Accords. Kissinger, worried about the reaction to covert action within the State Department if the
mission began happened while he was abroad, State would “turn it (opposition) into a religious
movement.”470 Due to this concern, Kissinger delayed action for another two and a half weeks.

THE DIE IS CAST
Despite the efforts of regional leaders and the residual Portuguese colonial army, by July
the Angolan Civil War had begun in earnest. Despite an uneasy truce orchestrated by Jomo
Kenyatta between Neto, Savimbi, and Roberto, on July 9, heavy fighting began in Luanda, and
quickly spread throughout the countryside.471 The Battle of Luanda had begun; in less than a
week, the MPLA had ejected the FNLA from the capital. Johnny Eduardo Pinnock, the FNLA’s
top man in the transitional government, resigned.472 The ephemeral transitional government
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dissolved.473 With the fall of the government, Savimbi withdrew UNITA from Luanda. He
assembled the core of his forces into a column of 180 trucks to return to Nova Lisboa (Huambo).
MPLA forces massacred the UNITA column in an elaborate ambush at Dondo. Savimbi was
determined to avoid a civil war, but he finally relented after yet another MPLA ambush at the
end of July.474
The same month that parties in Angola escalated their skirmishes into a full-blown civil
war, South Africa, the United States, and Cuba also decided to intervene.475 These decisions
occurred in parallel, independent from each other.476 The FNLA and UNITA consolidated their
gains in their traditional territories. Soviet aid continued to reach MPLA forces in Luanda
throughout the summer. The one-time guerrilla war had evolved into a conventional war for
territory between organized, externally funded armies.
The MPLA likewise consolidated control of their ethnic base and key points throughout
the country. The Portuguese government, constantly in flux between conservatives and leftists
after the coup, was keen to avoid further involvement in the war. The young officers of the MFA,
who espoused socialist political theory, began to allow Soviet supply ships to unload directly in
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Luanda harbor.477 With the FNLA ejected from the capital, the MPLA went on the offensive.
They secured the railroad through the Mbundu heartland to its terminus in Malange. From there,
Neto’s forces moved beyond their stronghold in Luanda’s hinterland and pushed to the eastern
city of Henrique de Carvalho, the site of the second largest Portuguese airbase in Angola.478 The
airbase, combined with their control of the capital and the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, enabled
the MPLA to control every strategic site in country except for the Benguela railway and its port,
Lobito.
With the FNLA and UNITA dislodged from the capital, Daniel Chipenda convinced
Roberto and Savimbi to join forces and accept aid from South Africa. Chipenda had already met
with the South Africans in April to discuss an alliance between Savimbi, already backed by
Pretoria, and Roberto.479 At a meeting in Kinshasa between Roberto, Savimbi, Chipenda, and
Mobutu, the Angolans promised cooperation with South Africa against SWAPO and the ANC in
exchange for $14 million in weapons.480 The South Africans suggested that the FNLA and
UNITA fight in a “more conventional way.”481 South Africa had provided the incentive and the
direction for the grand alliance between the three factions. With the MPLA alone in its control of
Luanda, the new FNLA-UNITA alliance knew its goal was to capture the capital.
Back in Washington from Helsinki, Kissinger felt prepared to take on the peaceniks in
the State Department. On July 14, 1975, nearly fifteen months after the Portuguese Revolution,
the 40 Committee seriously considered an armed intervention.482 Nathaniel Davis,

477

George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 61.
Marcum, Angolan Revolution - Vol. 2, 261.
479
George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 62–63.
480
Ibid.
481
Miller, “Yes, Minister,” 16–17.
482
“Memorandum for the Record - Document 115,” July 14, 1975, 115, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969-1976, Southern Africa, Volume XXVI.
478

146

Undersecretary for Africa, was not present. Colby reported on the MPLA’s complete control of
the capital, and that he anticipated the Zairian response to that setback, along with American
covert funds, “would have (an) immediate impact” on the situation. An arms package would take
“weeks to months” to reach the front lines, but arms given by Mobutu could reach Roberto’s
troops in sooner.483 American arms would travel by sea to Zairian ports on the Angola side of the
Congo River, supplemented by up to “69 C-141 flights.”484 Colby made it clear that his agency
believed any action needed to happen as quickly as possible if there was any chance to retake
Luanda.
The massive, sudden program envisioned by Colby and Kissinger was much larger than
even the hawks in the State Department could handle. Undersecretary of State Sisco and Director
of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research William Hyland made an impassioned plea to their
boss against such an intervention. Sisco thought that Angola was “simply not important
enough…to warrant covert action.”485 Kissinger asked him directly if he was “willing to let
(Angola) go Communist”; he promptly responded in the affirmative. Sisco, uncomfortable with
the prospect of a secret war, suggested an alternative option; move forward with a long-awaited
military aid package to Mobutu to show the American commitment to the region. Hyland took
another approach; he argued that Roberto was “weak,” and had already squandered “every
opportunity but has lost ground.” He thought that America’s advantage was that the U.S. had yet
to enter the war, which might allow it to pose as an honest broker. Further, Hyland argued that a
winning policy in Angola required “massive intervention,” which America, in the wake of
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Vietnam, lacked the heart to accomplish.486 On that, his final point, he proved doubly correct.
Sisco ultimately voted against intervention, arguing that no vital interests were at stake, that the
risks remained too high, and that the proposed program would lead to stalemate at best.487
Kissinger and the military establishment dismissed the last ditch attempt by the State
Department to scuttle the covert operation. America’s chief diplomat commented that Roberto
was weak “because we’ve not supported him.” The State Department’s protestations were
merely statements of fact, not policy prescriptions, he complained. Kissinger scoffed at Hyland’s
suggestion that the $300,000 disbursed in January represented a meaningful involvement, even in
the face of the millions spent in the intervening period by the MPLA’s allies. Deputy Secretary
of Defense William Clements backed up the Secretary of State. He argued that Mobutu was our
ally, and “by God we should help him” in Angola. America needed to work “as quickly as
possible.” Colby agreed, but moved the discussion away from arms towards direct cash
payments. He was “scared of the Congress” on the issue, of weapons, which cash would avoid.
His concern sprung in part from the fact that the CIA Director would have to brief six
congressional committees about covert expenditures.488 However, Colby was adamant that the
United States needed to stand by Mobutu and respond to the crisis. Moreover, the DCI noted that
beyond the Cold War implications of the crisis, “the big issue is the black/white one.”
Ultimately, Kissinger argued that American credibility was at stake, especially “coming on top
of Vietnam and Indochina;” he quipped: “if the USSR can do something in a place so far away,
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what is the U.S. going to do?”489 The Secretary wanted to prove to America’s allies, including
Mobutu, that despite the fall of Saigon, the United States was prepared to confront the Soviets
anywhere. The Committee decided to send Vance to Kinshasa yet again, and to wait for a
response from Mobutu before moving forward.
President Ford did not want to wait for another round of talks with Mobutu. On July 18,
he told Kissinger “I have decided on Angola…I think we should go.” Both Kissinger and Ford
realized that “unless we can seize it (Luanda) back, it is pretty hopeless.”490 Ford approved $6
million for both UNITA and the FNLA, and the president did not preclude more funds in the
future.491 Nathaniel Davis submitted his resignation immediately. Without a point man for
Africa, nor an ambassador to Kinshasa, Kissinger once again sent Vance to inform Mobutu of
Washington’s plans and to deliver the first million dollars of the CIA’s money to Roberto and
Savimbi.492
Over several dinners and breakfasts, Vance and Mobutu refined the plan they had
concocted in June. Vance landed in Kinshasa and Mobutu scheduled their first meeting for the
following morning. However, he proved too excited to wait, and Mobutu called his dear friend
back to invite him over for dinner to determine the fate of Angola. During dinner with Mobutu,
Vance met again with Roberto. Holden had finally entered Angola, and he personally reported to
Mobutu and Vance on the military situation in country. Mobutu had limited his aid to Roberto to
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some old small Belgian armored cars, anti-tank weapons, towed artillery, and heavy mortars to
launch an offensive against the MPLA. Mobutu lamented that despite the weapons, the offensive
had stuttered. His “rueful comment” to Vance was that “Holden is not a military leader.”493
Nevertheless, Roberto’s men carried the heaviest load of the fighting, and therefore needed the
majority of American weapons and funds. Even if Mobutu was ready to pick Savimbi over
Roberto for president, he was not ready to abandon his close friend. Mobutu “did not consider
Savimbi as important militarily.” The fastest way to change the position on the ground was to
give Zaire modern American equipment, so that Mobutu could pass on his old, outdated arms to
Roberto.494 Over dinner with Mobutu’s whole family present, the two men filled out an order for
$6 million in materiel, and a wish list for an even larger program to “have a real impact on the
Angolan situation.”495
Upon Vance’s return to Washington, Kissinger decided to adopt Mobutu’s plan as
America’s covert program. He directed Colby to immediately deliver the goods requested by
Mobutu.496 Shortly thereafter, the 40 Committee and Ford approved another $8 million for the
program, dubbed operation IAFEATURE.497 Amidst the flurry of cables Vance sent from
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Kinshasa to Washington, the 40 Committee overlooked a warning note that Roberto’s men had
encountered Cubans near Caxito, on the road to Luanda.498
The Cubans the FNLA fought in July were the beginning of a massive mission to train,
equip, and defend the MPLA. In July, Fidel Castro approved the expenditure of $100,000 to help
the MPLA free-up weapons stored in Tanzania.499 Just a few weeks later, on August 8, Cuba
decided on a plan to send 480 troops to build and man four training centers where some 5,300
Angolans would receive training over the next three to six months. Furthermore, Castro was
prepared to provide those MPLA soldiers enough guns, ammunition, food, clothing, camping
gear, toiletries, medicine, cots, and bedclothes for the next six months.500 The Cubans envisioned
four training centers, one each in Cabinda, Salazar (N’Dalatando), Benguela, and Henrique de
Carvalho (Saurimo).501 Fidel Castro himself chose the disposition of the camps and his advisors,
keenly aware of the need to protect the strategic gains of the MPLA: the oil fields, the main
airfields, and the southern approaches to the capital.502 To the north, the MPLA dug in at
Quifangondo, in the small hills that overlooked the main road from Caxito to Luanda that ran
through the wide swampland at the mouth of the Bengo River.503 Fighting continued between
those National Front and Popular Movement bases until independence.
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JOHN STOCKWELL AND IAFEATURE
On July 30, the CIA brought John Stockwell to Washington to lead operation
IAFEATURE. Stockwell had been in the CIA over ten years, and had only returned from
Vietnam on April 23, a week before Saigon fell.504 He was precisely the ‘Devlin-like’ character
Kissinger wanted to run the program. Raised by Presbyterian missionaries in the Kasai province
of Zaire, Stockwell had joined the CIA in 1964 after a tour of duty as a marine in a parachute
reconnaissance company.505 Stockwell had been to Luanda in 1961 as a marine, and in 1967, the
CIA sent him to eastern Zaire during the mercenary rebellion. In 1969, Stockwell visited an
FNLA camp along the Angolan border and left unimpressed.506 In 1972, after service in Burundi
and as chief of the Kenya-Uganda section, he went to Vietnam to take charge of the Tay Ninh
province upcountry.507 Stockwell had a resume few could match, and given his experience in
central Africa, he seemed the perfect man to lead the secret war in Angola.
IAFEATURE was rife with contradictions. The main CIA mission was to transport
weapons and materiel from warehouses in the United States to Zaire, a simple enough task. The
arms shipments were to be concealed by regular U.S. Air Force military flights, which routinely
delivered supplies to Kinshasa for the U.S. military mission there, as well as for the Zairian
army.508 However, once delivered, someone needed to know how to use them, and to actually go
into Angola to engage and defeat the MPLA. The operation relied on Roberto, with advice from
Mobutu, to execute the overall military strategy. The slow march to Caxito and the approaches to
Luanda had already proved Roberto a rather poor general.
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Colby “had advised the National Security Council the CIA would have to spend $100
million” to win, which was not possible because it would require direct funding from Congress.
The CIA interpreted its job in IAFEATURE to mean that the agency was to do its best to put
Roberto in a stalemate with Neto, not defeat him. Stockwell called this the “no win” strategy.509
Colby and James Potts, head of the Africa section for the CIA, rejected departmental plans to use
a secret air force like the one used by Devlin and Mobutu in the 1960s, and another to use
Portuguese commandos to take over the colonial government. Instead, the only approved action
in early August was to ship pre-packaged weapons in country. The CIA eventually shipped more
weapons than the FNLA and UNITA had soldiers; the agency sent 28,800 World War II era
carbines alone for an estimated 10,000 Angolan combatants.510 IAFEATURE quickly blew
through its funds. On August 20, the 40 Committee approved another $10.7 million.511
Stockwell and the agency wanted to do more, but the vague and indecisive orders from
the President and his staff made it difficult. To get a better idea of what was possible given the
time, financial, and operational constraints of the mission, Stockwell went to Zaire and Angola in
August to assess the situation first hand. He found Roberto to be a poor leader and an even worse
military commander. Nevertheless, after a tour of the fighting in northern Angola, just 32
kilometers from Luanda, Stockwell expressed the view that “abundant, immediate support”
could provide “a total victory.” (original emphasis)512 Despite this positive report, Kissinger
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remained committed to the idea that the United States did not “need a total victory,” but rather,
for the fighting to be competitive enough for diplomacy to win the war.513
Washington continued a slow escalation. Into September, the 40 Committee kept
debating whether to send advisers to Zaire, which parts of Angola were of strategic importance,
and where to find non-American commanders to fight in Angola alongside Roberto and
Savimbi.514 Eventually Stockwell expanded the number of CIA officers in the field to 83, and
distributed them among the Kinshasa, Luanda, Lusaka, and Pretoria stations.515 Even though the
40 Committee strictly prohibited it, Stockwell sent CIA paramilitary experts into Angola.
Training operations extended into Angola, and CIA communications teams in the field relayed
updates to Washington. The CIA even hired French mercenaries to fight with UNITA and the
FNLA.516 IAFEATURE became larger than the 40 Committee had anticipated, but the
fundamentals of the operation remained insufficient to win. The American team coordinated with
the South Africans, who had intervened separately in Angola in an operation codenamed
‘Savannah.’ “Thus, without any memos being written at CIA headquarters saying, “Let’s
coordinate with the South Africans,” Stockwell recalled, “coordination was effected at all CIA
levels and the South Africans escalated their involvement in step” with the CIA.517

QUIFANGONDO
The MPLA, “having effectively secured control of Luanda and its environs, began an
offensive into the south.” South Africa feared that MPLA influence along the border of Namibia
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would encourage SWAPO infiltration. To prevent such a negative outcome, the SADF took
control of the Ruacana hydroelectric plant and the Calueque Dam along the border. Jamie Miller
has called this seizure “something of a Gulf of Tonkin incident” for South Africa. It came to
justify the invasion that followed.518
To counter the MPLA offensive, the SADF decided to train Daniel Chipenda’s forces in
the south. On August 29, General Jan Breytenbach began training Chipenda’s former MPLA
troops at Mpupa, near the Namibian border.519 Breytenbach claimed that Chipenda’s troops
decided, on their own volition, to put him in operational command of the FNLA’s southern
wing.520 After a meeting between the SADF, Roberto, and Savimbi, South Africa agreed to
deploy a conventional invasion force.521 The first fighting by the South African Defense Force
(SADF) and the MPLA occurred on October 5. By October 14, Prime Minister B.J. Voerster had
authorized an invasion of “no more than 2,500 troops and 600 vehicles.”522 South Africa divided
the force into two initial components, battle group Foxbat, composed of UNITA and South
African armored cars, and battle group Zulu, a force of South Africans and Chipenda’s
Angolans.523 Zulu easily moved through southern Angola to Serpa Pinto and Cuchi, Daniel
Chipenda’s hometown.524 Zulu and Foxbat were to capture the Ovimbundu heartland before
independence, to include complete control of the Benguela railroad.
The scope and speed of the South African invasion drastically changed the balance of
power in the south. P.W. Botha, the South African Minister of Defense, hoped to control the
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countryside before independence, and to launch a final attack on Luanda shortly thereafter.525
After taking the important railhead and port at the twin cities of Benguela and Lobito, the
advance stalled for four days while the South Africa decided whether or not to expand the
operation beyond its original objectives.526 After the lull, the advance continued up the coast
toward the bridges across the Quanza River that commanded the roads to Luanda.527 The rapid
SADF advance in the south met little resistance and it seemed the MPLA would be unable to
stop the onslaught.
With the MPLA on its heels, Fidel Castro took decisive action. Worried for the safety of
the Cuban trainers in country, the Cuban leader unilaterally approved a massive increase in
support for the MPLA. Codenamed Operation Carlota, the Cuban mission committed to
defending the MPLA at all costs. On November 4, Castro ordered “a 652-man battalion of the
elite Special Forces of the Interior” to Angola to put up an immediate defense of Luanda.528 This
force included the absolute elite of the Cuban military, including many soldiers with doctorates
in technical and military sciences.529 The MPLA dislodged the Portuguese from Luanda’s airport
shortly before the arrival of the Cubans, allowing the direct delivery of arms and reinforcements
into Angola. Cuba’s troops flew in old Bristol Brittania aircraft on the forty-eight hour trip with
stops in Barbados, Bissau, and Brazzaville.530 Along with the Special Forces, Castro sent
artillerymen to assemble and operate advanced Soviet BM-21 multiple rocket launchers
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deployed along the MPLA defensive position at Quifangondo in the north.531 Castro dispatched
232 Cubans to Cabinda, along with one fully trained MPLA infantry battalion.532 To the south,
the Cubans sent MPLA forces to key choke points along river crossings in an attempt to delay
the South African advance.
On November 10, the eve of independence, Holden Roberto launched an assault on the
Cuban-MPLA defenses in an effort to capture Luanda. Roberto knew that if he took the city in
time for independence celebrations, he would become the first president of an independent
Angola. The last remaining Portuguese troops left the capital earlier that morning, clearing the
way for the winner of the climactic battle to become the first Angolan in 400 years to rule in
Luanda.
Roberto’s army was the culmination of Stockwell’s work with IAFEATURE. His column
of troops included the FNLA army, two Zairian armored car battalions, four South African
artillery crews, and a hundred Portuguese-Angolan commandos. 533 The Zairian troops were
Mobutu’s best, the elite Seventh and Fourth Commando battalions that had trained with the
Israelis in the 1960s.534 To soften the Cuban-MPLA positions, South Africa brought three
Canberra bombers in theater for a bombing run.535 At the same time, Savimbi flew to South
Africa to coordinate the war in the South.536 Roberto was confident in victory. In Langley,
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Virginia, Stockwell and the Angola Task Force threw a party to celebrate Angolan Independence
Day.537
Roberto later called November 10, 1975, “the worst day in my life.”538 The combined
CIA-FNLA army advanced within sight of the capital and into the range of Soviet-supplied,
Cuban rockets. Stockwell wrote that the communist ‘Stalin Organs’ rained down on Roberto’s
army, “not like single claps of thunder, but in salvos, twenty at a time.”539 Holden watched
rockets pummel his troops, and he later lamented, that “he wished the ground had opened up and
swallowed him.”540 The bombardment routed the FNLA, which began a hasty, chaotic retreat
back to the Zairian border.
Meanwhile, Mobutu invaded Cabinda in an attempt to pry Angola’s oil reserves from the
MPLA. With the help of Cuban troops, the MPLA drove the Zairians out of Cabinda. The attack
was a total failure.541 This victory ensured MPLA control of Angola’s greatest resource and with
it the means to fund and operate the central government.
After Neto achieved victory in the north, he declared the birth of the People’s Republic of
Angola. Shortly thereafter, the USSR, Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Mozambique, Mali, GuineaBissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Romania, and Brazil recognized the
MPLA government.542 Kissinger, America’s top diplomat, had done relatively little to prepare
the international community. Due to the covert nature of IAFEATURE, the only real diplomatic
push from Washington came in the form of a telegram to all posts that described the MPLA as a
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communist entity, declaring that the United States wanted “a peaceful, negotiated solution” to
the situation.543 No state recognized the FNLA/UNITA government.544
Russia directly sent aid to Luanda following independence. In early January 1976, the
Soviets cleaned up the logistics of Operation Carlota, and formalized relationship between Cuba,
the U.S.S.R., and the young People’s Republic of Angola. First, Russia replaced Cuban Air
Force planes with their own Il-62’s, which were modern jetliners. The increased range of the Il62’s allowed for trans-Atlantic flights directly to communist Guinea-Bissau before reaching
Luanda. Second, the Soviet Union promised to supply all future weaponry directly to Angola for
Agostinho Neto’s army.545 The Cuban-Soviet-Angolan forces went on the offensive against
Roberto’s men in the north, with plans to do the same in the south.
Washington faced a major dilemma. Operations thus far had used most of the available
money: provision of further funds required an act of Congress. The unexpected Cuban airlift
swung the tide of battle in the north, and it was reasonable to expect that Castro’s next move was
to wheel his forces south to meet the SADF. Colby argued that an American initiative was
needed to rally the broken-FNLA, introduce air power to the northern front, and bring in more
foreign troops to fight the professional Cuban army. Furthermore, Colby reported that success
hinged on continued South African involvement, which everyone acknowledged was “political
dynamite.”546
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Kissinger remained in total denial that the war was hopeless. Despite the fact that the
stated goal of IAFEATURE was to achieve a stalemate to encourage a diplomatic settlement,
Kissinger called “diplomacy no alternative” to covert action. He derided the failings of the
program as “the sign of amateurs at work.”547
In mid-November, Henry Kissinger drafted his own plan to vastly escalate the war and
force a negotiated settlement.548 His new plan centered on convincing France in the short term to
become the main financier and arms dealer for Mobutu, Roberto, and Savimbi. With the fighting
stabilized with French help, Kissinger would then assemble a military force comprised of
soldiers, tanks, and planes from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.549 Such a massive escalation
would take months to implement, could not guarantee victory, and would overcommit the United
States to a region that had thus far only been of symbolic importance.
Congress stepped in to end American involvement in the war before Kissinger got very
far in the planning stages. By December, the press had blown the cover on IAFEATURE and
Savannah. For the first post-Watergate Congress, the parallels between Angola and Vietnam
were clear. Senator John Tunney of California called Angola “the greatest foreign policy debate
in the American Congress since the end of the Vietnam War.”550 Senator Ted Kennedy called the
war in Angola “secretive, insular policy-making” that “is not only antithetical to good decisionmaking within an open society such as ours, but has led us into disasters of major proportion in
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the very recent past.”551 Congress passed the Tunney Amendment in December of 1975, which
ended funding for IAFEATURE. The Clark Amendment passed in early 1976 permanently
banned future American covert action in Angola. The involvement of South Africa in
IAFEATURE seemed to most Americans as collusion with white supremacists, rather than as
support of black nationalists.
With the Americans out, Roberto defeated, the Cubans wheeling south, and the Soviets
bringing ever more sophisticated arms into Angola, the South Africans reconsidered their
commitment. After a skirmish with Cuban forces at a key river crossing, known as the Battle of
Bridge 14, the SADF saw little chance for victory. Jan Breytenbach, commander of South
African forces in the battle, exclaimed that “There was no way to cross the rivers” between the
SADF invasion force and Luanda.552 Dejected, the SADF began a lengthy withdrawal to
Namibia. In their wake, the SADF left behind arms for Savimbi and UNITA. The war was over;
the MPLA had won.

CONCLUSION
After a fourteen-year struggle for independence, Angola became a free nation under a
Marxist regime. A far cry from Henry Kissinger’s bold claim that “the whites are here to stay,”
the Portuguese fascist state collapsed under the weight of three colonial wars, a stagnated
economy, and nearly 50 years of autocratic rule. The Kissinger years, divided between the Nixon
and Ford administrations, was a period marked by neglect and disarray in America’s Africa
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policy. The decision to pick the white powers was the result of a major misread of the
undercurrents of African affairs, and failed to prepare for the crisis of Portuguese decolonization.
Choosing to double down on the whites of Africa had won little for the United States.
The anticipated fruits of NSSM 39 proved elusive; neither relations with Portugal nor security in
Africa improved. Negotiations over American use of the Azores, including during the Yom
Kippur War, had continued to demand constant attention from Washington during the Nixon
years. The policies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford up to 1975 angered and antagonized
American allies in Africa. Even after the Carnation Revolution, Kissinger refused to listen to
black African voices. It was only after a slow, drawn out, ineffective secret war in the summer of
1975 that Kissinger realized that to contain revolutionary nationalism in Africa, the United States
needed to lead in the dismantling of white rule. Kissinger’s 1976 visit to Africa, during which he
called for an end to Ian Smith’s regime in Rhodesia, was an easy victory for American policy
that was available since the day he came to office in 1969.
America was defeated. Holden Roberto, the Angolan revolutionary who had worked for
twenty years for independence, faded into obscurity. Jonas Savimbi, the once-promising GRAE
foreign minister and eventual founder of UNITA, withdrew into the bush to continue resistance
to the MPLA regime. Mobutu became more important than ever to Washington, a key ally with a
massive border next to a communist nation home to thousands of Cuban and Soviet military
personnel. Kissinger and Nixon ignored the Cold War in southern Africa in 1969. After 1975,
Africa was an undeniable front in the global Cold War.
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Conclusion
American relations with Angola and the white powers of southern Africa began during
and immediately after World War II. South Africa fought alongside the allies, most notably again
Rommel’s Afrika Corps in northern Africa. The Belgian Congo (Zaire) provided the nuclear
material for the first American atomic bombs. Portugal, itself a fascist power, provided raw
materials and most notably rights to an airbase in the Azores islands to the Allied war effort.
Those small volcanic islands became the crucial impediment to America’s Angola policy up to
1975, as the Pentagon viewed them as a prized strategic possession. Lajes Airfield on the island
of Terceira remains an integral part of the U.S. military, and the base has played key roles in
American military action in the Persian Gulf (1991), the Balkans (1993-1999), Afghanistan
(2001-present), Iraq (2003-present), and Libya (2011).553 Truman and Eisenhower supported the
New State regime of Antonio Salazar, despite its despotism, because of this strategic imperative,
including helping Portugal gain entry into NATO in 1949 and the United Nations in 1955.
The sweep of decolonization in Africa that began in the 1950s complicated American
interests in the region. The CIA responded to instability in the Belgian Congo by coopting local
elites into American policy. This included Holden Roberto, a prominent Angolan exile, and
Joseph Mobutu, a former colonial soldier, in the later 1950s. These two men came to lead the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the independent nation of Zaire,
respectively. Staunch American allies, Roberto and Mobutu stayed loyal to Washington despite
periods of intense neglect and flirtations by the United States to dump them in favor of other
regional allies. It was only because of the CIA, through personal links to Congolese and
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Angolans, which kept the region in the ‘free world’ up to 1975. At the same time, the National
Party in South Africa intensified its policy of Apartheid, or legal separation, between whites and
blacks. Washington, a newcomer to African affairs, increasingly felt pressure to choose between
the black rebels and the white extremists. The mood of 1960, ‘the year of Africa,’ portended two
possible futures for the continent: the tide of independence triumphant, or the cruel hand of white
domination.
The United States engaged in African affairs during this early decolonization period due
to America’s own race problems and the desire to present an alternative to communism for
Africa’s newest countries. Under Kennedy and Johnson, the United States became deeply
involved in the Angolan revolution, and invested in the stability of the former Belgian Congo.
These presidents struggled to overcome America’s ties to the white regimes, and experimented
with armed insurrection against them. In the Congo, a decade of intervention succeeded in
keeping out communist infiltration. In Angola, neither Washington nor Holden Roberto made
serious gains toward achieving Angolan independence.
The policy of covert aid to black nationalists yielded few results. Business and security
concerns moderated the most radical proposals of the period, including the South African arms
embargo under Kennedy and the decision whether or not to arm Roberto against Portugal. At
times, aid to the Congo and to Roberto were at odds, as when Moïse Tshombe came to power in
Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and prevented a substantial American covert program to aid the FNLA.
Roberto’s FNLA soldiered on without American support, and by the end of the 1960s his most
skilled advisors had left to form their own movement, UNITA. U.S. policy failed to bring a black
revolutionary government to power in Angola but its efforts strained U.S.-Portuguese relations to
the point that jeopardized American access to the strategically important Azores airbase.
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Although the policy stood on a firm moral ground and its aspirations were in line with those of
Africans, straddling the fence between the reactionary whites and the forces of Black
Nationalism was a tedious job that failed to bring about a breakthrough in southern Africa.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger abandoned their predecessors’ policies in the hope
that ignoring black Africa would improve business and strategic relations with the white powers.
Known as the ‘tar-baby option,’ the foundation of this strategy was the belief that the Cold War
was dormant in Africa, and that the white-ruled governments would maintain total domination
through the mid 1970s. Despite their best wishes, Nixon and Kissinger gained very little from
South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal for their friendship. None of the white powers presented
less to Nixon and Kissinger than Portugal, which remained an annoyance for Washington. Even
after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the Azores base proved crucial for American aid to Israel,
Portugal remained a fickle, troublesome ally.
The Carnation Revolution in Lisbon took Washington by complete surprise, and it took
nearly a year for Henry Kissinger to formulate a response to the crisis of Portuguese
decolonization.554 Events in southern Africa did not wait for an American response; in the
absence of American leadership, the Angolan revolutionaries, South Africa, Cuba, and the Soviet
Union plotted the future of Angola. Although Kissinger claimed in July 1975 that the delay in
American action was not because of him, but rather, that he had “tried to get something going six
weeks” prior.555 Unfortunately, by that point it was already too late.
A major consequence was America’s absence in the political and diplomatic deals in
1974 that determined the parameters of the Angolan crisis. With his attention on revolutionary
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Lisbon and Southeast Asia, Kissinger allowed the Portuguese to draft the Alvor Accord, which
did little to ensure a peaceful transition to independence in Angola but provided the quickest
Portuguese withdrawal. By waiting and ignoring the African implication of the revolution in
Portugal, the United States gave up an opportunity to influence the composition of the Angolan
transitional government, to preempt South African meddling in the crisis, and to ensure a
friendly government in Luanda. By the time Washington gave $300,000 to Holden Roberto in
January 1975, the Alvor Accord had already locked in a defunct transitional government and
American-allied Angolans had already taken South African weapons and cash. Despite a covert
American military intervention, codenamed IAFEATURE, the United States and its regional
allies were unable to overcome the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their Angolan allies in the opening
salvo of the Angolan Civil War.
The defeat of the United States in Angola at the hands of a Cuban-Soviet alliance and the
formation of an American-Apartheid alliance were not preordained. America’s loss was the
result of longstanding weakness in American regional policy and specific decisions made by
Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Gerald Ford in the critical months following the Carnation
Revolution in Portugal. In direct contrast to Washington’s handling of the Portuguese
withdrawal, Havana and Moscow took decisive action during the same period. Whereas the
Russians and Cubans immediately began addressing the crisis in April 1974, the Americans only
slowly came to grips with the severity of the situation and the significance of the outcome.
American policy makers struggled to understand the historic connections between Washington
and Angola, Holden Roberto and the CIA, Zaire and Angola, and the role of the other white
powers in regional affairs.
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The civil war in Angola outlived the failure of IAFEATURE and the Cold War itself.
Unlike the chilling effect brought about elsewhere by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the
Cold War and the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops did not bring peace. Jonas
Savimbi, strengthened by years of support from South Africa, Mobutu, and Ronald Reagan,
fought on until his death in 2002.556 Neto had already been long gone, taken by cancer in 1979;
his replacement, the implacable Jose Eduardo dos Santos, remains in power to this day. Holden
Roberto, not to remain completely out of politics, ran for president in 1992 and won a measly 2.1
percent of the vote.557
Since the beginning of Holden Roberto’s crusade to expel Portugal from Angola, the
United States was a principal supporter for both sides of the conflict. This bizarre arrangement
was due to Angola’s divided nationalists and their competing visions of an independent nation,
and an autocratic regime in Lisbon that loathed American political ideals yet depended on aid
from Washington. Roberto, a man who proved to be a weak leader and a poor client, was
America’s policy for maintaining control of Angola after the anticipated fall of the Portuguese
empire. It was not a war that began in 1975 as part of a post-Vietnam, “search for enemies” to
recover from the embarrassment of the fall of Saigon.558 Rather, it was a conflict whose root was
the essence of the Cold War in Africa, a competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union to control the mantle of racial equality in the third world. In 1955, the CIA station staff in
Leopoldville felt this way when they hired Holden Roberto, as did Kennedy and Johnson when
their administrations supported Holden’s war efforts. Henry Kissinger, at the helm of American
policy after Watergate, begrudgingly embraced the Angolan revolution when the fall of the
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Portuguese empire made it the epicenter of the Cold War. With the passing of both Portuguese
rule and Roberto’s bid for power, America’s war in Angola ended in vain.
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